Below the fold, I will try to explain the significance of Representative Curt Weldon’s recent allegations. But first, a visual representation of the 19 hijackers, and their roles will be helpful. Weldon alleges that four of the hijackers were identified as members of al-Qaeda by a secretive military intelligence unit called ‘Able Danger’, in the summer of 2000. These four hijackers were dubbed the ‘Brooklyn Cell’. The members of this alleged cell actually come from two different cells: the Hamburg, Germany cell, and the San Diego Cell.

For each flight, I have listed the alleged pilot first.

WTC- North Tower 8:46

Flight 11 Mohammed Atta- Egpytian (Brooklyn Cell, Hamburg Cell)
Flight 11 Waleed Alshehri- Saudi (muscle)
Flight 11 Wail Ashehri- Saudi (muscle)
Flight 11 Abdul Alomari- Saudi (operational)
Flight 11 Satam Al Suqami- Saudi (muscle)

WTC- South Tower 9:02

Flight 175 Marwan Alshehhi- United Arab Emirates (Brooklyn Cell, Hamburg Cell)
Flight 175 Fayez Banihammad- United Arab Emirates
Flight 175 Mohald al Shehri- Saudi (muscle)
Flight 175 Hamza al Ghamdi- Saudi (muscle)
Flight 175 Ahmed al Ghamdi- Saudi (muscle)

Pentagon- 9:37

Flight 77 Hani Hanjour- Saudi (San Diego Cell)
Flight 77 Khalid Almihdhar- Saudi (Brooklyn Cell, San Diego Cell)
Flight 77 Salem al Hazmi- Saudi (muscle)
Flight 77 Majed Moqed- Saudi (muscle)
Flight 77 Nawaf al Hamzi- Saudi (Brooklyn Cell, San Diego Cell)

Shanksville, Pa. 10:06 (variously reported)

Flight 93 Ziad Jarrah- Lebanese (Hamburg Cell)
Flight 93 Ahmed Alnami- Saudi (muscle)
Flight 93 Saeed Alghamdi- Saudi (muscle)
Flight 93 Ahmed Alhaznawi- Saudi (muscle)

The Hamburg cell was made up of three of the four pilots. All three of the pilots trained in Venice, Florida. They also trained in other places around Florida and Georgia. Ramzi bin al-Shibh was also a member of the Hamburg cell, but as a Yemeni he was repeatedly denied a visa to enter the United States. Al-Shibh was later captured in Pakistan.

The San Diego cell was made up three members. One was Hani Hanjour, the alleged pilot of Flight 77. The other two men were fugitives from justice on 9/11.

The Brooklyn Cell is alleged to have been made up of two members of the Hamburg Cell and two members of the San Diego cell. If true, this is incredibly significant. And I’ll explain why.

First, let’s look at how the U.S. Government first learned the identities of Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf al Hamzi:

In late 1999, the National Security Agency (NSA) analyzed communications associated with a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle East, indicating that several members of “an operational cadre” were planning to travel to Kuala Lumpur in early January 2000. Initially, only the first names of three were known-“Nawaf,” “Salem,” and “Khalid.” NSA analysts surmised correctly that Salem was Nawaf’s younger brother. Seeing links not only with al Qaeda but specifically with the 1998 embassy bombings, a CIA desk officer guessed that “something more nefarious [was] afoot.”41
9/11 Commission

All three of these men would later die when Flight 77 hit the Pentagon. But first, they would travel to Malaysia and be filmed at a meeting with other known terrorists. It is now believed that the meeting in Kuala Lumpur was for the purpose of planning the bombing of the USS Cole.

Al Hamzi and Almihdhar left Kuala Lumpur on a flight to Bangkok. The CIA station in Bangkok was informed of their movements, but they were too late arriving at the airport and lost their trail.

A couple of months later the CIA learned that the two men had left Bangkok on Janurary 15th, 2000, and flown to Los Angeles. Soon thereafter, they moved to San Diego and settled in.

Why is this so significant? Weldon claims that a military intelligence unit identified these two gentlemen as potential terrorists in a part of a cell with Mohammed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi (the Brooklyn Cell). The unit allegedly made this identification within two months of Atta and Alshehhi’s arrival in this country (in late May/early June 2000).

Now, we have to keep in mind three different government agencies: the CIA, a unit of military intelligence, and the FBI. These groups do not automatically share information. The CIA didn’t tell the FBI about Al Hamzi and Almihdhar’s presence in this country until August 24th, 2001. The ‘Able Danger’ group forwarded their information about Al Hamzi and Almihdhar (as well as Atta and Alshehhi) to the Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida, sometime before October, 2000. They recommended that the information be passed on to the FBI. Apparently, the Special Operations Command declined to do so.

