Big Tent Democrat (aka Armando) takes exception to my piece on 11-Dimensional chess. Apparently, he coined the term (or claims to, anyway). Now, Armando’s thesis is that to the extent the public option is still alive it is only through the efforts of progressives, labor unions, and activists who have kept the pressure on the administration. Whether that is largely or only partially true is kind of unknowable, but it is certain that we wouldn’t be in this position without the tireless efforts of the supporters of a public option.
I’d like to limit the amount of ‘what-ifs’ in my analysis, so I won’t attempt to assign degrees of responsibility. What I do know is that there were several very logical reasons for the administration’s wishy-washy position on the public option. Their first responsibility was to canvas the Senate and find out where the reform effort stood. They did that back in the winter and realized that the effort was in trouble. With Al Franken unseated and Kennedy and Byrd in ill-health, the prospect of getting 60 votes didn’t look so hot. So, they made sure to include language in the budget that would allow them to come back in the fall and pass the bill through the Budget Reconciliation process at the 51-vote threshold. This put the Republicans on notice that they couldn’t just obstruct, obstruct, obstruct and think they would succeed in preventing reform. Unfortunately, they didn’t get the message.
The administration also realized back in the winter that they didn’t have unanimity in support of a public option within their Senate caucus. They could overcome that problem with the Budget Reconciliation gambit, but they also knew two things.
- 1. That it would be difficult to do all the things they wanted to do using reconciliation because of parliamentary obstacles.
2. That it would be a highly contentious move that would require a lot of groundwork to justify.
When they looked at the Senate, they realized that they could get the public option through Kennedy’s HELP Committee, but they’d never get it through Baucus’s Finance Committee. But they also knew they didn’t need to get the public option through the Finance Committee. All they needed was for Baucus to report something. If it deadlocked in Finance, the whole thing would come to a stall.
So, what was the logical solution? Answer: Get the public option passed in the four committees where it could pass, and then drop it from the Finance discussion where it could not.
How would that have worked if Obama had staked out a position that he wouldn’t sign anything without a public option?
The question answers itself. That strategy would not have worked at all. And, as I detailed in my previous post, in refusing to stake out an ironclad position, Obama presented a ‘formless’ target for the Teabaggers and Townhall Screamers, as well as the Republican caucuses. He appeared to be bending over backwards to reach a compromise, and the polls bear out that he succeeded in leaving that impression. Creating that impression was an absolutely critical element in shaping public opinion for the final steps of this process, whether it is done through reconciliation or not.
Speaking only for myself.
Autocracy is so much easier I wonder why we don’t consider returning to it. Take for example…
Anyone hear of any problems with Samoa since 1962? I think we could learn a thing or two from them.
Would you prefer Nixon, Reagan, or Dubya be our king?
A previous record-holder was Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Now hated in Ethiopia and deified in the Caribbean.
That it’s easier to govern a country the size of Newport News, VA than the third most populous country in the world?
I made the same point in an open thread here, a little while ago, when I predicted that, if we end up with a public option, many progressives will be quick to take all the credit for “forcing” it upon Obama, without considering the possibility that he used some strategy to get to that point.
No one disputes that pressure from the left is a good thing. But I don’t see why such pressure must be accompanied by cynicism about the administration’s motives and tactics.
Sometimes the best plan to reach one’s objective includes declining to threaten “my way or else.”
Hmm. Shades of skippy? Here Armando/BTD simply states that “Today it is known as…”, and not that he coined the phrase:
(Emphasis supplied.) As I wrote earlier in a comment, “up yours” to the ACLU used to be known as “triangulation” when a certain William Jefferson Clinton did it. Today it is known as “11 dimensional chess.” Another episode today demonstrates the transformation of “triangulation” into “11 dimensional chess:”
It’s good to see a credible argument that justifies some optimism re hcr. The downside of a “formless” strategy is that while it deprives the enemy of a solid target it is also depriving the ally of a solid rallying point. We went into this year, most of us, buoyed by hope that change was indeed on the way. Obama’s vagueness on specifics made that hope hard to sustain — hence the bleeding in his approval numbers mainly from those who had voted for him.
I do think there’s an overlooked bit of evidence that supports something like the “formless” theory: his speeches. Seems to me there’s been a kind of cognitive dissonance going on, where Obama’s rhetoric includes some of the most radical general principles and worldview we’ve heard in generations (at least on the left), and some of the strongest liberal rhetoric. The idea that health care is a fundamental right, for example, or simply his calling out the insurancecos. Or his startling analysis of race in America. On the other hand, there’s been little hard action that meshes with those generalities.
