Obama Talking to Islamofascists!

31 Comments

1. 

   BooMan on February 2, 2009 at 4:01 pm

   Oh, the Humanity!!

2. 

   robertdsc on February 2, 2009 at 4:27 pm

   Let’s hope the President has read the 2007 NIE that says the Iranians aren’t developing nuclear weapons and haven’t since 2003.

   • 

     Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 5:30 pm

     If he has, he does not appear to have paid any attention to it. His statements on Iran all contain the unequivocal and unmistakable assumption that Iran is actively developing nuclear weapons, and that it MUST BE STOPPED.

     And by the way, there is no evidence at all that Iran has EVER had a nuclear weapons program, including prior to 2003. As I recall from reading that part of the NIE, it actually does not state or imply that they ever had one. My recollection is that it does not say, as is universally represented, that Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003. I believe all it does is confirm that Iran has not had a nuclear weapons program since 2003(anyone who has the text handy or wants to look it up, please feel free to correct or confirm this). There is no implication that it ever had a nuclear weapons program prior to 2003, it merely confirms that they have not had one since 2003.

     It is interesting – and scary – that the media and just about everyone else has chosen to interpret the NIE as stating that Iran “abandoned its nuclear program” in 2003, thereby implying that it actually had one to abandon. I am quite certain it says nothing of the kind. I spoke with Scott Ritter about this last year, and he agreed with me that this distortion of reality, and I believe, of the NIE itself, is very dangerous.

     • 

       BooMan on February 2, 2009 at 5:43 pm

       It’s hard to be more wrong that you are:

       Key Judgments

       A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
       program
       1
       ; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is
       keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence
       that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium
       enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
       Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing
       international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously
       undeclared nuclear work.
       * We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were
       working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
       * We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of
       intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC
       assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt
       to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.)
       * We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
       program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop
       nuclear weapons.
       * We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently
       have a nuclear weapon.
       * Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined
       to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment
       that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure
       suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged
       previously.
       B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least
       some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it
       has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired
       from abroad–or will acquire in the future–a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material
       for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would
       need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously–which we judge
       with high confidence it has not yet done.
       C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough
       fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge
       1
       For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design
       and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we
       do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.
       Page 7
       enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons
       program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we
       judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating
       them.
       * We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be
       technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this
       is very unlikely.
       * We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of
       producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
       (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
       foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the
       possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.
       D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could
       be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example,
       Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high
       confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development
       projects with commercial and conventional military applications–some of which would
       also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
       E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing
       to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its
       options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt
       it to restart the program.
       * Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to
       international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit
       approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and
       military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified
       international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its
       security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might–if perceived
       by Iran’s leaders as credible–prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear
       weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.
       * We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo
       the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
       within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s
       key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable
       effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment,
       only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
       plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons–and such a decision
       is inherently reversible.
       Page 8
       F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities–
       rather than its declared nuclear sites–for the production of highly enriched uranium for a
       weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium
       conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably
       were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been
       restarted through at least mid-2007.
       G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing
       and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.
       H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial
       capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

       • 

         Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 6:00 pm

         Thanks for the correction, BooMan.

         No thanks for the condescending tone. But then, how else can you be expected to address an anti-Semitic liar?

         • 

           BooMan on February 2, 2009 at 6:23 pm

           it’s not condescension.  It’s more like frustration that you would post things that are 180 degrees away from the truth.  It’s not always possible to refute such things with such ease.

         • 

           Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 6:28 pm

           You are right in that I should have done my own fact checking before I posted, especially since I was not sure of my memory, which was clearly not accurate on the contents of the NIE. I should have waited until I had time to check. I DID ask for correction if I was wrong, however, didn’t I?

           On the other hand, I stick by what I said about there being no evidence that Iran had a nuclear weapons program prior to 2003. Several people, including Scott Ritter, have also pointed this out.

         • 

           BooMan on February 2, 2009 at 7:59 pm

           If you look at the NIE, it lists what it means when it uses those various categories (high confidence, moderate confidence, etc.).

           It says this:

           * We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were
           working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons…

           <snip>

           * We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo
           the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
           within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s
           key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable
           effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment,
           only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
           plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons–and such a decision
           is inherently reversible.

           In other words, they express with high confidence (the highest level they use) that Iran was developing nuclear weapons prior to 2003.  It appears that the invasion of Iraq focused their minds.  

           As they also note, Iran has many reasons to desire a nuclear weapon and any decision to forego efforts to attain them is reversible.  

           Those are the assessments of the NIE and they don’t support pretty much anything you have said about Iran on this forum.  

           Now, whether the international community and the anti-proliferation components of the United Nations should be prohibiting Iran from getting nuclear weapons is a matter for debate.  And whether the United States should threaten Iran and lie about Iran’s capabilities and our intelligence about their capabilities are also areas for debate.