If the Special Command had passed the information on to the FBI in September of 2000, the FBI would have discovered that Atta and Alshehhi were training at Huffman Aviation in July and August. They would have discovered that $69,985 was wired from the UAE into the their joint bank account on September 18th. They would have noticed them enrolling at Jones Aviation in Sarasota on the 24th. They might have taken an interest, when on December 24th, they stalled a Huffman airplane on Miami International runway and abandoned it.

But more importantly, the FBI would have quickly added Atta and Alshehhi to the TIPOFF list (if they hadn’t already) on August 24th, 2001, when the CIA finally told them that Alhamzi and Almidhar were in the country.

The administration and the FBI have been very insistent that we could not have stopped 9/11, even if we had caught Alhamzi and Almidhar, because we had no intelligence to link the San Diego cell to the Hamburg cell. The 9/11 Commission was less sure:

We believe that if more resources had been applied and a significantly different approach taken, Mihdhar and Hazmi might have been found. They had used their true names in the United States. Still, the investigators would have needed luck as well as skill to find them prior to September 11 even if such searches had begun as early as August 23, when the lead was first drafted.85

Many FBI witnesses have suggested that even if Mihdhar had been found, there was nothing the agents could have done except follow him onto the planes. We believe this is incorrect. Both Hazmi and Mihdhar could have been held for immigration violations or as material witnesses in the Cole bombing case. Investigation or interrogation of them, and investigation of their travel and financial activities, could have yielded evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11 plot. The simple fact of their detention could have derailed the plan. In any case, the opportunity did not arise.
9/11 Commission

Despite the 9/11 Commission’s reservations, the idea that the attacks could not have been prevented was successfully implanted in the public mind.

Here is an excerpt from Time Magazine piece from August 4th, 2002:

Could al-Qaeda’s plot have been foiled if the U.S. had taken the fight to the terrorists in January 2001? Perhaps not. The thrust of the winter plan was to attack al-Qaeda outside the U.S. Yet by the beginning of that year, Mohamed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi, two Arabs who had been leaders of a terrorist cell in Hamburg, Germany, were already living in Florida, honing their skills in flight schools. Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar had been doing the same in Southern California. The hijackers maintained tight security, generally avoided cell phones, rented apartments under false names and used cash-not wire transfers-wherever possible. If every plan to attack al-Qaeda had been executed, and every lead explored, Atta’s team might still never have been caught.

First of all, you can use Lexis to see several leases the hijackers signed. Some examples, below:

Flight 11

Name: ALSHEHRI, WALEED (MALE)

Social Security Number: 000-00-XXXX

Consumer Name Last Updated: 11/16/1999

Address:
3864 LONG GROVE LN
DAYTONA BEACH, FL 32119-8630
Address Type: SINGLE FAMILY
Address Created: 11/16/1999
Address Updated: 11/16/1999

On File Since: 11/16/1999

Date Vendor Record Last Updated: 11/16/1999

Name: ALSHEHRI, WALEED AHMED

Also Known As:
SHEHRI, WALEED A; AL, SHEHRI WALEED

Social Security Number: 595-43-XXXX

Address:
502 ORRIN STREET
VIENNA, VA 22180-4834
Address Updated: 2/1/1999

Previous Addresses:
1690 DUNN AVENUE APT. 307
DAYTONA BEACH, FL 32114-1474
Address Updated: 1/1/1995

Telephone: 238-6082

On File Since: 7/1/1994

Flight 175

Name: ALSHEHHI, MARWAN

Address: 4890 POMPANO ROAD
VENICE, FL 34293-7843
Address Updated: 8/1/2000
On File Since: 8/1/2000

FAA PILOTS DIRECTORY

Name: ALSHEHHI, MARWAN YOUSEF

Address:3389 SHERIDAN ST # 256

HOLLYWOOD, FL 33021-3606
Pilot Number: A4211367 FAA
Region: SOUTHERN
Certification Class: COMMERCIAL PILOT
Rating: AIRPLANE MULTIENGINE LAND COMMERCIAL PILOT
INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE COMMERCIAL PILOT
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND PRIVATE PILOT
Medical Class: THIRD CLASS
Medical Exam Date: 7/2000
Medical Expiration Date: 7/2003

Flight 175

Name: ALGHAMDI, AHMED (MALE)

Social Security Number: 427-81-XXXX
Consumer Name Last Updated: 11/3/2000

Address:9975 UNIVERSITY PKWY APT 84
PENSACOLA, FL 32514-5463
Address Type: HIGH-RISE/APARTMENT
Address Created: 8/30/2000
Address Updated: 8/30/2000

Previous Addresses: 209 S 29TH AVE APT 128
HATTIESBURG, MS 39401-7122
Address Type: HIGH-RISE/APARTMENT
Address Created: 11/3/2000
Address Updated: 11/3/2000

Home of 14th Flying Training Base, Columbus Air Force Base.

