If Jackson Diehl has a humanitarian bone in his body, he doesn’t display it in his mocking call for an American-led war in Syria. While Diehl notes that Bashar al-Assad’s regime is killing civilians, he doesn’t even stop to condemn it; he merely mentions it in passing. Instead, he focuses on “the failure of the United Nations or Syria’s neighbors to stop the country’s slide into civil war in the absence of U.S. leadership.” He details the failed efforts, in turn, of Turkey, the Arab League, Russia, and U.N. envoy Kofi Annan. He says that Sunni Arab efforts to arm the opposition have “floundered.” And then he lays out a doozy of an argument. He explains why Turkey has failed to create a “humanitarian corridor” in Syria:
[Prime Minister Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, a mercurial man, was infuriated. He allowed opposition leaders, including the Free Syrian Army, to take refuge and organize in Turkey. He repeatedly suggested that he supported the creation of a humanitarian corridor or refuge in Syria — in other words, a strip of territory that would be taken over by outside powers and if necessary, defended with military force.
But there is no humanitarian corridor. The reason is fairly simple: The Turkish military would not launch such a bold initiative without the active backing of the United States, if not NATO as a whole. It’s not that Turkey can’t do it: In 1998, it successfully intimidated the Syrian regime simply by massing its large army on the border.
But this crisis has exposed the weaknesses in Erdogan’s regional ambitions. As a former imperial power under the Ottomans, Turkey cannot intervene in an Arab state without risking a broad backlash. Its mildly Islamist Sunni government raises suspicions among Syria’s large Christian and Kurdish minorities — not to mention Assad’s Alawites.
The logic here is terrible. Turkey could create a humanitarian corridor in Syria because they once amassed their troops at the border. Imagine if someone said that the US could successfully occupy Iraq because in 1990 they amassed troops on the Kuwaiti border. He says that Turkey can do this but that they can’t do it because they are seen as an imperial power with a history of lording it over the Arabs. All they need is US and NATO backing, but they risk a “broad backlash.” Isn’t that a synonym for an insurgency?
Mr. Diehl does not explain why Turkey’s history with the Arabs is a problem while Europe and America’s history with the Arabs is not a problem. However, he does at least hint at the fact that Syria has other problems.
Sectarian tensions have also undermined the Arab League’s effort to assert itself. Sunni states, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, that have been eager to intervene have been checked by Shiite governments in Iraq and Lebanon. Meanwhile, independent efforts by the Gulf states to provide arms to the opposition have floundered.
As for Russia, its bid to reestablish itself as a player in the Middle East by brokering a Syrian settlement is also failing. The Kremlin wants to save Assad, but he refuses to take even the modest steps needed to open the way for a regime-preserving deal. Moscow can prevent the Security Council from authorizing tougher sanctions or military intervention, and it can supply the Syrian army with weapons and fuel. But the past few weeks have shown that it can’t stop Syria’s slide into civil war.
So, there it is. Despite the brutality of Assad’s regime, Russia, Iraq, Lebanon, and (obviously) Iran do not want to see the regime overthrown. Things break down along sectarian lines, with Sunnis generally in favor of regime change and Shi’ites generally opposed. Syria is technically ruled by the Alawites, who are a schismatic branch of Shi’a Islam. That explains why they are so closely aligned with Iran and with Hizbollah-dominated Lebanon. It also means that this civil war is about a lot more than humanitarianism. The CIA Factbook says that Syria is 90% Arab, and 74% Sunni Muslim. Alawites and Druze combined comprise only 16% of the population. We can predict how the Alawites would fare in a democratic system, or a Sunni dictatorship. That is why they fight so tenaciously.
The fundamental dishonesty of Mr. Diehl’s argument becomes apparent when we consider these facts. What he wants is not to prevent a civil war but for the opposition forces to win a civil war. I can hope for that, too, in an abstract way. Why should 74% of the population who are Sunni Muslim be ruled over by less than 16% who are Alawites? Why should Syrians live under a dictatorship at all? Why should Assad’s brutality be tolerated? And why not deny Iran a major ally that seems to do nothing but cause trouble for Lebanon and Israel? For political, strategic, and humanitarian reasons, and based on the principle of self-determination, I can certainly hope that the Sunni opposition prevails and throws the regime out.
