The silliest moment in yesterday’s fiasco came after the vote failed and the Republican leadership emerged to blame Nancy Pelosi’s speech for hardening the hearts of a dozen ‘yes’ votes and turning them into ‘no’s’. That was some historically sorry rhetoric, as several GOP House members readily admit.
Republican Rep. John Shadegg said Tuesday that House Minority Leader John Boehner and other Republican leaders made a “stupid claim” by alleging that Nancy Pelosi’s speech changed any minds on the bailout.
“I do believe that we could have gotten there today had it not been for this partisan speech that the speaker gave on the floor of the House,” said Boehner after the failed vote on the bailout package. His leadership colleagues endorsed the opinion. Rep. Eric Cantor waved a copy of Pelosi’s speech and said the bailout went down because of Pelosi.
Shadegg said that he doesn’t know of a single GOP vote that shifted because of the speech.
On Monday evening, Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), a lead opponent of the bailout, told the Crypt that the notion was “nonsense” and mocked the possibility that a Republican would be shocked or offended by the partisan nature of a Democratic speech.
That’s some refreshing candor. Boehner’s failure to deliver the votes could well cost him his position as minority leader. It’s a mistake to look at today’s polls and think that the public will reward the people that prevent a rescue plan. In fact, the polls already show a mixed story. The public assigns responsibility for the failure to the Republicans by a 44-21 margin. You might think that would benefit the Republicans, but after seeing the markets tank yesterday, the bailout isn’t all that unpopular. Forty-seven percent oppose it, while 45% support it. Perhaps most significantly:
…nearly nine in 10 expressed concern that the failure of the bill could lead to a more severe economic decline, including a slim majority calling themselves “very worried.”
David Brooks made a good point on culpability:
And let us recognize above all the 228 who voted no — the authors of this revolt of the nihilists. They showed the world how much they detest their own leaders and the collected expertise of the Treasury and Fed. They did the momentarily popular thing, and if the country slides into a deep recession, they will have the time and leisure to watch public opinion shift against them.
Indeed. It takes more foresight than courage to vote for the rescue plan. In the end, people will want to know why nothing was done, and they won’t be looking to reward the do-nothings. As we assess the new package, I hope we can avoid hyperbole. It won’t be a hand-out to CEO’s, it won’t be a trillion dollar appropriation, it will not lack oversight, and it will have measures to slow the rate of foreclosures. Of course, that was all true of yesterday’s version of the bill, too, but it didn’t prevent a flood of commentary to the contrary. Can we do better?
It’s fairly simple, actually, when looking at who voted against the bailout. Everyone in a competitive race – D or R – voted against it. Politically, it makes sense – a vote for expending $700 billion can be lampooned from the left and the right – regardless of the benefit or necessity of the package itself. Short of the constituents clamorong for such a package no vulnerable representative will give that kind of ammo to their opponent in the name of good governance. Self-preservation has trumped good governance for as long as there have been governments.
This doesn’t even address the spcifocs of the legislation itself, much of which the public knows little about, and after the Patriot Act debacle a little time for reflection could be a good thing. After all, if we found the enacted law to be a bad then then we couldn’t exactly send the repo man for our cash…
Boo hoo hoo, Nancy was MEAN to me Mommy!
While I agree with you in the long run, I do have to say that if the 7-9% point loss in the markets yesterday is a sign those who voted against the bailout are in trouble, what does today’s 2-3% gain mean for their immediate political futures?
Remember, Bush promised us Armageddon. We took a brutal knock, but we’re still kicking, and we’ve put back a third of yesterday’s loss today. Sure it’s a dead cat bounce, sure the LIBOR is still having a heart attack, but we have a second chance on the table now.
What I’m saying is that we have time to work out a better bill for Thursday and should take advantage of it to do so.
where will the market be on election day? And how will perceptions harden between now and then? If we pass nothing, you can be sure that the markets will be a world of pain, and incumbents will be marked for dispatch. It won’t be a good thing that day to be a do-nothing.
Yes, let’s make the bill better, not worse, in order to get it passed. Then I’ll be happy to hear the criticism that we would have had a worse bill if people had supported the first version.
Fair enough.
today’s gain in the markets is tied to ‘window dressing.’ It’s the end of the month and end of Q3.
I think you can probably peg today’s Dow performance, which is positive at least through mid-day, to the picking-over by speculators of the carcass left from yesterday; not to any particular good news in the financials.