Birthdate: 1975

On File Since: 11/3/2000
Date Vendor Record Last Updated: 11/3/2000

Flight 93 FAA PILOTS DIRECTORY
Name: JARRAH, ZIAD

Address: 4641 BOUGAINVILLA DR
LAUD BY SEA, FL 33308-3616

Pilot Number: A4207695FAA

Region: SOUTHERN Certification
Class: PRIVATE PILOT
Rating: AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND
PRIVATE PILOT INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE PRIVATE PILOT
Medical Class: FIRST CLASS
Medical Exam Date: 7/2000
Medical Expiration Date: 1/2001

Flight 93

Name: ALGHAMDI, SAEED (MALE)Social Security Number: 000-00-XXXX

Consumer Name Last Updated: 3/6/1998

Address: 2730 FLIGHT SAFETY DR
VERO BEACH, FL 32960-7945
Address Type: HIGH-RISE/APARTMENT
Address Created: 3/6/1998
Address Updated: 3/6/1998

Flight 93 Name: ALGHAMDI, SAEED (MALE)

Social Security Number: 000-00-XXXX

Consumer Name Last Updated: 10/28/1997

Address: 4710 PRIETO DR APT 707
PENSACOLA, FL 32506-6657
Address Type: HIGH-RISE/APARTMENT
Address Created: 10/28/1997
Address Updated: 10/28/1997

Telephone: (561) 569-7365

On File Since: 3/6/1998

Date Vendor Record Last Updated: 3/6/1998

Flight 77

FAA PILOTS DIRECTORY

Name: AL HAZMI, SULAIMAN SALEMAddress: PO BX 167 TECHNICAL TRAINING DE
JEDDA, SAUDI ARABIA

Pilot Number: A0015099FAA

Region: EUROPEAN

Certification Class: MECHANIC
Rating: AIRFRAME MECHANIC
POWERPLANT MECHANIC

Update [2005-8-10 20:38:19 by BooMan]: I don’t have my source handy, but Fayez Banihammad from Flight 175 had a FAA Pilot Number: A0013056

Do yourself a favor, and don’t compare the dates of those leases with the 9/11 Commission’s timelines for the hijackers’ first entry into this country. It will turn you into a tin-foil hatter.

And don’t question the FAA certifications either, because they raise troubling questions about who the actual pilots were. Instead, let’s leave crazy stuff like that aside on focus on the government’s main story line.

The 9/11 Commission was operating on the premise that only three of the hijackers were known to be terrorists prior to 9/11. These three were Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhamzi, and Nawaf’s little brother, Salem al Hazmi. All three were identified as al-Qaeda operatives back in 1999. The commission noted that the plot might have been averted if they had been watchlisted. They might have been averted if two of them had been caught in August or early September. But they never contemplated that two of these hijackers had been linked to Mohammed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi by a military intelligence unit, a full year before the attacks.

If they had known that, they would have had to take an entirely different angle. The information that members of our intelligence community had pegged Atta and Alshehhi as bad guys was withheld from the full commission, even though the Pentagon seems to be insisting that they supplied the information to the investagotory staff. The staff is denying they received the information.

If the 9/11 Commission members had known about the suspicion surrounding Atta and Alshehhi they would have investigated what is was that aroused that suspicion. And who knows where that line of investigation might have led.

In summary: if Weldon’s information is correct is raises serious concerns. Was the fact that Atta was under suspicion covered up and, if so, why?

And, what different conclusions and recommendations would the Commission have come up with if they had been privy to this information?

Finally, for you tin-foilers, spoiling for some way to make sense of those FAA licenses (above), don’t forget this Newsweek article from 9/15/01:

NEWSWEEK

By George Wehrfritz, Catharine Skipp and John Barry

Sept. 15 — U.S. military sources have given the FBI information that suggests five of the alleged hijackers of the planes that were used in Tuesday’s terror attacks received training at secure U.S. military installations in the 1990s.

THREE OF THE alleged hijackers listed their address on drivers licenses and car registrations as the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Fla.—known as the “Cradle of U.S. Navy Aviation,” according to a high-ranking U.S. Navy source.

Another of the alleged hijackers may have been trained in strategy and tactics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Ala., said another high-ranking Pentagon official. The fifth man may have received language instruction at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Tex. Both were former Saudi Air Force pilots who had come to the United States, according to the Pentagon source.

But there are slight discrepancies between the military training records and the official FBI list of suspected hijackers—either in the spellings of their names or with their birthdates. One military source said it is possible that the hijackers may have stolen the identities of the foreign nationals who studied at the U.S. installations.

The five men were on a list of 19 people identified as hijackers by the FBI on Friday. The three foreign nationals training in Pensacola appear to be Saeed Alghamdi and Ahmad Alnami, who were among the four men who allegedly commandeered United Airlines Flight 93. That flight crashed into rural Pennsylvania. The third man who may have trained in Pensacola, Ahmed Alghamdi, allegedly helped highjack United Airlines Flight 75, which hit the south tower of the World Trade Center.
Read the whole article

If you can make this Newsweek jive with the 9/11 Commission’s report, you are a better person than me.