It’s somewhat amazing to watch a bunch of clowns get led around by the nose by Paul Krugman, as if he were the sacred source on all things economic and political, only to see Krugman pull the rug out from under them by supporting the bailout plan. And, yet, even with Krugman showing common sense and maturity, the infants he whipped up into a frenzy are still calling on all decent progressives to call their congressmen in the morning and yell, ‘Hell, no!’
Here’s the deal. The bailout plan that is currently on offer bears very little resemblance to the three-page piece-of-crap Paulson Plan that got everybody’s knickers in a twist. It has oversight, it has public equity, it has executive pay provisions, it doesn’t dole out all the money at once, it has provisions for repayment.
If Congress had not come up with a bailout package it would have led to certain short-term economic calamity. Not only would the global economy have panicked, but no one would be able to secure credit to meet payroll. The bailout package could have been a lot better, and it is certainly no guarantee that we aren’t headed into a nasty recession. But it is an acceptable piece of legislation under the circumstances.
Don’t listen to people that think they understand economics but don’t. Don’t call your congressperson to complain about this bill…call them to complain about why this bill became necessary. And, remember, if you subscribe to Gospel According to Paul Krugman, Krugman supports the bill.
If Congress had not come up with a bailout package it would have led to certain short-term economic calamity.
Booman, do you have a Ph.D. in economics? Most economists are against the bailout. Why are you selling Republican snake oil?
Revolting economists
Please don’t quote Sirota to me. He wants to create a progressive heaven out of a credit crunch. It’s so unrealistic it shouldn’t taken seriously for a moment.
Half the quotes he uses are dates critiques of the original Paulson Plan.
Banks are no not lending normally. Is it somewhat exacerbated by a short-term wait-and-see attitude towards the bailout? Maybe, but the problem reared its ugly head before Paulson reacted to it.
If you want the economy to suffer a 20% global stock exchange slump accompanied by a total grind-down of economic expansion, then don’t to a rescue.
It isn’t a $700 billion plan to buy shitpile at inflated prices anymore.
The plan hasn’t changed all that much. Pelosi still calls it a “Republican bill”. Nouriel Roubini hasn’t changed his mind about the plan since a draft of it was released today, as I note here.
Are you aware of a groundswell of support by economists for the plan now that a draft of it has been released? I am not.
Pelosi is looking for cover, including from people like you. But it is a Republican bill in the sense that a Democratic bill would have probably nationalized more assets and included more aggressive homeowner assistance, as well as all kinds of goodies like extending unemployment insurance.
You’re right BooMan. And I would add that more economists are coming in favor of the bill. Mark Thoma, of U of Oregon. Same for Brad DeLong at Berkeley, Lawrence Summers at Harvard.
I can understand some progressives’ mistrust of the Bush administration, but this is a problem that needs to be fixed now.
I agree that there seems to be persuasive economic opinion that this, or any, bailout did not need to be rushed out in a crisis atmosphere like this. But the political reality is that something was going to be done, right or wrong. I think it’s now time to focus our energies on making sure that the Dem provisions protecting the government’s money, mandating oversight, making the funds available over time instead of in one chunk, and somewhat limiting executives profiting from their larceny/incompetence are not negated before the bill is signed.
Aside from the initial payment, there appears to be nothing that the Dems (and the libertarian right) can’t control if they choose to and modify with further legislation next year. I think our longer-term goal should be pressing Dems to use this shock to Reaganist bullshit as an opportunity for moving economic doctrine and practice in a much more liberal direction than we’ve seen since the LBJ regime.
Raising a five-alarm on the economy was perhaps unnecessary. It ramped up the short-term risk if nothing passed. But it also focused everyone’s attention. To me, that’s a wash.
The real sin was putting out a three-page plan asking for $700 billion with no oversight and protection from prosecution.
They never recovered, and they ramped up the political costs for everyone that eventually votes for the bailout.
The problem is .. there isn’t any confidence they will do that .. when is the last time the Democrats .. as a group .. have shown a spine?
Actually I think they did right now. Don’t forget, Paulson presented a three-page demand for a no-strings, no oversight giveaway of at least $700B. Despite his hysteria-inducing threats of global meltdown unless he got his way right now, the Dems stuck to almost everything they promised to demand, and they got it. It’s been so long since I’ve thought the Dems did good that I almost don’t know how to think it. It seems counterproductive to revile them for a basically good job under incredible pressure.
the political reality is that something was going to be done
That’s only thanks to people like Krugman and Booman.
our longer-term goal should be pressing Dems to use this shock to Reaganist bullshit as an opportunity for moving economic doctrine and practice in a much more liberal direction than we’ve seen since the LBJ regime.