My biggest fear is that we don’t know just how much time we have to decide whether or not to do something. Much like a leaking dam, we know that things can possibly become dire if we fail to act correctly, but when the dam actually gives way and we see the catastrophic magnitude of the results, there is nothing left to do then but watch……and wait.
I wish I had an ounce of confidence that somewhere in Washington there is a mature and responsible adult in charge. After watching Bush earlier today I know we can’t count on him to do anything of substance. The man is an ignorant and impotent jackass.
Yeah, that’s why I called it a dead cat bounce.
let’s not forget that during the last Great Depression of 1930s there were rallies lasting for well over a year – rallies of 10 to 30%, even two of over 90%.
I can’t figure this out, McCain is saying the treasury can purchase up to 1 trillion in home mortgages??
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080930/ap_on_el_pr/mccain
i can’t believe you referenced the brooks column, whose title is crying out for a lebowski reference, without heeding the call.
Awesome. How did I miss it?
good gathering nevertheless.
Yglesias takes a shot at Brooks, something that crossed in my thoughts:
He’s right on. There’s an Ad blaming Obama for the meltdown and bailout failure, while party leader McCain is stepping on his message calling for bipartisanship
This is why I’m getting so pissed at the lefties who just keep droning on about how the Dems conspired with Bush, got conned, etc. I’ve been no fan of Pelosi, but this was played beautifully. Opinion is turning fast as more and more people check with their own banks and start getting scared. If the Dems come up with a bill (The Economic Recovery Act of 2008?) minus the concessions the GOP put in, they should be able to get it through Congress with minimal Rep support and force Bush to sign it. I call that waking up at last.
Liberals and Progressives as Political Creationists
McCombover’s whole campaign is also crying out for such a reference.
In this case, Donnie is the U.S. economy.
The political problem for Democrats is to explain to the public that a huge “bailout” or “rescue” or whatever you want to call it is no more than a baby step toward getting the economy on a sound footing. It isn’t a cure to what ails the economy. It’s just a holding action that will permit the economy to retreat to more defensible ground.
It’s rather telling that we have gone from describing the problem as a “credit bubble” to a “credit crisis.” Of course there’s a crisis in the credit markets–there was an unsustainable credit bubble that all parties came to accept as “normal course.” In fact, the level of debt out here, whether governmental, corporate, or personal is not sustainable.
There’s a great political temptation to try to “fix” the hole in the bubble and reinflate it. That’s no longer possible. So, like a diver coming to the surface, we have to allow the economy to adjust to more expensive and lower levels of debt. The pain of this adjustment will be real–unlike some of the purported gains we thought would go on forever.
So…to jump to another metaphor…The economy is being assaulted by credit contraction, unemployment, insane levels of debt, demographics and by it’s own internal contradictions. It’s time to beat a retreat to defensible ground. If that isn’t explained up front, how do you explain to the voter that “yes” there is more pain coming your way and “no” the bailout wasn’t a failure?
I have seen no one with the courage to lay this difficult card on the table and tell the American people, straight up, that we are in for a long, long hard road no matter what way we go. Everyone I know seem to think that this “bailout” or “rescue” or whatever the hell one chooses to call it, is simply a one-time bitter pill. And all that’s needed is to write the big check to the fat-cats to bail them out or decide to let them fail; which might result in a short-term draw-down of the market until the dust settles. Maybe, like the denial experienced when receiving a potentially terminal medical diagnosis while the only symptom you’ve had is a scratchy throat for a few months, people are just refusing to believe that this has the potential to destroy a significant portion,, if not all, of one’s worth and savings.
check Obama’s speech above.
But this is the worst of both worlds.
The Democrats are telling us that they are the responsible adults (to paraphrase Booman) and that we all have to take our medicine. But they are saying the medicine is buying Wall Street’s debt and as soon as we do that it will be fixed.
The Democrats are not being honest. They are pretending that this will “fix” the economy. Hell, Booman and Obama are basically promising that the stock market will go up if we pass the biggest socialist bailout in the history of the World.
It’s very short sighted. When the stock market goes down again and the credit markets are roiled again (as they have the last year) the public’s support will be yanked out from under the Democrats like a cheap rug.
That’s the perfect way for Dems to present their case. I hope some of them read this.
Democrats aren’t heeding any advice. Obama is rushing in to “save” the economy by passing a version of Bush’s bill.
