[promoted by BooMan. Should make for a valuable discussion]

Do Democrats have a ‘vision gap’ on foreign policy? Well, yes, they do. I just finished writing about this in a two-part series for The American Prospect. Where in part I I talk about the "vision gap," in part II, I attempt to close it, by offering a coherent vision and narrative for liberals. The basic jist is this: we must put democracy promotion at the center of a new progressive foreign policy vision. It’s not enough to criticize the Bushies. We need to offer an alternative that will inspire Americans. In any case, here’s part II of the article:

What might a progressive foreign policy look like — not just in theory but also in practice? In recent months, there have been numerous efforts to forge a workable alternative to the belligerency of neoconservatism and the amorality of neo-realism, including proposals from Michael Signer, Madeleine Albright, Robert Wright, and Peter Beinart. Several common themes come up repeatedly, themes that may very well animate a new progressive consensus on foreign policy. But despite their ambition, the contributions in question address only vaguely the inevitable moral and strategic dilemmas that would-be Democratic policy-makers will have to face.


Beinart’s book, for example, is an invigorating call to arms. But critical questions remain unanswered. Yes, we must promote democracy abroad. We must offer a new Marshall Plan for the Middle East. But the battle we fight today is different than the one we fought in the Cold War for a fundamental reason: If we now know who our enemy is — Islamic extremism or Islamic totalitarianism, depending on your preference — it is not clear that we know who our friends are, the allies who will stand beside us in this new struggle.

In the Bush era, practically no one in the Middle East supports U.S. foreign policy, however broadly construed. Even pro-American Arab liberals — an increasingly endangered minority — have largely given up on the United States. Moreover, mainstream Islamists, feeding off the burgeoning fury of the grass roots, grow ever more powerful and influential. If there were truly free and fair elections, Islamist parties would come to power in nearly every single Arab country. The central dilemma, then, is a familiar one: we seek democracy, but we fear what it might bring.

The “democratic dilemma” has become yet more confounding in recent years. The more that anti-American sentiment increases in light of ongoing crises in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, the more costly promoting democracy becomes. The Bush administration, for all its bluster, has not resolved these confused knots of American policy.

The administration’s many failures have demonstrated, quite convincingly, that the war on terrorism cannot be won through military strength alone or a faith-based belief in the righteousness of one’s cause. Our adversaries are emboldened. Iran and Hezbollah have come out of the most recent Israeli-Lebanese conflict stronger and more influential. In a sign of things to come, last week, after the U.N.-sponsored cease-fire took effect, Hamas proclaimed that it had found inspiration in Hezbollah’s example.

Because of the nature of the challenge before us, competence and intelligence — both of which Democrats have in abundance — will not suffice. Islamic extremism represents an existential challenge to the very moral foundations of our country, for the simple reason that large-scale terrorist attacks on the homeland will make it much more difficult — if not impossible — for us to stay free. As such, Democrats must make national security not just a top priority but the top priority. (There is a difference.) A progressive foreign policy would elevate democracy promotion as its primary component — not only because it is right, but because it is necessary. For a movement and a political party that continue to grope for “big ideas,” a focus on democracy would transform a set of seemingly unrelated policies into a cohesive vision that can inspire and reassure Americans. We do indeed have a story to tell, and it is this: America will close, finally, the long-standing gap between words and deeds; we will, today, wage a war on the twin perils of tyranny and terrorism; and we will not stop until we have won.

A few points should be made clear at the outset. The progressive approach to democracy promotion is distinguished by a fundamental realization that democracy cannot be imposed at gunpoint. The United States can, however, effectively pressure Arab governments to democratize by making economic and military aid conditional on a pre-established set of markers emphasizing freedom of expression, free elections, and the rights of opposition groups. In practice, this would mean telling Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah of Jordan, and others that if they do not get serious about political reform, the United States will get serious about slashing foreign aid. For governments that demonstrate a willingness to change, a comprehensive package of incentives will be offered. A successful democracy promotion policy consists of more than just a statement of intent. It requires a sustained commitment, clear objectives, and detailed policy prescriptions tailored for each country’s particular needs and challenges.