Absolutely. Even people at the American Enterprise Institute have argued for more interventionism, as I note here.
Economists are not objective experts: that’s the whole problem with economics.
I know that. My graduate training is in economics. But if all economists agree about something, as they do in this case, then that’s grounds to think that one should take what they have to say seriously. Consider this:
Well, maybe they should have been busily combating the American stupidity about anything that can be painted as socialism rather than either selling the idea that the market is always right or hiding in their ivory towers.
Nationalisation is considered politically impossible: economists helped set-up that situation.
He supports it because of the equity position which is totally within the control of the Treasury. There are no guarantees that this equity position will be worth a bucket of spit. He supports giving control over this equity position to the same guy who didn’t want it in the first place. What kind of sense does that make?
If this thing is necessary, it’s necessary in the same sense that putting your finger in the dike is necessary. Futile–but if you’ve got to do something….This bailout will not be the last sandbag. There are trillions that have to be (borrowed and) spent to upgrade the infrastructure, finance the return of jobs that are actually productive, provide services such as healthcare and education that are mandatory–politically, morally and economically. What’s another trillion? Is that your belief?
Paulson is gone in three months.
Paulson can spend it in three months. There’s nothing to prevent it.
…and even if there were something in the legislation to “prevent it”…would it prevent it?
there’s plenty to prevent it. He’s got all kinds of reporting requirements, he has to hire asset managers, he has to develop rules.
Fuck it, read the outline:
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
Section 1. Short Title.
“Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.”
Section 2. Purposes.
Provides authority to the Treasury Secretary to restore liquidity and stability to the U.S. financial system and to ensure the economic well-being of Americans.
Section 3. Definitions.
Contains various definitions used under this Act.
Title I. Troubled Assets Relief Program.
Section 101. Purchases of Troubled Assets.
Authorizes the Secretary to establish a Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions. Establishes an Office of Financial Stability within the Treasury Department to implement the TARP in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
Requires the Treasury Secretary to establish guidelines and policies to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Includes provisions to prevent unjust enrichment by participants of the program.
Section 102. Insurance of Troubled Assets.
If the Secretary establishes the TARP program, the Secretary is required to establish a program to guarantee troubled assets of financial institutions.
The Secretary is required to establish risk-based premiums for such guarantees sufficient to cover anticipated claims. The Secretary must report to Congress on the establishment of the guarantee program.
Section 103. Considerations.
In using authority under this Act, the Treasury Secretary is required to take a number of considerations into account, including the interests of taxpayers, minimizing the impact on the national debt, providing stability to the financial markets, preserving homeownership, the needs of all financial institutions regardless of size or other characteristics, and the needs of local communities. Requires the Secretary to examine the long-term viability of an institution in determining whether to directly purchase assets under the TARP.
Section 104. Financial Stability Oversight Board.
This section establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Board to review and make recommendations regarding the exercise of authority under this Act. In addition, the Board must ensure that the policies implemented by the Secretary protect taxpayers, are in the economic interests of the United States, and are in accordance with this Act.
The Board is comprised of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Federal Home Finance Agency, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Section 105. Reports.
Monthly Reports: Within 60 days of the first exercise of authority under this Act and every month thereafter, the Secretary is required to report to Congress its activities under TARP, including detailed financial statements.
Tranche Reports: For every $50 billion in assets purchased, the Secretary is required to report to Congress a detailed description of all transactions, a description of the pricing mechanisms used, and justifications for the financial terms of such transactions.
Regulatory Modernization Report: Prior to April 30, 2009, the Secretary is required to submit a report to Congress on the current state of the financial markets, the effectiveness of the financial regulatory system, and to provide any recommendations.
Section 106. Rights; Management; Sale of Troubled Assets; Revenues and Sale Proceeds.
Establishes the right of the Secretary to exercise authorities under this Act at any time. Provides the Secretary with the authority to manage troubled assets, including the ability to determine the terms and conditions associated with the disposition of troubled assets. Requires profits from the sale of troubled assets to be used to pay down the national debt.
Section 107. Contracting Procedures.
Allows the Secretary to waive provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation where compelling circumstances make compliance contrary to the public interest. Such waivers must be reported to Congress within 7 days. If provisions related to minority contracting are waived, the Secretary must develop alternate procedures to ensure the inclusion of minority contractors.