Hook. Line. Sinker.
When the stock market goes down again we know who to blame.
Elite panic on Wall Street
tripe.
More tripe:
A biological walk down Wall Street
Agree with BooMan. That’s all tripe playing to the roar of the crowd who are uninformed on the reality of events.
My concern is the credit markets have seized: there’s a unique run on the banks, meaning the banks are running from each other. CONSEQUENCES: They’ve cut corporate lending…. have cut credit card limits and the worse is yet to come.
WTFU
$250 billion is less than a ten penny piggy bank. So is $700 billion, less than the cost of a big Mac.
The Federal Reserve lent $1.25 trillion last week, not to the strong, but fragile financial entities. Nouriel Roubini who thinks the Bill was flawed now says we need “Triage to stop the silent run on Banks” Video up at BloombergTV.
$1.25 trillion, created out of thin air is much larger than $250 billion or $700 billion.
The bailout, though flawed included funds for Fannie and Freddie to take on more.
FDIC needs $150 billion.
My larger concern; the current plan for $700 billion is insufficient. Some will be allowed to fail. In the end we’ll need trillions and there will be CONSEQUENCES.
We have a choice: Resist giving Wall Street the Triage, keep businesses functioning or Enjoy the coming Great, great Depression.
I’ve been reading Roubini. He says the immediate problem is lack of solvency. The solution is recapitalizing banks by buying preferred shares, like Warren Buffett did with Goldman Sachs.
Bush has ZERO influence. Dems need to start thinking for themselves and stop thinking about this plan as some kind of solution. The only reason Krugman reluctantly backed the plan is that it provides for buying preferred shares through the back door (and I’m actually not sure if it actually does that, as opposed to providing an option to buy them later).
Since the American public is firmly opposed to a bailout and the plan was rejected by congress, why not drop the bailout idea, which only helps investors who made bad and greedy decisions, and go with a clean recapitalization?
Dems are playing exactly the same game with us that they did on withdrawing from Iraq in June 2006. And that despite this time the public being overwhelmingly against what Bush wants!
Don’t agree with Booman. He is backing a Bush plan, which naturally is not going to work and is only going to help Bush’s cronies.
This sort of thing will go on until the Democrats take charge of doing what needs to be done and get over the “negotiating” with assholes. The administration presented this plan in a way that guaranteed failure. There is no credibility left for Bush or the congressional GOP.
The Dems, including Obama, are the only ones left standing. Now’s the time for them to tell the truth and present a plan that keeps faith with traditional Democratic values. Then comes the hard part: communicating the reality to the mass of Americans. But that’s what politicians are supposed to be for.
Brooks is spewing crap as usual. The fact is, most Dems voted for the bill. If half the Republicans had voted for it, it would have passed easily. Brooks is peddling his worn-out meme that there’s enough blame to go around. Bullshit. It was not somehow the Democrats’ sole responsibility to get a shaky bill passed. The bill was killed by a combination of House Republicans and a president who rightly has zero credibility, who introduced the bill in a manner that doomed it from the start, and who caused the crisis in the first place.
For the Dems, this could be the opportunity of a lifetime. The GOP has no further credibility or relevance on economic policy. If the Dems forget the “bipartisan” drivel, forget “negotiating” with discredited people, they can come up with a good bill of their own and get it passed with a solid Dem majority. If they pull it off, they will become the dominant majority in this country for the foreseeable future.
What’s needed is a bare-bones bill now that clearly favors Main Street rather than Wall Street. For example, getting the same deal Buffet got. The details wouldn’t have to be radically different from the ones in the defeated bill. The crucial thing is that it comes from the Democrats (and Obama would have to get off his hot air balloon and go all in on backing it), not from “negotiating” with Bush and the Republicans. It has to be a shiny new package, not a rerun of the old one. It also has to come with a commitment from the Dems that this is just the beginning of sweeping economic reform they will pursue next year.
I think following that scenario would do much more to calm foreign markets than anything Bush had a hand in. And that calm would spread from there to American markets. Once the House passed such a bill it would be extremely difficult for Senate Reps to kill it, and for Bush to veto it. From the perspective of responsible governance as well as pure partisan strategy, this is the only good path out of the mess that I can see.
Somehow, I don’t seem to have any problem visualizing a Bush veto on something like this. He still desperately wants to wield his supreme executive power. After all, he’s spent almost his entire tenure doing anything necessary to accumulate it.
