It’s easy to forget how much energy went into Pan-Arabism in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. How many people remember that Syria and Egypt were one country between 1958-1961, called the United Arab Republic, and that it was loosely aligned with North Yemen? How many people remember that Iraq and Jordan formed an alliance/country in 1958 called the Arab Federation which was basically a Hashemite Kingdom? It only lasted six months until a military coup removed the Iraqi king from power. I think we should keep this history in mind when we think about the possible attitude of a future democratically elected government in Egypt.
Personally, I don’t think Egypt will be much friendlier towards Iran than the Mubarak was during his reign. But they probably will be friendlier towards Syria. And, while I don’t expect any revival of the United Arab Republic, I do think there is a possibility of more Arab unity, which could mean a big reduction in how much influence Iran has over Syria. I think it’s hard to overestimate how much disdain there is among most Arabs, especially the elites, for Shi’ites. So, to a large degree, Arab unity translates as Sunni unity. Certainly, that is the sentiment that the Saudis will try to exploit. The Saudis have been losing influence in Syria and Lebanon, and the wave of democratic reforms sweeping North Africa and parts of the Arabian Peninsula are threatening to their regime. What better distraction than to ramp up the Sunni/Shi’a divide?
Syria, of course, is run by Alawites, which is an offshoot of Shi’a Islam, but which is seen as heretical by the Iranian clerics who run that country. Yet, according to the CIA World Factbook three-quarters of Syrians are Sunnis, while only 16% are Alawites or some other non-Sunni Muslim. It’s a Sunni majority country run by an Alawite elite. It’s almost a mirror image of Bahrain, which is Shi’ite majority country run by a Sunni elite. If democratic reforms come to Syria, the first change we’re likely to see is a Sunni elite reestablishing control of the country.
This is basically what I predict will happen, especially because it is in the interests of all major parties in the region (excepting Iran and Iraq), including Israel. Pretty much everyone would like to see Iran have less influence over Syria and, by extension, Hizbollah have less control over Lebanon. Even in the case of Hamas and the Gaza Strip, I think Egypt will want more direct control and less influence from Iran.
The situation in Jordan also bears watching. The King and Queen there enjoy more popularity and legitimacy than most other regional leaders, but they certainly have a lot of detractors and a lot of internal problems. There will be a lot of pressure on the monarchy, especially if change comes to Syria. A real threat to their rule would put the principles that Obama laid out yesterday to their truest test.
“The United States also strongly supports the universal rights of the Libyan people. That includes the rights of peaceful assembly, free speech, and the ability of the Libyan people to determine their own destiny. These are human rights. They are not negotiable. They must be respected in every country. And they cannot be denied through violence or suppression.”
It’s very hard to sort out all the competing interests and how they might combine, but it seems to me that the democratic wave will be incomplete for a time, and that the democratic nations will align themselves somewhat with the surviving monarchies to check the power of Iran. In this effort I expect a miniature revival of a kind of pan-Arabism, but with a certain degree of Sunni chauvinism attached. And I expect the first target to be the Alawite regime in Syria.
Iran will react, of course, and they will seek to draw closer to Iraq while exploiting the democratic wave where it might benefit them, as in Bahrain or in the oil-producing Shi’a-majority regions of Saudi Arabia.
And, throughout all of this, we’ll be witnessing something new and exciting, which is the realization within the Arab world that there is route to empowerment and a better life that is not built on the Iranian model, nor on terrorism, nor even on anything strictly anti-Western. It’s called democracy and human rights, won through superior organization, patience, and non-violence.
The challenge for the West will be to deftly decide when to keep their hands off, and to be very disciplined about defining what is in our essential interests. The most sober thing to do would be to begin making contingencies for a sustained interruption of oil flow from the region, particularly from both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Because the world economy, our jobs, our prosperity, and even our way of life still depend on the availability of affordable energy sources from the region. But the stability genie is out of the bottle, and future good relations with the region will depend a lot on whether we were friends or enemies of the reformers.
Obama’s principles are a good place to start, but living up to them will be challenging in practice.
Speaking of principles, we have this today from Taegan Goddard:
http://politicalwire.com/archives/2011/02/24/flashback_quote_of_the_day.html
I’d be willing to bet those protesters last week remembered this when they were asking where the President was.
i personally doubt there will be much more arab unity. pan-arabism is pretty dead. and while the pan-arab channels like al-jazeera make it look like there might be an arab nationalistic revival, the same national rivalries and conflicting interests that killed the UAR (and that ruined the FAR from ever coming into existence) are still very much alive today.
what we’re seeing now is arabs from different countries inspiring each other to rise up against their government. assuming they reach power and the task turns to governing, then the same local issues that drove the prior generation apart will come into play again.
i actually think the most plausible scenario for a real revival of pan arabism is if the democratic wave fails. then the various arab leaders will find common cause in snuffing out the opposition in their respective countries. probably mutual concerns about survival is the one thing that can make arab leaders overlook their own parochial interests.