Democracy promotion should no longer be viewed as one policy instrument among many. Rather, a democracy-centric foreign policy will provide an integrated approach that will, in turn, clarify other important U.S. objectives:

  1. War on Terrorism. Terrorism does not occur in a vacuum. When people are unable to express their grievances through a legitimate, responsive political process, they are more likely to resort to political violence and terrorism. Islamic extremism feeds upon humiliation, or what Tom Friedman has called “the poverty of dignity.” Arabs can reclaim their dignity only through a democratic process that treats them as citizens with rights, rather than subjects whose sole obligation is to obey. Only with the promise of a democratic future can the Middle East break free of the economic, cultural, and political malaise that has, for decades, fueled the rise of religious extremism.
  2. Promoting Moderate Islam. Political reform leads to religious reform, not the other way around. Islamic thought and practice has been stifled by an undemocratic atmosphere in which Muslims are not exposed to the full diversity of opinions on issues of importance. Democracy, as Madeleine Albright argues in “A Realistic Idealism,” will “create a broader and more open political debate within Arab countries, exposing myths to scrutiny and extreme ideas to rebuttal.” In free societies, Arab liberals will finally be allowed to organize politically and communicate their ideas to a larger audience. Even so, illiberal Islamist parties will still likely come to power in free elections. This is a reality we must come to terms with. Working with these emerging governments, at least initially, will be frustrating. Anticipating these difficulties, we must begin to engage in dialogue with mainstream Islamist parties sooner rather than later. Over the long-term, the responsibilities of government are likely to privilege pragmatism over ideology, practicality over posturing. Democracy does not always moderate ideological actors, but, in the right conditions and with sustained international involvement, it can and will.
  3. Arab-Israeli Peace. In the short run, a Democratic administration would actively push for a comprehensive peace through hands-on diplomacy. We already have a model for this — the last years of the Clinton administration. In the long run, democratization in the Arab world will encourage citizens to shift their focus from regional concerns to local and domestic ones. If the United States facilitates peaceful democratic transitions in the region, we will have much-needed economic and political leverage with those parties that come to power. Such leverage can be wielded to pressure the emerging Arab governments to, first, reconcile themselves to Israel’s existence, then, later, to forge diplomatic ties with Israel. Ultimately, a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab world can come only through negotiated agreements that enjoy the consent of the electorate (unlike the current paper-thin peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan).
  4. Iraq. Thanks to the Bush administration, Iraq has become the war on terrorism’s front line. We cannot simply wash our hands of the responsibility that is now ours. Rather than “staying the course,” however, we must change course, and decisively so. A Democratic president in 2008 must make a new case to the world, that we made a mistake in invading Iraq the way we did, that we betrayed our ideals in the dungeons of Abu Ghraib, but that the cause of Iraqi democracy remains a just one that deserves — rather, demands — the international community’s participation.
  5. Public Diplomacy. The importance of improving our image abroad cannot be overstated. The more people hate us, the more easily they can be convinced to take up arms against us and our allies. Moreover, because of terrorist access to new, lethal technologies, “grass-roots hatred and resentment of America,” as Robert Wright notes in his New York Times essay, “may be converted into the death of Americans with growing efficiency.” A progressive approach to public diplomacy thus emphasizes action over rhetoric. Instead of trumpeting that we love democracy, as Bush does, we must actually prove that we do. In distancing ourselves from autocrat allies, we will begin to regain lost credibility and the trust of Arab audiences.
  6. WMDs. Democratic government means more transparency — and as Wright correctly points out, “the evolution of biotechnology will make an increasingly fine-grained transparency vital to security.” The transparency that comes with democracy will make it harder for countries to accumulate stockpiles of dangerous weapons without the rest of the world knowing about it.

This is all ambitious, to be sure; America, in its finest hour, has been distinguished by its moral ambition. Progressives must begin to appreciate and harness what Michael Signer refers to as the “enormous latent authority in America’s almost congenital idealism.” If they don’t, progressives in power, while likely proving to be competent managers of an interdependent world, will fail to inspire it. No doubt, they will also fail to inspire Americans.

At the same time, if expectations are raised too high, they will only too easily be shattered. Democracy promotion is not a cure-all panacea, and the Bush administration was wrong to make it seem like it was. Along the way, we will make mistakes; this is fine as long as we admit them readily. We are great not because we are perfect, but because we are not, and more importantly, because we realize it. Beinart argues in The Good Fight that it is this capacity for self-doubt — in his words, the “recognition that we are not angels” — that has long defined the liberal approach to foreign policy.

Progressives today must come to terms with the fact that, while supporting democracy is not always in America’s short-term interest, it need not be. In the long run, a foreign policy that puts democracy promotion at its center is the only way to secure our strategic interests, stay true to our ideals, and keep America safe. Democracy must be the new calling for our coming struggle. With it, progressives can show the American people that we do indeed have a plan, a vision, and a narrative. Armed with a newfound confidence and clarity of purpose, we will begin the work that Republicans chose to neglect, and wage the war on terrorism and autocracy anew.