But with each passing day he looks more and more like Captain Queeg.
If the Dems managed to sell their plan to the voters as the bill that addresses their objections to the failed one, I just can’t see Bush withstanding the pressure to sign it. He would have a good shot at going down in history as the president that single-handedly brought the “American century” to a pathetic end.
“History, we don’t know. We’ll all be dead.”
I have a very hard time believing that George Bush gives a flying fuck about that. After all, in his mind he’s been put in the White House by God Almighty and has been doing nothing but God’s will for the last eight years.
If you honestly think that George W. Bush believes in God then you probably think that there are WMDs in Iraq too – after all, George W. Bush asserted it to be true, and we know with certainty that Dubya is utterly honest in everything that he proclaims…
…so people OUTSIDE the Congress can read and review the provisions.
Knowing, as I do, how few of our Congresspeople actually read the bills they vote on, this is more important than ever.
Yes. Absolutely. Which is why the Dems need to do something bare bones now and make a firm pledge that this is just the beginning, not the end, of major reform of the economic system that will continue next year with a new administration and Congress.
What’s needed is a bare-bones bill now that clearly favors Main Street rather than Wall Street.
No major new bill is needed.
James Galbraith, A Bailout We Don’t Need
I discuss this a little more in an update to my diary about a better rescue plan.
From Michael Moore.
that’s all about 100% wrong. There was a letter from 200 economists in response to the original plan. So what? The bill did have provisions for stopping foreclosures, and it had an absurd level of oversight. Absurd.
Absurd level of oversight? Specifics, BooMan? do you have the text of the bill?
Here’ an outline:
Section 1. Short Title.
“Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.”
Section 2. Purposes.
Provides authority to the Treasury Secretary to restore liquidity and stability to the U.S. financial system and to ensure the economic well-being of Americans.
Section 3. Definitions.
Contains various definitions used under this Act.
Title I. Troubled Assets Relief Program.
Section 101. Purchases of Troubled Assets.
Authorizes the Secretary to establish a Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions. Establishes an Office of Financial Stability within the Treasury Department to implement the TARP in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
Requires the Treasury Secretary to establish guidelines and policies to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Includes provisions to prevent unjust enrichment by participants of the program.
Section 102. Insurance of Troubled Assets.
If the Secretary establishes the TARP program, the Secretary is required to establish a program to guarantee troubled assets of financial institutions.
The Secretary is required to establish risk-based premiums for such guarantees sufficient to cover anticipated claims. The Secretary must report to Congress on the establishment of the guarantee program.
Section 103. Considerations.
In using authority under this Act, the Treasury Secretary is required to take a number of considerations into account, including the interests of taxpayers, minimizing the impact on the national debt, providing stability to the financial markets, preserving homeownership, the needs of all financial institutions regardless of size or other characteristics, and the needs of local communities. Requires the Secretary to examine the long-term viability of an institution in determining whether to directly purchase assets under the TARP.
Section 104. Financial Stability Oversight Board.
This section establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Board to review and make recommendations regarding the exercise of authority under this Act. In addition, the Board must ensure that the policies implemented by the Secretary protect taxpayers, are in the economic interests of the United States, and are in accordance with this Act.
The Board is comprised of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Federal Home Finance Agency, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Section 105. Reports.
Monthly Reports: Within 60 days of the first exercise of authority under this Act and every month thereafter, the Secretary is required to report to Congress its activities under TARP, including detailed financial statements.
Tranche Reports: For every $50 billion in assets purchased, the Secretary is required to report to Congress a detailed description of all transactions, a description of the pricing mechanisms used, and justifications for the financial terms of such transactions.
Regulatory Modernization Report: Prior to April 30, 2009, the Secretary is required to submit a report to Congress on the current state of the financial markets, the effectiveness of the financial regulatory system, and to provide any recommendations.
Section 106. Rights; Management; Sale of Troubled Assets; Revenues and Sale Proceeds.
Establishes the right of the Secretary to exercise authorities under this Act at any time. Provides the Secretary with the authority to manage troubled assets, including the ability to determine the terms and conditions associated with the disposition of troubled assets. Requires profits from the sale of troubled assets to be used to pay down the national debt.
Section 107. Contracting Procedures.