           But Iran has merely suspended their nuclear program and they did it only after the US had invaded both of their neighbors and stationed 200,000 troops there.  

         • 

           Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 11:43 pm

           Look, BooMan, I made a mistake, and a serious one. I made a statement based on a recollection I was not sure of without waiting until I had time to confirm whether my memory was accurate or not. That’s bad on any level you care to name, and there is no excuse for it. At least I did indicate that I was not completely sure of my recollection, and invited someone who had the text available to confirm or correct.

           Beyond that, the NIE most certainly does not contradict “pretty much everything” I have said about Iran. On the contrary, it tends to confirm the thing I have said most frequently, which is that there is no evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. In fact, the evidence from all sources tends to indicate that they do not.

           And I have not only never denied that Iran has plenty of very good reasons to desire nuclear weapons, I have enumerated some of them. In that context I have also pointed out that the credible reasons that Iran might want nuclear weapons are about defense/deterrence and not a desire to destroy America or “wipe Israel off the map” (which, I feel compelled to remind people, is not what Ahmadinajad actually said).

           In general, I hope you are not suggesting that the NIE on Iran is infallible. As we know very well, not only are NIE’s not infallible, they have been known, particularly in the last eight years, to be to one degree or another politicized. Therefore, I do not take everything in this NIE to be the final truth. I prefer to rely on a broader collection of sources.

           I have said there is no evidence that Iran ever had a nuclear weapons program prior to 2003. That might be too definitive a statement. There were suspicions that Iran had a nuclear weapons program, but it was not confirmed.

         • 

           G Hazeltine on February 3, 2009 at 12:21 am

           Exactly which ‘nuclear program’? As Jeff Huber put it, “I’ve said this again and again but it demands repeating: The Russians didn’t begin building Iran’s first reactor until fall of 2002. If Iran halted its weapons program in fall of 2003, it had to have been the kind of weapons program a couple of Revolutionary Guard colonels drew up on a bar napkin at the Fort Farsi officers’ club.”

           He takes apart the NIE here:

           http://zenhuber.blogspot.com/2007/12/when-did-iran-stop-beating-its-wife.html

           Throwing around the notion that ‘Iran was developing nuclear weapons’ before 2003 is at best sloppy, at worst dishonest.

           This line though is beyond outrageous: “But Iran has merely suspended their nuclear program and they did it only after the US had invaded both of their neighbors and stationed 200,000 troops there.” How in the holy bloody hell do you pretend to know that??

         • 

           Hurria on February 3, 2009 at 12:59 am

           “Throwing around the notion that ‘Iran was developing nuclear weapons’ before 2003 is at best sloppy, at worst dishonest.“

           More importantly, as Scott Ritter has said, it is dangerous.

           “But Iran has merely suspended their nuclear program and they did it only after the US had invaded both of their neighbors and stationed 200,000 troops there.“

           Yes, well, that kind of flies in the face of conventional wisdom, not to mention common sense. Very closely in time the U.S. invades non-nuclear Iraq, destroys its government, and turns the entire country and society on its head, and then decides to negotiate with long-time arch foe Korea soon after learning it has nuclear weapons. And this is supposed to convince Iran to abandon an ongoing nuclear weapons program instead of accelerating it?

           It’s also a nice example of the progressive version of American exceptionalism.

         • 

           G Hazeltine on February 4, 2009 at 2:55 pm

           From Alistair Crooke in Le Monde:
           “Not surprisingly, despite Iran’s cooperation with Washington during the war in Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003), its attempts to reach a so-called “grand bargain” with the US were all rebuffed or undercut by senior members of the Bush administration. The 2003 proposal to open talks with the US that appeared to acknowledge US security concerns – including the demand for an end to Iran’s support for Hizbullah and Hamas and to its nuclear programme, and recognition of Israel – has become a part of legend. But to assume that pressure caused Iran to offer to sever its links to the resistance and come to terms with Israel is to misread Iran’s intent. Iran’s offer was a nuanced reformulation of an earlier proposal for partnership and a discussion of all issues in contention. To interpret the 2003 episode as a signal that “pressure works”, and that more pressure on Iran will yield these and further concessions, may lead to a catastrophic error of policy.”

           http://mondediplo.com/2009/02/05iran

         • 

           ishmael on February 2, 2009 at 6:28 pm

           I find it hard to believe anyone here called you an ant-semitic liar. And I hope that’s not how you feel you are perceived.

         • 

           Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 6:32 pm

           Thank you, Ishmael. I appreciate that you took the trouble to say this.

           Unfortunately, there was recently an unmistakable implication of anti-Semitism, and an explicit accusation that I was lying when I challenged the anti-Semitism implication.

           I hope that is not how I am generally perceived here. It is certainly not how I am perceived by anyone who actually knows me.