Allows the FDIC to be selected as an asset manager for residential mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities.
Section 108. Conflicts of Interest.
The Secretary is required to issue regulations or guidelines to manage or prohibit conflicts of interest in the administration of the program.
Section 109. Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts.
For mortgages and mortgage-backed securities acquired through TARP, the Secretary must implement a plan to mitigate foreclosures and to encourage servicers of mortgages to modify loans through Hope for Homeowners and other programs. Allows the Secretary to use loan guarantees and credit enhancement to avoid foreclosures. Requires the Secretary to coordinate with other federal entities that hold troubled assets in order to identify opportunities to modify loans, considering net present value to the taxpayer.
Section 110. Assistance to Homeowners.
Requires federal entities that hold mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, including the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve to develop plans to minimize foreclosures. Requires federal entities to work with servicers to encourage loan modifications, considering net present value to the taxpayer.
Section 111. Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance.
Provides that Treasury will promulgate executive compensation rules governing financial institutions that sell it troubled assets. Where Treasury buys assets directly, the institution must observe standards limiting incentives, allowing clawback and prohibiting golden parachutes. When Treasury buys assets at auction, an institution that has sold more than $300 million in assets is subject to additional taxes, including a 20% excise tax on golden parachute payments triggered by events other than retirement, and tax deduction limits for compensation limits above $500,000.
Section 112. Coordination With Foreign Authorities and Central Banks.
Requires the Secretary to coordinate with foreign authorities and central banks to establish programs similar to TARP.
Section 113. Minimization of Long-Term Costs and Maximization of Benefits for Taxpayers.
In order to cover losses and administrative costs, as well as to allow taxpayers to share in equity appreciation, requires that the Treasury receive non-voting warrants from participating financial institutions.
Section 114. Market Transparency.
48-hour Reporting Requirement: The Secretary is required, within 2 business days of exercising authority under this Act, to publicly disclose the details of any transaction.
Section 115. Graduated Authorization to Purchase.
Authorizes the full $700 billion as requested by the Treasury Secretary for implementation of TARP. Allows the Secretary to immediately use up to $250 billion in authority under this Act. Upon a Presidential certification of need, the Secretary may access an additional $100 billion. The final $350 billion may be accessed if the President transmits a written report to Congress requesting such authority. The Secretary may use this additional authority unless within 15 days Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval which may be considered on an expedited basis.
Section 116. Oversight and Audits.
Requires the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct ongoing oversight of the activities and performance of TARP, and to report every 60 days to Congress. The Comptroller General is required to conduct an annual audit of TARP. In addition, TARP is required to establish and maintain an effective system of internal controls.
Section 117. Study and Report on Margin Authority.
Directs the Comptroller General to conduct a study and report back to Congress on the role in which leverage and sudden deleveraging of financial institutions was a factor behind the current financial crisis.
Section 118. Funding.
Provides for the authorization and appropriation of funds consistent with Section 115.
Section 119. Judicial Review and Related Matters.
Provides standards for judicial review, including injunctive and other relief, to ensure that the actions of the Secretary are not arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law.
Section 120. Termination of Authority.
Provides that the authorities to purchase and guarantee assets terminate on December 31, 2009. The Secretary may extend the authority for an additional year upon certification of need to Congress.
Section 121. Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
Establishes the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the actions undertaken by the Secretary under this Act. The Special Inspector General is required to submit a quarterly report to Congress summarizing its activities and the activities of the Secretary under this Act.
Section 122. Increase in the Statutory Limit on the Public Debt.
Raises the debt ceiling from $10 trillion to $11.3 trillion.
Section 123. Credit Reform.
Details the manner in which the legislation will be treated for budgetary purposes under the Federal Credit Reform Act.
Section 124. Hope for Homeowners Amendments.
Strengthens the Hope for Homeowners program to increase eligibility and improve the tools available to prevent foreclosures.
Section 125. Congressional Oversight Panel.
Establishes a Congressional Oversight Panel to review the state of the financial markets, the regulatory system, and the use of authority under TARP. The panel is required to report to Congress every 30 days and to submit a special report on regulatory reform prior to January 20, 2009. The panel will consist of 5 outside experts appointed by the House and Senate Minority and Majority leadership.
Section 126. FDIC Enforcement Enhancement.
Prohibits the misuse of the FDIC logo and name to falsely represent that deposits are insured. Strengthens enforcement by appropriate federal banking agencies, and allows the FDIC to take enforcement action against any person or institution where the banking agency has not acted.
