The New Yorker Gives Us the Heads Up

4 Comments

1. 

   Bearpaw on August 4, 2005 at 11:42 am

   “It seems likely that the Administration will begin to withdraw American forces from Iraq early next year, well ahead of the midterm elections in November — regardless of the realities.”

   Uh-huh, “… will begin to withdraw American forces …”.  Bet on it.  There will be an appearance of withdrawl, and maybe some will happen, and there will be vague promises of more.  The trick for the Bush League will be how to do it (1) if, as is likely, violence continues and (b) in such a way as they can pretend that we’ve won.

   Look for phrases similar to: “We have full confidence in the Iraqi security forces to respond to these challenges on their own” or at least, “Iraqi security forces are taking the lead in responding to the abhorrent actions of these last hold-outs; they know they can call upon our help if they need it.”

2. 

   Knoxville Progressive on August 4, 2005 at 1:23 pm

   It’s always interesting to compare events and decisions in this administration with the Nixon administration, so your diary prodded me to google “Vietnamization.”  It turns out the process started earlier than I had remembered, in 1969. (OK, I was all of 10 then, so cut me a break.)  I found a good upper-level high-school history class summary here, excerpted below:

   In the spring of 1969 President Richard M. Nixon initiated his new policy of “Vietnamization.” Vietnamization had two distinct elements: first, the unilateral withdrawl of American troops from South Vietnam; and, second, the assumption of greater military responsibilities by the South Vietnamese armed forces to make up for that loss. Military planners had based previous withdrawl plans on reductions in enemy forces. Vietnamization rested on the twin assumptions that the combatants would not reach any kind of political settlement, or understanding, and that the fighting in the South would continue without any voluntary reduction in enemy force levels. Although in theory the subsequent withdrawl of American troops depended on improvements in South Vietnamese military capabilities and the level of combat activity, in practice the timing and size of the withdrawals were highly political decisions made in the United States…

   Well, that sounds familiar.  If this plays out along similar lines, here are some things to watch for:

   Senior advisers in Vietnam … all saw a pressing need for more air, artillery, and logistical support, and more attention to training and retaining troops. Most recommended more promotions based on merit, and more stationing of troops near home to reduce desertions. Phasing the American troops out of Vietnam could take no less than five years was often mentioned. The four senior advisers were hopeful that the South Vietnamese could eventually deal with the insurgency by themselves, but none felt that they could handle a conventional North Vietnamese threat or a combined Viet Cong – North Vietnam opponent.

   But the Nixon administration had no intention of giving the South Vietnamese five years to get their act together:

   Troop withdrawls were to begin July 1, 1969, with alternative completion dates of December 1970, June 1971, and December 1972. Kissinger requested an initial overall report outline by June 1. Thus, despite the divergent U.S. agencies involved in the war effort and despite the unanimous opinion of these same agencies that the South Vietnamese could never deal with a combined Viet Cong – North Vietnamese Army threat, the new administration had instructed the American military command to develop plans for turning over almost the entire ground war to the South Vietnamese. Towards the end of 1969, the first American troops left Vietnam, never to return.

   This continued about three years:

   By the end of [1972], 66 percent of the U.S. military forces would have left Vietnam, while the total advisory effort would have only declined 22 percent.

   What did we do to keep a fig leaf on the situation?  We threw supplies at the South Vietnamese, so that if they failed it wouldn’t be because we didn’t leave them prepared:

   …a succession of material supply projects that enabled the South Vietnamese to complete existing modernization programs; to make up for heavy combat losses; to create new units, and to fill their depots with munitions, fuel, spare parts, and other supplies. The eventual result was a massive sea and airlift between October 23 and December 12, 1972 that brought over 105,000 major items of equipment to South Vietnam, about 5,000 tons by air and the rest by sea.

   Of course, this process did not do anything to create a viable government in South Vietnam that would have the trust of the people; this eventually led to the fall of South Vietnam.