Allows the Secretary to waive provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation where compelling circumstances make compliance contrary to the public interest. Such waivers must be reported to Congress within 7 days. If provisions related to minority contracting are waived, the Secretary must develop alternate procedures to ensure the inclusion of minority contractors.
Allows the FDIC to be selected as an asset manager for residential mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities.
Section 108. Conflicts of Interest.
The Secretary is required to issue regulations or guidelines to manage or prohibit conflicts of interest in the administration of the program.
Section 109. Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts.
For mortgages and mortgage-backed securities acquired through TARP, the Secretary must implement a plan to mitigate foreclosures and to encourage servicers of mortgages to modify loans through Hope for Homeowners and other programs. Allows the Secretary to use loan guarantees and credit enhancement to avoid foreclosures. Requires the Secretary to coordinate with other federal entities that hold troubled assets in order to identify opportunities to modify loans, considering net present value to the taxpayer.
Section 110. Assistance to Homeowners.
Requires federal entities that hold mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, including the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve to develop plans to minimize foreclosures. Requires federal entities to work with servicers to encourage loan modifications, considering net present value to the taxpayer.
Section 111. Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance.
Provides that Treasury will promulgate executive compensation rules governing financial institutions that sell it troubled assets. Where Treasury buys assets directly, the institution must observe standards limiting incentives, allowing clawback and prohibiting golden parachutes. When Treasury buys assets at auction, an institution that has sold more than $300 million in assets is subject to additional taxes, including a 20% excise tax on golden parachute payments triggered by events other than retirement, and tax deduction limits for compensation limits above $500,000.
Section 112. Coordination With Foreign Authorities and Central Banks.
Requires the Secretary to coordinate with foreign authorities and central banks to establish programs similar to TARP.
Section 113. Minimization of Long-Term Costs and Maximization of Benefits for Taxpayers.
In order to cover losses and administrative costs, as well as to allow taxpayers to share in equity appreciation, requires that the Treasury receive non-voting warrants from participating financial institutions.
Section 114. Market Transparency.
48-hour Reporting Requirement: The Secretary is required, within 2 business days of exercising authority under this Act, to publicly disclose the details of any transaction.
Section 115. Graduated Authorization to Purchase.
Authorizes the full $700 billion as requested by the Treasury Secretary for implementation of TARP. Allows the Secretary to immediately use up to $250 billion in authority under this Act. Upon a Presidential certification of need, the Secretary may access an additional $100 billion. The final $350 billion may be accessed if the President transmits a written report to Congress requesting such authority. The Secretary may use this additional authority unless within 15 days Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval which may be considered on an expedited basis.
Section 116. Oversight and Audits.
Requires the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct ongoing oversight of the activities and performance of TARP, and to report every 60 days to Congress. The Comptroller General is required to conduct an annual audit of TARP. In addition, TARP is required to establish and maintain an effective system of internal controls.
Section 117. Study and Report on Margin Authority.
Directs the Comptroller General to conduct a study and report back to Congress on the role in which leverage and sudden deleveraging of financial institutions was a factor behind the current financial crisis.
Section 118. Funding.
Provides for the authorization and appropriation of funds consistent with Section 115.
Section 119. Judicial Review and Related Matters.
Provides standards for judicial review, including injunctive and other relief, to ensure that the actions of the Secretary are not arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law.
Section 120. Termination of Authority.
Provides that the authorities to purchase and guarantee assets terminate on December 31, 2009. The Secretary may extend the authority for an additional year upon certification of need to Congress.
Section 121. Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
Establishes the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the actions undertaken by the Secretary under this Act. The Special Inspector General is required to submit a quarterly report to Congress summarizing its activities and the activities of the Secretary under this Act.
Section 122. Increase in the Statutory Limit on the Public Debt.
Raises the debt ceiling from $10 trillion to $11.3 trillion.
Section 123. Credit Reform.
Details the manner in which the legislation will be treated for budgetary purposes under the Federal Credit Reform Act.
Section 124. Hope for Homeowners Amendments.
Strengthens the Hope for Homeowners program to increase eligibility and improve the tools available to prevent foreclosures.
Section 125. Congressional Oversight Panel.
Establishes a Congressional Oversight Panel to review the state of the financial markets, the regulatory system, and the use of authority under TARP. The panel is required to report to Congress every 30 days and to submit a special report on regulatory reform prior to January 20, 2009. The panel will consist of 5 outside experts appointed by the House and Senate Minority and Majority leadership.