Section 127. Cooperation With the FBI.
Requires any federal financial regulatory agency to cooperate with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies investigating fraud, misrepresentation, and malfeasance with respect to development, advertising, and sale of financial products.
Section 128. Acceleration of Effective Date.
Provides the Federal Reserve with the ability to pay interest on reserves.
Section 129. Disclosures on Exercise of Loan Authority.
Requires the Federal Reserve to provide a detailed report to Congress, in an expedited manner, upon the use of its emergency lending authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
Section 130. Technical Corrections.
Makes technical corrections to the Truth in Lending Act.
Section 131. Exchange Stabilization Fund Reimbursement.
Protects the Exchange Stabilization Fund from incurring any losses due to the temporary money market mutual fund guarantee by requiring the program created in this Act to reimburse the Fund. Prohibits any future use of the Fund for any guarantee program for the money market mutual fund industry.
Section 132. Authority to Suspend Mark-to-Market Accounting.
Restates the Securities and Exchange Commission’s authority to suspend the application of Statement Number 157 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board if the SEC determines that it is in the public interest and protects investors.
Section 133. Study on Mark-to-Market Accounting.
Requires the SEC, in consultation with the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, to conduct a study on mark-to-market accounting standards as provided in FAS 157, including its effects on balance sheets, impact on the quality of financial information, and other matters, and to report to Congress within 90 days on its findings.
Section 134. Recoupment.
Requires that in 5 years, the President submit to the Congress a proposal that recoups from the financial industry any projected losses to the taxpayer.
Section 135. Preservation of Authority.
Clarifies that nothing in this Act shall limit the authority of the Secretary or the Federal Reserve under any other provision of law.
Title II–Budget-Related Provisions
Section 201. Information for Congressional Support Agencies.
Requires that information used by the Treasury Secretary in connection with activities under this Act be made available to CBO and JCT.
Section 202. Reports by the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office.
Requires CBO and OMB to report cost estimates and related information to Congress and the President regarding the authorities that the Secretary of the Treasury has exercised under the Act.
Section 203. Analysis in President’s Budget.
Requires that the President include in his annual budget submission to the Congress certain analyses and estimates relating to costs incurred as a result of the Act; and
Section 204. Emergency Treatment.
Specifies scoring of the Act for purposes of budget enforcement.
Title III–Tax Provisions
Section 301. Gain or Loss From Sale or Exchange of Certain Preferred Stock.
Details certain changes in the tax treatment of losses on the preferred stock of certain GSEs for financial institutions.
Section 302. Special Rules for Tax Treatment of Executive Compensation of Employers Participating in the Troubled Assets Relief Program.
Applies limits on executive compensation and golden parachutes for certain executives of employers who participate in the auction program.
Section 303. Extension of Exclusion of Income From Discharge of Qualified Principal Residence Indebtedness.
Extends current law tax forgiveness on the cancellation of mortgage debt.
Boo:
As you should know .. the problem isn’t one of liquidity .. it is one of solvency … they are two different things
Cool! How did you make a separate scroll bar?
You can do it with this html code:
<div style=”overflow: auto; height: 500px; width: 500px;”>
All the text you want in the scroll box
</div>
Obviously you can change the height and width to whatever your heart desires.
Thanks!
HMMMM, let’s see…
I could go on, but I am sick of it.
I hope you forgive me if I withhold my support. Obama will be elected, but accomplish nothing of an consequence. Bush has seen to that.
Please, no more talk of a failed Bush administration. He has succeeded in all he REALLY cares about. Now he will leave office and ‘refill the ‘ol coffers’.
If you hear a sound in the far distance, it’s Pelosi, Reid, Bush and Cheney laughing their asses off.
nalbar
I don’t necessarily disagree with anything you’ve said here, primarily because I have no clue how this thing will influence the national and global economies and secondarily because I haven’t yet read it. But don’t you think this post is a bit condescending coming from someone who wrote this just two weeks ago?
yeah, it is.
Two things:
I’m consistent that way. If left-wing bloggers are lying to you about what is in the bill in order to get you to call your congressperson and read them the riot act about a bill that they need to support, then I am going to get pissed off and break my usual standards.
Fair enough, and I appreciate the honesty. But (IMHO) your usual standards are what keeps most of your readership here, and if you’re going to violate them, I’d at least like to see what specifically got your ire up in the first place.
I’d also like to hear why you support this plan. All that is up on the front page right now is one post saying that ‘based on Pelosi’s representations, I support this’ and another berating Krugbots. Please, lend us your insight.
