One of the biggest difficulties with the plan Harry Reid is floating to include an opt-out public option in the base health care bill is that it turns over veto power to every single Democratic senator. The plan eschews the hard-won support of Sen. Olympia Snowe in favor of attempting to get a better piece of legislation prior to the Conference Committee. But that means that no Republicans support it. And that means that Reid needs every single Democrat, plus Bernie Sanders and Joe Lieberman, to vote for cloture and kill the Republican filibuster. And the problem with that is that senators Ben Nelson, Evan Bayh, Mary Landrieu, Kent Conrad, Blanche Lincoln, and Joe Lieberman have all expressed that they do not support a public plan even if it has an opt-out provision. Reid can get them to vote for cloture, perhaps, but he will have to compensate each and every one of them in some way. Their price may be a vote on amendments that have the potential to blow up the deal. The opportunities for mischief are very high.
“He’s knows what he’s doing is a gamble,” Reid spokesman Jim Manley said. “But more and more, he’s convinced it’s the right thing to do.”
Or, as someone told Ezra Klein:
On Thursday night, Reid went over to the White House for a talk with the president. The conversation centered on Reid’s desire to put Schumer’s national opt-out plan into the base bill…One staffer briefed on the conversation says “the White House basically told us, ‘We hope you guys know what you’re doing.'”
Now, to go back to my last post, last July the president explained his strategy to me and others in the progressive blogosphere:
I am less interested in making sure there’s a litmus test of perfection on every committee than I am in going ahead and getting a bill off the floor of the House and off the floor of the Senate…Does it have a serious public option in place? …Conference is where these differences will get ironed out…But I’m not assuming either the House and Senate bills will match up perfectly with where I want to end up.
The president never thought he could get a public option (robust, or not) in the pre-conference Senate bill. The reason is obvious. He didn’t have any Republican support for it, he didn’t even have support for it from enough Democrats on the Finance Committee, and cloture was unreachable with less than 60 members of the Democratic Caucus, but he only had a sketchy 59 members in the Caucus.
His stated plan was to get the House and the Senate to pass their bills and then fight to make sure that the Conference Report included the following:
Does this bill cover all Americans? Does it drive down costs both in the public sector and the private sector over the long-term. Does it improve quality? Does it emphasize prevention and wellness? Does it have a serious package of insurance reforms so people aren’t losing health care over a preexisting condition? Does it have a serious public option in place? Those are the kind of benchmarks I’ll be using.
If this plan was going to work, it was going to rely on two things. First, the House was going to have to pass a public option (the stronger, the better) so that he had something to work with in Conference. Second, he was going to have rely on the sheer momentum for reform that would be created by both houses of Congress passing a bill, to bully the whole Democratic caucus to vote for cloture. But, even this plan seemed out of reach so long as the Democrats could not rely on both Byrd and Kennedy to be available for a vote.
This meant he had to do two things. He had to consider what it would take to win over Olympia Snowe (in the event that either Byrd or Kennedy were not available to vote). And he had to have the back-up plan of using the budget reconciliation process if either Snowe’s price was too high of both Byrd and Kennedy were unavailable to vote. Or, of course, there were conservative Democrats who were exacting too high a price for their cloture vote.
Think about these hurdles for a moment. Even in the best case scenario, each and every Democratic caucus member would have to be willing to vote for cloture. That meant that Obama couldn’t piss off any of them. If Kent Conrad wanted to explore co-ops, that was just something that had to be indulged. If the Finance Committee wanted to go in a totally different direction than the other committees, their views had to be respected. The question isn’t whether or not Obama has been playing 11-Dimensional Chess, but how anyone could expect him to succeed doing anything less.
So, now the stars have aligned in a way even the biggest optimist could not have anticipated. We have 60 healthy members of the caucus (for now, anyway). It is at least theoretically possible to pass a public option through the Senate on the first pass. Harry Reid is under immense pressure to make the attempt. The White House has to decide whether Reid can actually pull it off, and whether the reward outweighs the risk. After all, the plan all along assumed that the Senate could not do this, but that they could succeed in getting a public option passed anyway. What if they follow Reid’s plan and it backfires and the Senate can’t pass anything? What if what they pass includes undesirable amended language that it is impossible for them to strip out in Conference? Why lock in things that are unnecessary and hard to remove?