To many on the left, that equates to hypocrisy, sellout, even echoes of teabagger attacks against him. The strategic argument is the one explanation that allows us to root for both outcomes to the left of what we’re seeing so far, and at the same time hold onto our faith in Obama’s intentions, honesty, and effectiveness. If the theory is correct, and if he makes it work to bring about decent health care reform, he will go down in history as not only a great changebringer but also a grand strategic master. Despite many bouts of anger and despair, I’m mostly still betting on that outcome. We’ll see soon enough.
Well put.
It’s amazing how seeing public opinion survive the teabagger onslaught and having the 60 Senator finally (stay healthy Sen. Byrd) has begun to change the mood of the netroots.
Of course, by having no rallying point, the allies had to invent one; Rahm is undercutting real reform. And that was what rallied the effort to solidify the Congressional Progressive Caucus.
And even given “formlessness” as a strategy, there is the possibility that it could (still) fail. Armando is right as far as he goes; the rallying of the netroots and the pressure put on progressives in Congress might well turn out to be a turning point.
Strategists are not omniscient. Or omnipotent.
I agree that the pressure from the left has been absolutely essential to making the strategy work. It helps redefine the playing field and lets Obama credibly seek bipartisanship. Even the personal attacks from the left that I deplore undercut claims that he is a raging lefty/socialist etc etc etc.
If this is all a strategy, it is breathtaking in its boldness and its selflessness. As you suggest, success is by no means guaranteed. Standing tall for single-payer or something like it from the beginning would have left Obama in much better political shape whatever the outcome. Failure would still leave him admired for putting up the good fight, giving it all he’s got. Success would have made him an FDR-level hero for the rest of his term, even if the final bill turned out to be a tepid compromise.
If we are to believe the “formless” theory, he instead chose a strategy that he believe improved the odds of success for a good bill. A failure now will be blamed on his “wishy-washyness” or even his perfidy. A success will be claimed as a save by the left. But Obama will have gotten the job done. If that’s not all a fantasy, we are indeed witnessing a new kind of politics.
But the left response did form – around the public option. All of the other reforms in the bill could be taken for granted (no small feat in and of itself) and all energy was placed on getting this one thing included.
This diary is no great revelation to anyone that recognized what was coming and how it was coming early on. But the entire process could have been a lot easier if the left side of the Blogosphere that has a brain had not bandwagoned the Public Option in the first place.
Pressure from the left for single payer could have made it hard for even the finance committee to ignore a public option and we would not be talking about whetehr or not there would be one but, instead, how strong it would be. And the reconciliation threat might have even been single payer, even if that would be unlikely to happen in the Senate at all, EVER, under this political climate.
Just my two cents… For what it’s worth.
Yep, the progressive netroots fell asleep at the switch after the euphoria of the inauguration and the early disappointments on a change of policy in the DOJ.
And we fail to appreciate still the effect that the Republican holds on appointments have had. Now with nominally 60 votes in the caucus, moving those appointments through should be an early test of how procedurally unified the caucus will be.
Yeah. It was kind of a strange spectacle, when you think about it. The lefties posturing and blustering yet folding as soon as single-payer was taken “off the table”, and taking up the tepid compromise of the public option. I think we let the side down when it comes to “making him do it”. I’ve wondered whether Obama and the progressive legislators were hoping for a massive pushback against “off the table” that never really materialized in a sustained way. Instead most of bloggieland settled for attacking Obama for not going it alone.
“the progressive legislators were hoping for a massive pushback against “off the table” that never really materialized”
It materialized but was never capitalized on and was even hampered by a slew of “A-listers” that ignored it.
I am not saying that we still can’t get something good out of what we have to work with… But we could have done a hellalot better.
The administration walked out the death of the “public option” not once, not twice but three fucking times before the morons in the progsphere woke from their post-electoral slumber, hit the bait and sorta shored up the left flank.
I think that what Armando misses in his analysis is that the push-back from the left was part of the strategy.
Its not a situation of either Obama or us. Its all of us doing our bit to make it happen.
I agree with your analysis of Obama’s moves BooMan. But I also think that none of that would have worked without progressives speaking up.
I don’t disagree that the progressives need to fight for their agenda in order to see their agenda passed into law. I just don’t buy the idea that progressives are forcing Obama to get his agenda enacted against his will.
I agree 100%.
I think that your two posts on this have been exceptional!!
I’m at a loss to imagine how a bunch of nitwits screaming about being thrown under the bus could have helped anything.