         • 

           ejmw on February 2, 2009 at 7:14 pm

           I must have missed that episode, but wanted to chime in that I have no such perception of you.  I greatly appreciate your posts and your point of view.

         • 

           Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 7:52 pm

           Thank you. I really appreciate you taking the effort to say something.

           It’s just as well that episode went for the most part unnoticed. Unfortunately, it’s pretty strongly emblazoned on my memory and isn’t going to go away. And then to be called a liar on top it it – well, it still stings very badly.

         • 

           CabinGirl on February 2, 2009 at 7:55 pm

           I’ve never perceived you that way at all.  

         • 

           Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 8:18 pm

           Thank you, CG.

           As anyone who knows me is aware, I have very decent bona fides as an anti-anti-Semite. I have never felt it necessary to  talk about any of it, and I do not really want to honour the allegation by defending against, but it is not easy to overestimate how much it hurts coming from someone one respects and takes seriously.

         • 

           Indianadem on February 2, 2009 at 8:36 pm

           Hurria, for me you have done much to broaden my knowledge and hopefully, a better understanding of a region I know little about. Your beautiful photos are a gift. Thank you.

         • 

           Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 11:07 pm

           Thank you. It’s my honour to be able to share the photos here, and a bonus to have people appreciate them.

3. 

   Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 5:36 pm

   Bashar Al Asad is actually a very western-oriented guy who has repeatedly tried to reach out. He lived in London for years and had a successful ophthalmology practice there, for heaven’t sake! He has tried several times to reach out to Israel, in fact.

   This pretense we have been living through that he is some kind of dangerous extremist is beyond absurd. I guess it has profited the Zionists and neocons to keep it up Of course, he might insist upon being treated with respect, and I am not sure he would ever make a good puppet like Mubarak et al., so maybe that is the problem.

   • 

     Steven D on February 2, 2009 at 5:45 pm

     The problem isn’t the man, the problem is the Golan Heights. Israel wants to keep it, and Syria wants ot back. Syria could be the most pro-US democracy in the Middle East and that fact wouldn’t change. So what do you do if you are Israel and its US supporters? Demonize the Syrians and Assad.

     That said, Assad is a dictator. He may be a relatively benign dictator as dictators go, but I’d personally prefer a democracy in Syria. And Egypt. And Saudi Arabia. None of which is likely to occur anytime soon.

     • 

       Steven D on February 2, 2009 at 5:48 pm

       And here is the reason Israel wants the Golan — It’s the water.

     • 

       Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 6:14 pm

       Yes, of course, I am very aware of the situation in regard to the Golan Heights. It is, among other things, Israel’s most successful ethnic cleansing project to date – 96% of the Syrian population systematically cleansed and 95% of the cities, towns, and villages demolished within weeks. And of course Israel has been illegally colonizing it and illegally stealing its resources ever since. Yes, it is the water, but not just the water. It is also the very fertile agricultural land that Israel is stealing.

       “I’d personally prefer a democracy in Syria. And Egypt. And Saudi Arabia.“

       Of course Al Asad is a dictator, and benign is not quite the word I would choose for his regime. It is not so much him, either, but the regime that is the problem.

       Please do not take this in the wrong way – I don’t mean it harshly – but it is really none of your business what form of government Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have. And do be careful what you wish for. It is extremely unlikely that democracy in those countries would work out well for the United States – or Israel.

       In fact, it is not necessarily the case that it would work out all that well for the people in those countries at this point. I’m not saying it would not, I’m just sayin’ that we all need to be careful what we wish for.

       • 

         Steven D on February 2, 2009 at 6:16 pm

         Not to worry — my wishes rarely come true.

         • 

           Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 7:02 pm

           That said, of course I would prefer to see a form of government in each of those countries that would fully honour the rights and desires of all their citizens and inhabitants. It’s just that I would like to see this form of government evolve without the self-interested meddling of the U.S. and other powers.

         • 

           Steven D on February 2, 2009 at 7:40 pm

           We agree on that point.

         • 

           Hurria on February 2, 2009 at 7:53 pm

           Somehow I was pretty sure we did.

4. 

   corvus on February 2, 2009 at 11:21 pm

   Hm, nobody on the right complained when presidential candidate Ronald Reagan reached out to the Iranians behind the scenes… to prolong the hostage crisis. In fact, they prefer not to talk about it.

   The real danger to the right is that an America without slavering enemies is an America in which they cannot peddle the only things they have to sell: fear and hatred.

   • 

     Hurria on February 3, 2009 at 1:02 am

     I don’t think it is fair to say that fear and hatred are the only things America has to sell.

     • 

       corvus on February 3, 2009 at 9:21 am

       That’s not what I meant; sorry if I didn’t phrase that as clearly as I should have. I was referring to what the Republicans have to sell; outside of the GOP, America has a great deal to offer the world.