I’m thinking of a more aspirational pan-Arabism than any explosion of true unity. I think the monarchies have more staying power than the juntas, and that once the pressure subsides, the surviving monarchs will resort to a kind of Shi’a/Iran bashing to establish a degree of common cause with the democratic states. The democratic states will have a kind of affinity for each other, but their interest in spreading the revolution will be strongest where it would result in Sunni dominance and weakest where it would threaten it. So, that’s why I see Syria as a riper target for revolution than the kingdoms of Morocco or Jordan. It’s also why I think the monarchy in Bahrain will survive, while Algeria may see its government swept away.
Of course, Libya could be entering a period of sustained civil war which could put a halt to the democratic wave, as it will serve as an example of the downside of tossing aside stability in favor of the unknown.
i disagree with you about syria (that regime is probably the least threatened in the region. the opposition proclaimed a “day of rage” and no one but the security forces showed up anywhere but a few small towns in the kurdish region), but that’s an interesting distinction you make about monarchs vs. non-monarchs. i’m not sure why it would make a difference though.
of all the monarchs, i think the king of bahrain is in the most trouble, with jordan next most endangered after that. whatever extra legitimacy a monarchy has is undermined in bahrain by the fact that the king is a different religion than most of the citizens. the only reason i think the odds are in his favor is because the saudis and americans are so supportive of him.
with jordan the king has enjoyed some popularity, but his legitimacy is undermined by the fact that he is a transplant. the hashemites are from what is now saudi arabia. they were installed as the leaders of jordan, syria and iraq to reward the family for supporting the british in world war one. the hashemites in syria and iraq were quickly overthrown. the jordanian monarchy has survived because the king has tried to keep people happy and he has made some nods towards democracy. but rising expectations are the leading cause of revolution. in some sense that just makes it more ripe for change.
even so, it’s also quite possible that after tunisia, egypt and libya, the democratic wave will die down without overturning any more governments.
Am I being too optimistic in thinking that Jordan might peacefully evolve into a Constitutional Monarchy? Or am I too pessimistic in thinking that the likeliest result is that the Middle East falls to religious fanatic governments? Like Wisconsin?
I wasn’t trying to funny with the Wisconsin remark. Note the Indiana A-G’s tweet about using live ammunition to clear Madison of protesters and plans in both states to ban abortions. Not to mention the Us.S. House bill to force insurance companies to not fund abortions. (Who’s interfering in private commerce now?)
watching the happenings in Libya is painful, but I won’t complain about the President’s actions. I think these folks have to stand or fall on their own. I think they should have the right to fight for their country like anyone else.
As much as it pains me to see what’s going on, I agree with you.
You are getting too carried away with the sectarian stuff, especially when it comes to Syria. Syrian society is quite pluralistic with a significant and strong Christian population. It is governed by a secular socialist party, not a religious one. I am not saying that the fact that the ruling family is Alawite and most of the political power is in Alawite hands is a non-issue with everyone, but it is certainly not a big enough issue to bring about a revolution.
“I think it’s hard to overestimate how much disdain there is among most Arabs, especially the elites, for Shi’ites.“
It can’t be that hard, since it looks like you have managed to do it. In my experience among Arab elites I haven’t heard a whole lot of judgmental talk one way or the other about Shi’ites. Of course, that might be because among the elites who have formed my contacts over the decades there has always been a very generous number of…….Shi’ites? – oh, and and people from mixed Sunni-Shi`a families, not to mention a sprinkling of Christians, Yezidis, and various other religions too, including a few Jews. And, of course, secular people as well.
And yes, I have heard some negatively critical remarks, but rarely anything general. Usually the negative comments center around specific practices, such as self flagellation and temporary marriages, all of which I have heard criticized more by Shi’ites themselves than by Sunnis.
I don’t doubt there is in some segments of the Arab population great disdain toward Shi’ites, but in my experience it is not nearly as widespread or as deep as you seem to believe it is.
“I think it’s hard to overestimate how much disdain there is among most Arabs, especially the elites, for Shi’ites.“
It can’t be that hard, since it looks like you have managed to do it. In my experience among Arab elites I haven’t heard a whole lot of judgmental talk one way or the other about Shi’ites. Of course, that might be because among the elites who have formed my contacts over the decades there has always been a very generous number of…….Shi’ites? – oh, and and people from mixed Sunni-Shi`a families, not to mention a sprinkling of Christians, Yezidis, and various other religions too, including a few Jews. And, of course, secular people as well.
And yes, I have heard some negatively critical remarks, but rarely anything general. Usually the negative comments center around specific practices, such as self flagellation and temporary marriages, all of which I have heard criticized more by Shi’ites themselves than by Sunnis.