The calculations are incredibly complex, and the Obama administration has always followed a strategy of moving the ball forward and disempowering any single senator’s ability to obstruct. Now, I don’t really buy the narrative that has been told about Reid’s Thursday meeting with the White House. I don’t think Reid would float the opt-out compromise publicly to see how it would fly with the White House. He must have received permission to float it from the White House. In essence, they said, ‘okay, if you think you can get cloture for this, go ahead and float it and see what reaction you get.’ And, when they met at the White House, it sounds like they were willing to go along with Reid’s plan but were also nervous about placing veto power in people like Ben Nelson and Joe Lieberman’s hands. Thus, “We hope you know what you’re doing.”
If Reid gets double-crossed, or the process produces some poison-pill amendment, then the whole effort to pass this under regular order will fail, and fail because of a lack of Democratic unity. That won’t mean that the president won’t be able to revert back to the budget reconciliation process, but it will be a major blow to the momentum for reform that could derail even the effort to do it through budget reconciliation.
It’s a very high risk proposition. This isn’t about whether to pass a public option or not. It’s about passing a bill through the Senate on the first pass.
Also available in orange.
If Reid gets double-crossed……
Well……….what are the chances that won’t happen?
If you’re playing bridge, would you want Harry Reid across the table from you?
When it boils down to coming out on the winning side of a very risky strategy, having Reid as your General is cold comfort.
the Hamlet in the White House.
At least Hamlet can be forgiven for his having really been in an untenable and powerless position. If, in his despondency, he acted in patently desperate ways, it’s because he was desperate.
Even on “paper” he had no majority of the house. He was a minority of one.
Even as a minority, the Republicans haven’t flinched or balked at saying, “Oh yeah? Over our dead bodies!”
“flinched and balked”.
As Americans thirst for leadership.
Here are some points where solid answers would make this analysis more convincing:
— Is it really likely that even Nelson or Lieberman would stand up and be the senators that killed health care reform by filibustering with the Republicans? Take even the most cynical scenario: they’re not planning to run again, and are paving the way for cushy jobs/contracts with the insurancecos. Would that be worth being the pariahs in the Senate for the remainder of their terms? Would they have any value to the insurancos as lobbyists when they’d have negative influence with the Dem establishment? Or to put it another way, how much risk is there, really, that they’d filibuster with the GOP when the cards are down?
— Why is the conference report such a holy grail? Won’t whatever comes out be subject to the same filibuster threat? What would change at that point from now?
— How would a poison pill amendment get into the Senate bill over a Dem filibuster or other procedural blocks? Even if it did, if the public option can be fixed in the conference bill, why couldn’t the pill?
— Isn’t it a huge assumption that Snowe would have gone against the GOP filibuster unless the bill was totally useless? She did warn us that she wasn’t committing to anything no matter what goodies were added to make her happy. Isn’t depending on her more risky than depending even on the worst Dem or Lieberman?
— The analysis only talks about having to give carrots, but not sticks. Is it assumed that sticks (committee seats, etc) have no leverage?
I think credible answers to those points would make it easier to swallow the analysis. Most basically, I still don’t get why it’s riskier to face the filibuster now than at a later stage. Is it totally ridiculous to imagine that even a couple of Reps might opt out of the filibuster when the vote is called? Dems who join in will be dead meat come the next election, but being part of the Gang that Killed Healthcare could end some GOP careers, too, no? In a way the Reps will be in worse shape because they’ll be open to merciless attack from Dems during their next campaign, while Dem attacks on Dems will tend to be a little more muted.
Excellent questions.
On the first one: the plan for passing the bill under regular order relies on momentum. Pure and simple. The threat of a filibuster is enough to make Obama back down while the bill is being marked-up. But once it is through both Houses, the pressure not to filibuster is overwhelming. This touches on other points you made.