   A cease-fire was agreed to in January 1973 which lasted most of the year; the US was to time the withdrawl of all combat forces to coincide with the release of US soldiers held as prisoners of war.

   By the end of 1973 the offensive was underway that would lead to the collapse of the government in the South by 1975:

   …This continued through 1975, when the enemy came to be in near Saigon, and elements of the underground political opposition came into the open and held meetings to voice their antigovernment feelings. The government moved in and on March 27 1975, arrested a number of people suspected of plotting a coup. On April 2 1975, the South Vietnamese Senate even adopted a resolution holding President Thieu personally responsible for the deteriorating situation and asking him to take immediate steps to form a broader cabinet.

   …Demands that President Thieu should resign and transfer his powers at once to General Duong Van Minh were resurrected in earnest. A coalition government led by General Minh, it was said, stood a better chance of being accepted by the Communists; if so, more bloodshed could be averted. On Monday April 21, during a meeting at Independence Palace, President Thieu announced his decision to step down. He inferred that the United States wanted him to resign, and whether or not he consented, certain generals would press for a replacement.

   …After [Vice-]President Huong took over, he immediately went about imposing certain forceful measures, among which was a formal ban on all overseas travel. Servicemen and civil servants who had fled to foreign countries were ordered to return within thirty days; if they failed to do so, their citizenship would be revoked, and all their belongings confiscated. The only people that the new government would allow to go overseas were the old and the ill; they were to be permitted to seek treatment out of the country after posting a large bond (to say nothing of the large bribes required to obtain such a pass).

   In the meantime, the military situation became increasingly bad…April 27 1975, …the General Assembly voted to hand over the presidency to General Minh. The next day, Monday April 28, 1975 at 5:30 pm, General Minh was sworn in as president.

   …he firmly believed that a government with him at the head would be more acceptable to the Communists, and that they would be willing to negotiate with him for a political solution. President Minh waited in vain for a favorable word from the other side, but none came. The response of the Communists was ominous: they bombed Tan Son Nhut Air base the moment he was sworn in, and shelled Saigon barely twelve hours later. Still a last ditch effort was attempted by President Minh’s people to contact the Communists through their representative at Tan Son Nhut. But the answer was evasive and intimidating. It was then that President Minh realized that all hope was gone. He gave twenty – four hours for all U.S. personnel to leave South Vietnam.

   The evacuation proceeded ferverishly throughout the night and was over at 5:00 am on April 30. At 10 :00 am on April 30,1975, President Minh ordered the armed forces to stop fighting, and gave in to all Communist demands…

   Do I expect Iraq to play out in just this way?  No –  because of the oil fields there, as well as the multiple ethnic and religious internal divisions in Iraqi society.  Still, there is value in looking to the past and seeing how long it takes for a dinosaur to collapse, so that when you encounter another one you know what to expect.

   So what’s my gut feeling on Iraq?  We’ll announce a withdrawl and maybe have 1/4 of the troops out by the 2006 election, so we can say it’s proceeding in an orderly manner (despite increasing attacks that our press will cover meagerly at best).  We’ll have all of our forces out – due to the deteriorating situation – by 2008, except for reserve units guarding the iol fields, which will be heavily armed and fortified, with supplies airlifted in as needed.  These may carry on like little West Berlins for some decades…

   Meanwhile, the rest of the country will descend into civil war and chaos by no later than 2010, despite multinational attempts involving the Saudis and Europeans to attempt to broker a peaceful resolution.

   Of course, if we win at least one house of Congress in 2006, we may be able to bring all our troops home (no “little West Berlins”), if the Democrats start acting like an opposition party on the war.

   Hopefully I’m wrong about the decent into chaos.  But I’ve seen this show once already in my lifetime…

3. 

   vida on August 4, 2005 at 1:43 pm

   And here I just assumed he needed them out of Iraq before he could send them into Iran, or Syria or…well…

   • 

     Cho on August 4, 2005 at 4:10 pm

     Actually… he will probably pull them out to….

     Kuwait!