I don’t doubt there is in some segments of the Arab population great disdain toward Shi’ites, but in my experience it is not nearly as widespread or as deep as you seem to believe it is.
actually, especially in the GCC countries, there seems to be a lot of anti-iranian paranoia. when the people i talk to hear “shi’ite” they think that means iran. and any effort to give more political power to the shia’ minority (or in the case of bahrain, majority) is treated as if it is an iranian conspiracy and not an indigenous movement.
but that kind of thing varies a lot in other regions. from my (albeit brief) visit to syria, i agree that sectarianism doesn’t seem to be a big issue there. i spoke to christians, sunni and alawites and everyone claimed they had not run into problems with the other groups. kurds were a different matter, they were pretty disgruntled.
There’s more anti-Iran sentiment in Arab countries since the U.S. aggression in Iraq brought that kind of thing to the forefront. In Iraq there is quite a bit of confusion between Iran and Shi’ism as a result of the fact that power has fallen into the hands of some pretty backward Shi`a factions that allied themselves with Iran during Saddam’s time, are still very allied with Iran, and which have, since the American aggression and occupation empowered them, committed horrific atrocities not only against Sunnis, Christians, Sabaeans, and Yezidis, but against opposing Shi`as as well.
The reality is that historically Iraqi and other Shi`as are very distinct in most ways from Iranians. There is a far tighter historical connection between Iranian and Lebanese Shi`as than between Iranian and Iraqi Shi`as, despite assumptions to the contrary among American Middle East light-weight “experts” (this, and not the silly notion that Hezballah was created and is controlled by Iran, explains the connection between Hezballah and Iran).
I spend considerable time in Syria, and have a large number of friends and acquaintances there. It is my chosen destination in the Arab world since the U.S. began its 20-year destruction of Iraq in the 90’s. My time there is spent mainly hanging out and talking with friends, acquaintances, and strangers from all walks of life there, mostly in Arabic.
Syria has some major destinations for Shi`a pilgrims, such as the magnificent Umayyid mosque, which contains a Shrine to Imam Hussein. So, there are always a lot of Iranians about the place. The Umayyid mosque is an example of the lessons Syria has to teach us. It is a Sunni mosque that contains a shrine to Imam Hussein, revered by both Sunnis and Shi`as, and in the middle of the prayer area a shrine to John the Baptist, revered by both Christians and Muslims. In other parts of Syria are destinations that are shared by both Muslim and Christian pilgrims, such as the convent of Seydnayya, which houses an ancient portrait of Mary the mother of Jesus, revered by both Christians and Muslims. Do remember that Syria is the birthplace of Christianity, a fact of which most Syrians are very proud.
Yes, the Kurds have problems there, primarily as a result of discrimination by the government, not so much within society. That seems to be the lot of Kurds everywhere, and it is by far the worst in Turkey – yes, much worse than it has historically been in Iraq (rent the film Good Kurds, Bad Kurds for a pretty good picture of what life is like for Kurds in Turkey, and why Turkey’s horrific treatment and racism against Kurds is not know in the U.S.). I have rarely encountered more virulent social racism than that of Turks against Kurds. Certainly never saw that in Iraq, or in Syria.
A couple of years ago I met a group of Kurdish college students, mostly girls, on the train from Damascus to Aleppo. They were traveling home during a break, and we had a great conversation during the trip. We didn’t stay in touch, but I think I still have their e-mail addresses.
It is entirely normal in Syria to encounter very mixed groups of friends consisting of different flavors of Christians and Muslims, and varied ethnicities as well. Mixed marriages are not uncommon. I myself met and made friends independently with a Muslim woman and a Christian woman, and later discovered that they are neighbors and friends, so now the three of us go out together when I am there. The pluralistic nature of Syrian society reminds me strongly of how it used to be in Iraq, which might explain at least in part why I am so comfortable there.
My sense that Pan-Arabism in the sense Nasser and Gaddafi promoted it is dead; it was a thinly disguised effort to put together an empire across the Maghreb and to the Persian Gulf with those characters as emperor. The con job worked for a while.
What will remain is the Arab League. With luck, it will evolve into a regional mutual security organization that can conduct police actions like the OAU does in sub-Saharan Africa. Because it is a council of nations instead of a single authority, it is likely to be too slow than too fast to use force or to use it unwisely. For police actions, it will put together a temporary coalition force for the mission. With the underpinning of authentically democratic polities in its member nations, its evolution could follow the path of the European Union, which is slowly appropriating NATO as its security force.
And it likely will not align itself permanently with any single power.
No doubt going forward, the tension internally in the states that have become newly democratic is between majority rule and minority rights. The temptation to settle old scores will be a big danger as these countries rearrange their political institutions.
“The challenge for the West will be to deftly decide when to keep their hands off, and to be very disciplined about defining what is in our essential interests.”
And that’s one of the big reasons I’m sofa king glad I went for Obama and not Hilary “Obliterate Iran” Clinton.