The Conference Report cannot be amended, which means that you cannot filibuster by other means, as was done on the Stimulus, by offering an infinite number of amendments. They motion to debate the Conference Report is not subject to a vote, so debate cannot be blocked thru the filibuster. Only the motion to move to a final vote can be filibustered, and that is where you rely on momentum to carry you (we’ve come so far…).
The poison pill comes up when the price for a cloture vote is a Lieberman amendment that passes. Then, you have to turn around and strip it out, pissing Lieberman (or another hypothetical senator) off so much that their cloture vote is put at risk. This should be manageable, but you never know, thus the risk factor.
On the Snowe issue, we can’t rely on her vote for something she says she won’t vote for.
On your last point, it’s difficult but doable to threaten a single senator’s seniority. It’s much harder to do that to six or seven senators, as would be necessary to use a pure stick approach.
” Only the motion to move to a final vote can be filibustered, and that is where you rely on momentum to carry you (we’ve come so far…). “
You make much of this supposed “momentum”, as though it’s very fearsome or, if not fearsome, at least the linch-pin in the affair. I certainly don’t get the impression that Republicans are intimidated by the president and don’t see why they’re going to hesitate before “momentum”, either. On the other hand, I do get the distinct impression that the president is intimidated by the Republicans —any one of them, not to mention all of them. The mere threat of a filibuster is now known to be all that’s required to cause him to draw back, to fold on some contentious point.
The Republicans seem to recognize that they have nothing to fear in playing for broke as the “minority party” (LOL!!!). However, when the Democrats were in the minority, they didn’t feel free to go take a piss without unanimous consent. So, it’s now almost a fearure of Washington culture that Republicans, whether a majority or minority, fear nothing from Democrats, while, for Democrats, the reverse seems to be the case. As a practical matter, the Democrats’ numerical “majority” (LOL!!!) means strictly nothing. It’s useless when it comes to any measure which the Republicans choose, at their whim, to view as controversial. And in the current climate, it seems that anything the Democrats want to do meets that bar.
As soon a one allows it to be understood that he views himself as having “everything to lose” while he sees his opponents (as they see themselves) as having nothing to lose, then that looks to me like one starts out at a great disadvantage.
Obama’s aversion to “drama” and his marked and well-known tendencies to seek “consensus” make this all the more problematic for him. His is not the temperament nor the strategy that our “take-no-prisoners” political climate demands. If he wants to start making some progress —beyond what Republicans are happy to “give away” anyway—, I think he needs to make some people very afraid, and, if he can’t do that, the he should at least make something else very very clear–something like:
If you fight me, I will give you the fight of your life in return. There’s going to be blood on the floor and I’m going to see to it that as much of that as I can possibly make it be, is your blood. Even if I lose, you’re going to suffer.
If this bill is so vital, why hasn’t he treated it as though it is from the start? He fiddled, and I mean that almost literally, for a long time before he got around to appearing to take things seriously. In the process, he seems to have convinced his opponents, who didn’t any indication of needing much convincing in the first place, that “we can roll this guy. He’s just not tough.
Someday Democrats have to rediscover what a back-bone is and how to throw punches and knock the shit out of their opponents and impress on them that they’ve been in a fight. What, in the history we have to guide us, suggests that Reid and Pelosi are the people to do this? It seems to me that before Democrats can get tough with Republicans, they have to first get tough on themselves and, especially, their own “leadership” (LOL!!!) and, frankly, I don’t see that happening.
If Will Rogers were alive today, to the quip, “I’m not a member of any organized party…” he could add, “Please! Don’t hit me!”
Finally, all this analysis of the Kabuki makes me think of a disputatious family in which the husband and wife are arguing over the details of color options in a kitchen renovation while, as they argue, their house is burning around them.
“This isn’t about whether to pass a public option or not. It’s about passing a bill through the Senate on the first pass.“
It appears to me that the Republicans may, at their whim, make these one and the same issue.