In the simplest terms, if a bailout doesn’t pass then the first thing that will happen is that the global markets will go down significantly and people will lose trillions of dollars. At the same time, credit markets will dry up and small and large businesses will be unable to meet payroll, pay their utility bills, buy needed equipment, or purchase materials up front to meet new purchase orders. No one will be liquid and massive job losses will be inevitable.
But that only explains the need to do something, not the need to do this.
We need to do this because it is the only game in town and the bill have been massively improved over the original plan. It does have equity, it does have oversight…it meets the requirements both Obama and Krugman set out. They both support it.
It is not going to cost us $700 billion, it is not a hand-out to CEO’s that ran their institutions into the ground.
It’s a lot of money, but it’s half of the original plan and the Dems should be in control by the time we have to authorize the second half.
It’s easy to demagogue this, but it is needed and we should be grateful to have a piece of legislation that isn’t totally politicized even if the cost for that is that we don’t get any goodies.
If left-wing bloggers are lying to you about what is in the bill
Please produce examples of “left-wing bloggers” lying about the bill. If you don’t, I will conclude that you have a resemblance to John McCain, who is prone to hysteria and has admitted to being ignorant about economics.
For starters, every blogger that says this is a $700 billion outlay is a liar. Everyone that says it is primarily a bailout to reward Wall Street is a liar. Everyone that says it has no oversight is a liar. Everyone that suggests the Bushies can just spend all the money any way they want is a liar. I haven’t seen any honest blogging on this at all.
Everyone that says it is primarily a bailout to reward Wall Street is a liar.
But that’s what the NYU economist Nouriel Roubini said after he saw the draft of the bailout bill, as I note here. How do you know he is lying?
I’m pretty sure he’s not left-wing. He’s not a blogger. He’s a fucking professor at a top-flight economics department.
As Hal said in 2001:
Yikes!
I could just as easily say;
Anybody who says;
“In the simplest terms, if a bailout doesn’t pass then the first thing that will happen is that the global markets will go down significantly and people will lose trillions of dollars. At the same time, credit markets will dry up and small and large businesses will be unable to meet payroll, pay their utility bills, buy needed equipment, or purchase materials up front to meet new purchase orders. No one will be liquid and massive job losses will be inevitable. “
is a lier.
Besides the markets going down, you do not KNOW that any of that is true. Global markets go down all the time, and ‘people’ lose trillions.
But the credit markets drying up and businesses being unable to borrow money is guessing. I don’t believe a word of it. If it is anywhere near that dire, a measly 700 billion, spread out, will effect nothing. You cannot control a trillion dollar economy with pennies. But that is MY guessing. It has just as much validity as yours, with less accusations of lying.
Part, if not most, of the ‘market liquidity’ issue stem from the panic that the politicians threw into the process last week. This enabled them to ‘come to the rescue’, and skewed the process that should have been followed on any bill like this. One thing we have learned these past years is the ‘leadership’ cannot be trusted, not on torture, not on the war, not on wire taps.
Yes, I believe this is a ‘wall street bailout’. It is a HUGE transfer of wealth. Where do you think that wealth will come from? Who do you think will foot the bill? Who will be the recipients? The wealthy got their tax cuts 7 years ago. Now we are going to pay them, in advance, for their tax increases next year.
Those beliefs don’t make me a lier. I’m just an old guy who has seen it all before.
nalbar
I’ve been watching press conferences on Cspan and have come around to thinking this current plan is, at least, not terrible. If it’s managed right it should end up costing the government little or nothing because of the new provisions that give equity and guarantees to the government. It may even have too much oversight. The executive pay part looks to have holes that good corporate lawyers could drive their beemers through, but that’s one of the issues that can be addressed by a new Congress and administration.
Near as I can tell, it doesn’t lock the government into any irreversible risks that can’t be addressed by further legislation next year. Since the government will own the bad mortgages, the potential seems to exist for it to ease the onerous terms imposed by the swindler-mortgagors without handing them special government subsidies. If nothing slips up between now and the final passage of the bill, the congressional Dems seem to have pretty much kept the faith on this one and turned Bush’s crap into something we can live with.
Whether all this does the trick for the economy is another question, but that’s something nobody knows until it happens. In the meantime the Dems come out of a dangerous trap smelling like a rose, and with the tremendously delicate and difficult path ahead that the bill creates, I’d expect voters to conclude that it’s Obama and not McCain who has what it takes to lead us through.