Section 126. FDIC Enforcement Enhancement.
Prohibits the misuse of the FDIC logo and name to falsely represent that deposits are insured. Strengthens enforcement by appropriate federal banking agencies, and allows the FDIC to take enforcement action against any person or institution where the banking agency has not acted.
Section 127. Cooperation With the FBI.
Requires any federal financial regulatory agency to cooperate with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies investigating fraud, misrepresentation, and malfeasance with respect to development, advertising, and sale of financial products.
Section 128. Acceleration of Effective Date.
Provides the Federal Reserve with the ability to pay interest on reserves.
Section 129. Disclosures on Exercise of Loan Authority.
Requires the Federal Reserve to provide a detailed report to Congress, in an expedited manner, upon the use of its emergency lending authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
Section 130. Technical Corrections.
Makes technical corrections to the Truth in Lending Act.
Section 131. Exchange Stabilization Fund Reimbursement.
Protects the Exchange Stabilization Fund from incurring any losses due to the temporary money market mutual fund guarantee by requiring the program created in this Act to reimburse the Fund. Prohibits any future use of the Fund for any guarantee program for the money market mutual fund industry.
Section 132. Authority to Suspend Mark-to-Market Accounting.
Restates the Securities and Exchange Commission’s authority to suspend the application of Statement Number 157 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board if the SEC determines that it is in the public interest and protects investors.
Section 133. Study on Mark-to-Market Accounting.
Requires the SEC, in consultation with the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, to conduct a study on mark-to-market accounting standards as provided in FAS 157, including its effects on balance sheets, impact on the quality of financial information, and other matters, and to report to Congress within 90 days on its findings.
Section 134. Recoupment.
Requires that in 5 years, the President submit to the Congress a proposal that recoups from the financial industry any projected losses to the taxpayer.
Section 135. Preservation of Authority.
Clarifies that nothing in this Act shall limit the authority of the Secretary or the Federal Reserve under any other provision of law.
Title II–Budget-Related Provisions
Section 201. Information for Congressional Support Agencies.
Requires that information used by the Treasury Secretary in connection with activities under this Act be made available to CBO and JCT.
Section 202. Reports by the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office.
Requires CBO and OMB to report cost estimates and related information to Congress and the President regarding the authorities that the Secretary of the Treasury has exercised under the Act.
Section 203. Analysis in President’s Budget.
Requires that the President include in his annual budget submission to the Congress certain analyses and estimates relating to costs incurred as a result of the Act; and
Section 204. Emergency Treatment.
Specifies scoring of the Act for purposes of budget enforcement.
Title III–Tax Provisions
Section 301. Gain or Loss From Sale or Exchange of Certain Preferred Stock.
Details certain changes in the tax treatment of losses on the preferred stock of certain GSEs for financial institutions.
Section 302. Special Rules for Tax Treatment of Executive Compensation of Employers Participating in the Troubled Assets Relief Program.
Applies limits on executive compensation and golden parachutes for certain executives of employers who participate in the auction program.
Section 303. Extension of Exclusion of Income From Discharge of Qualified Principal Residence Indebtedness.
Extends current law tax forgiveness on the cancellation of mortgage debt.
Booman – I’m reading it now from here – full text at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/28/bailout-legislation-full_n_130063.html.
The Secretary has a lot of unilateral authority, for one.
Executive compensation limits can be imposed, but there can be no limits on bonuses – “incentives,” per this bill.
I don’t think anyone who is talking about the bill online has actually read the full text. It’s a very mixed bag, and the enforcement provisions are weak, as are the provisions for government to profit from taking on assets.
Where did this come from?
See my link, above.
Meaning – that wasn’t an answer to your question. But I don’t trust anyone else’s “analysis” until I’ve first read the actual bill, as those who favor it will give it a favorable analysis, and those who oppose it will give it an unfavorable one.
if that’s the case, then please explain that conference call by the treasury explaining that that democrats’ “oversight” was toothless?
View Highlights – Bailout bill Here
Reading highlights is usually a mistake, as the devil is the in the details, the most objectionable of which would not be highlighted! Thanks anyway though.
According to this legal analysis, one of the proposed levels of oversight might have been unconstitutional.
Since we’re throwing blame around here, I thought I’d toss a little Andy J on the woodpile:
“Routing out” no longer available 😛
Pax