Joe Girardi did about the worst job I’ve ever seen of managing a playoff baseball game tonight, and I’m angry. His first error came in the bottom of the sixth inning. The Angels had two outs with a runner on first and their clean-up batter, Vladimir Guerrero, at the plate. The Yankees were leading the game 3-1. After the Yankee starting pitcher Andy Pettitte got two strikes on Guerrero, Girardi decided to run out to the mound to talk to the catcher. Pettitte clearly looked annoyed by whatever was said. His next pitch landed in the outfield seats…game tied 3-3. Having broken his pitcher’s concentration, Girardi left him in the game and was lucky that Pettitte was able to record the third out.

Then, in the bottom of the seventh, Girardi sent Pettitte back out to the mound. Why? As soon as Pettitte recorded the first out, he brought in reliever Joba Chamberlain. Chamberlain has been a starting pitcher all year and is clearly more comfortable starting innings, rather than coming in in the middle of an inning. The first batter he faced clubbed a triple to right. The second batter he faced hit a sacrifice fly. Angels up 4-3. The third batter he faced roped a double to right.

Girardi’s most criminal offense occurred in the top of the eighth. The designated hitter, Hideki Matsui, led off the inning by gaining a base on balls. Matsui has aching knees, so everyone knew that Girardi would be pinch-running for him. He had three choices on who to select as the pinch runner. He could use Freddy Guzman, a light-hitting outfielder who is only on the roster for such situations, Jerry Hairston Jr., who isn’t the best option for stealing bases, or Brett Gardner, who typically replaces the weak-armed leftfielder Johnny Damon late in games.

When you pinch-run for the designated hitter you lose the ability to use that player in the field. Or, rather, you still reserve that right, but it comes at a high price. If you move the DH into a fielding position, the rules say that your pitcher must henceforth take his turn at bat. So, Girardi decided to use his best late-inning defensive replacement, Brett Gardner, as his pinch-runner. This was stupid. It will become increasingly apparent how stupid it was as I go on.

With Gardner now at first, the first pitch to catcher Jorge Posada was a strike. With a 0-1 count, and it quite obvious that the Yankees were intent on stealing a base, the potential for a pitch-out was so obvious that I said three times, “They’re going to pitch-out.” That is, of course, exactly what they did, but Girardi had given the steal signal. The catcher received the pitch-out standing and threw a peg down to second-base, beating Gardner by a mile. One out, no one on. Then Posada homered, tying the game but, critically, not taking the lead.

If there was a defense for using Gardner over Guzman as the pinch-runner, it was that Gardner is a better hitter. But the next time Gardner’s slot came up in the batting order, with two-out and one on in the top of the ninth, Girardi pinch-hit for him with Jerry Hairston Jr.. Hairston struck out.

It gets worse. In the tenth inning, the Yankees were forced to bring their legendary closer, Mariano Rivera, into the game with a runner on second and no one out. With the bases loaded and one out, Girardi decided it was time to replace Johnny Damon in left field. This was a good move. A short fly ball to left might score the runner on third, losing the game. The Yankees needed a stronger arm out there, just in case. Unfortunately, the only available stronger arm was now Jerry Hairston Jr., the designated hitter. Putting him in left field meant that Mariano Rivera would have to bat in Johnny Damon’s spot in the order. Johnny Damon was due up third in the top of the eleventh inning.

Rivera was able to wiggle out of the jam, sending the game to the eleventh. But, after Cabrera and Jeter made quick outs, Girardi had to decide whether to let Rivera hit so that he could pitch the next inning, or to pinch-hit for him. He decided to waste Rivera and pinch-hit the third-string catcher. The catcher struck out.

Then, in the bottom of the eleventh, Girardi brought in David Robertson to pitch. Robertson led the league in strike-outs per inning pitched this year. He easily recorded the first two outs. But Girardi decided not to let him finish the inning. He called for a pitcher who had blown the lead in Game Two, nearly costing the Yankees the game. The first hitter singled. The second hitter doubled him home. The Yankees lost the game, 5-4.

This was clearly an example of over-managing. He tinkered too much. He used up too many players and used them in the wrong situations. He didn’t trust his pitchers. He telegraphed his decisions and was outsmarted. Overall, a truly terrible job. Just atrocious.