Exactly.
Is Alan Grayson the first step in this process? I guess we’ll find out next year.
You entirely miss the point. The Democrats have 60 votes. They don’t need any Republicans unless a Democrat refuses to vote for cloture (either on the first-pass, or on the final passage on the conference report).
I wish everybody would quit using terms like “refuse to vote for cloture”, which is exotic and has a whiff of innocence about it, and start getting right to the point: “join the Republican filibuster to prevent a vote on healthcare reform”. Talking about cloture makes it sound like a sin of omission. The reality is that they’re actively preventing discussion and a vote.
I entirely miss the point? Isn’t the point (also) all about whether the Democrats shall still have 60 votes to overcome a potential filibuster once they see the Conference Report?—assuming it gets that far?
citing you, from above,
And didn’t you yourself call what’s still ahead, “It’s a very high risk proposition.” If that’s not “hedging,” what is it?
So, when the chips are down, if the Democrats don’t come through with the 60 votes for the Conference Report, your admonishment that, “You entirely miss the point. The Democrats have 60 votes,” becomes,
“If we had some ham, we could have ham and eggs—if we had some eggs.“
Will the Conference Report have 60 reliable Democratic votes for it? You don’t know whether it shall or not any more than I do. In your analysis, we’re to rely on this “momentum” for them, as I understand it. But the industries opposed to the legislation have long experience and they’ve been faced with momentum before. So, their “momentum” is pre-paid in the form of generous dollars in electoral support.
What’s to prevent Senator Baucus (or others) from saying of the Conference Report, this isn’t enough like the bill that came out of my committee’s work; I regret that I cannot support it” ? The fact that he’ll been on the Senate’s panel of conferees? If he is, will he still say words to the effect that he’d really like to have a public option but the votes for it weren’t there?
The problem with this analysis is that Snowe’s vote, for which she has not committed even with a trigger, only counters one defector. If you get two defectors, you’re still screwed. But the chances of a single defector are much lower than 2 or even 3 or 4: a single defector would have to take the entire blame for defeating health care reform, and it’s pretty clear that everyone in the Dem caucus wants to avoid that at all costs. The defectors need to credibly present themselves as at least some minute block.
Unfortunately, it’s still tea leaves. Obama and the White House never define “serious public option”. Does that include a trigger, negotiated rates, eligibility for a tiny fraction of the population, state-based opt-in plans, etc? We don’t know, and they’re not telling.
This guy expresses my feelings better than I can
http://www.actblue.com/page/obamafight
The hysteria going on over at Huffington Post in the comment section to the Stein/Grim article on this topic is mind-numbing. I’m beginning to wonder if people really want health care reform as opposed to just having something to argue about. And the number of commenters who seem to know next to nothing about the legislative process is also mind-numbing. I’ll have to admit that I left a comment referring them to your article, Booman, and to a McClatchy News article that deals with the same subject. I only hope that I haven’t brought a swarm of trolls down upon you. If so, please forgive me. I was only trying to encourage people to get out of the circular firing squad.
Here’s the McClatchy piece:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/77675.html?storylink=omni_popular
And here’s a link to the Stein/Grim piece:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/24/leaderless-senate-pushes_n_332844.html
Certainly, what BooMan is describing is possible, but a simpler explanation is that Obama & Co. don’t care that much about the public option, that they would rather get “something” passed for sure than fight harder for the passage of a bill that, in the minds of most of us, would make a much bigger positive difference in people’s lives.
I would argue the latter explanation is more likely, because I see no reason why Obama & Co. can’t lobby recalcitrant senators for a public option even if Obama & Co. are willing to settle for something less in the final bill. There is no evidence that such lobbying is occurring. Quite the contrary, I fear.
You add this to the way that Wall Street was recapitalized and the new administration’s foreign and security policy…a clear and disturbing pattern has emerged.
We shall see. Hoping for the best.
It is going to happen and that is that. Bet thing is to try to make the bill as good as possible rather than trying to stop the unstoppable.