All that said, Boo, I don’t get the nasty and petulant tone of your remarks. I mean, who led you around by the nose? Or are you an independent financial guru with the understanding to follow your own muse on matters of economics and high finance? There are hundreds of qualified economists who think there was no need for this extreme rush to “do something”. How is it “infantile” to choose to listen to them? I wonder if you’d also call those who didn’t follow the approved authorities re Iraq, FISA, the Patriot Act and all the rest infantile? It seems a shame that just when we finally have some reason to hope that our side did something right and effective, you choose to go on a personal attack against allies for disagreeing with your view. Not what we’ve come to expect around here. I hope you get a good night’s sleep.
I came to my senses today as well, Booman. For those in doubt about the political motives here, I recommend you read this post from Hilzoy. Most of us have no idea how bad things could get in just a matter of weeks if we don’t re-prime the credit market quickly. And ask yourself this: would you invest, or stay invested, in a company that had no access to a line of credit even if they don’t need it right now? No one else will either.
My grandparents have told me about the great depression and I never could quite relate. Even with this package in place, we’re still looking at a SERIOUS recession that could last a few years, at least. Without it, we could quickly find a large percentage of our country jobless, homeless and hungry. Really.
I don’t LOVE this package and there’s no guarantee that it will fix all of our economic woes. But something of this scale needs to happen now. The controls and repayment provisions they added make it very likely that we will get all of our money back after 5 years. Think of this more as a liquidity pool to take the pressure off of the credit markets rather than a bailout package.
I’m not sure I buy the urgency of doing something right now, but the reality is that something was going to be done or the doomsayers would have created a self-fulfilling prophesy. The final bill seems to do little harm in the long run and even have the potential for some good changes.
Anyway, that phase is now over. What’s important is to make sure it’s the small beginning, not the end, of a campaign for deep and sweeping economic reform, including preventing any financial institution from ever again becoming “too big to fail”. In that sense, this whole episode could be the best opportunity to exorcise the curse of Reaganism we’ve ever had. Let’s make sure it counts.
Most of us have no idea how bad things could get in just a matter of weeks if we don’t re-prime the credit market quickly. And ask yourself this: would you invest, or stay invested, in a company that had no access to a line of credit even if they don’t need it right now?
You understand this is an issue of solvency and not liquidity .. right? basically what Wall Street had constructed was not much more than a Ponzi scheme .. and now the chickens are coming home to roost
Agreed. There’s a whole lot of prosecuting to do, and a whole lot of regulation.
Nobody is going to be prosecuted, and no regulations of any meaning will be enacted.
No matter how many times progressives get screwed, they keep pulling down their pants. No wonder they are considered weak.
nalbar
nalbar, you are suffering from battered-wife syndrome while accusing others of the same thing. That’s called ‘projecting’.
This is the biggest government intervention since the 1930’s and it will have some heads on pikes.
HMMM,
how pleasant.
Now not only am I a lier, but I am a beat up victim.
Tonight you are being a jackass. I think I would prefer to be a victim.
nalbar
Sorry to be linking to Sirota, Booman, but I’ve just posted on one of his posts at Open Left two links to material that I think people should hear/read.
Krugman’s Monday column
Scary thought but one worth considering by the voters because this could be a common occurrence over the next few years.
Ummm… booman, a week or so ago when the crisis hit, weren’t you one of the first to say economics aren’t your strong suit?
In a way.
What I said was brief. I don’t write about economics because I don’t keep up with it on a day-to-day basis enough to pick apart economic media and give you the wheat from the chaff. If I paid as much attention to the markets as I do to politics, I could, but I don’t.
But, give me enough time to research an economic issue and I will give you an informed opinion.
I’ll admit that something has to pass from a psychological standpoint.
But I refuse to believe it’ll do any good.
Judging from the Asia/European/Dow Futures markets this morning, it’s No Confidence.
It’s rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic at this point.
I’m sorry I donated to this site, and I won’t again.
I am a good sincere American, and the next time you need to vent maybe you’ll shut your god damn mouth.
See that sig line? Al Gore did win, and I’ve tolerated your sneering condescension of him enough too.
You try to run a campaign coherently when the press hates and lies about you and makes ridiculous shit up on the fly. Sighs matters, motherfuckers.
Al Gore won. There is no World According to Booman, just our world, and you’re not spitting your venom in mine any longer.
God, I hope you’re right Boo. I can’t see it as anything but a stopgap AT BEST, until Obama gets in. And I’m not sure that it can stop the gap. But I hope you’re right.