But it would help if we were honest about what we want. It would also help if we were more realistic about the situation. This is a conflict between Russia and the United States, between Iran and the United States, between Iran and Saudi Arabia, between Iran and Israel, between Sunni Arab states and the Shi’a, between Alawites and the people they oppress in Syria, between Turkey and Syria, and between the European colonial powers and the anti-colonial forces and sentiments of the region.
Should we inject ourselves into this mess with a “humanitarian corridor” occupation? Having just left Iraq where we empowered the Shi’a majority, should we invade Syria in order to empower the Sunnis? These are the questions we need to be asking. But Mr. Diehl doesn’t ask them. Instead, we get this:
The United States, after all, is more than capable of creating and defending a humanitarian zone in Syria, with help from Turkey and NATO. If it were to support the arming of the Free Syrian Army, there is little question that the army would soon have more weapons. Many in the Syrian opposition believe that merely the announcement of such U.S. initiatives would cause Assad’s regime to crumble from within.
What’s missing, of course, is a decision by President Obama to make that commitment. To do so, he would have to set aside the idea that any action must be authorized by the U.N. Security Council. He would have to forge an ad hoc coalition with Turkey and other NATO members, led by the United States. And he would have to order U.S. diplomats to work intensively with Syria’s opposition movements and ethnic communities to build an accord on a post-Assad order.
In other words, Obama would have to behave as if the United States were still what Bill Clinton understood it to be: the indispensable nation.
It’s disingenuous to suggest that the Obama administration’s only consideration is whether or not they can get authority from the UN Security Council. They clearly cannot get such authorization because both Russia and China would exercise their vetoes. Could the United States easily create and defend a humanitarian corridor? Nothing else that Mr. Diehl wrote supports the claim that we could. We’d face a nasty insurgency. Nothing suggests that the competing forces and interests in Syria can be resolved by “intensive” diplomatic work. If the idea is to create some structure that leads to the “consent of the governed,” that’s nothing but wishful thinking that takes no account of reality.
But, even here, Mr. Diehl’s argument is confused and disorganized.
He wants us to not only create a humanitarian corridor, but to arm the opposition. Since these are not supposed to be mutually exclusive policies, that just means that we’d invade and fight with the opposition until they prevailed. This becomes even more clear when you examine Syrian society and realize that the populations are completely intermingled. While there are a few towns that are in open revolt, in most places there is no way to separate the Alawite from the Druze from the Sunni from the Kurd from the Christian from the Jew. To protect people from the government, we’d effectively be engaged in ethnic and sectarian resettlement.
Mr. Diehl’s argument is crafted to say that the only reason civil war is breaking out in Syria is because the only country capable of preventing it (the indispensable nation, America) is sitting on its hands. But what he really wants is for America to fight in the Syrian civil war until it is concluded and the Assad regime is defeated.
He not only makes that job sound too easy, he makes the aftermath sound like a cakewalk. A slam dunk, if you will.
The truth is that it would be an unholy mess. And we’d be right in the middle of it. Again.
We’ve listened to people like Jackson Diehl too many times. It’s time to marginalize him.


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Does Diehl like Obama on Foreign Affairs? Apparently not. Never mind, he doesn’t like David Cameron either and his pampering to Erdogan’s Turkey and reference of the Gaza prison camp as a “prison camp.”
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."He’d be the next Jay Garner.
I was thinking he’d been having too much Kool Aid and cookies at John Bolton’s house.
Nice deconstruction. I’d add that he also blithely mentions arming the Free Syrian Army without any consideration of either who they are or exactly how many arms it would take to be able to be competitive with (never mind overwhelm) the Syrian government. (Answers: thugs, at least in part; and, a whole lot, with all the death that would entail).
And lastly, of course, it’s laughable that he doesn’t think Turkey would be considered a neutral arbiter, but he thinks the United States – “special friend” of Israel, persecutor of Palestinians – would be. Also, too: Golan Heights.
Diehl, sadly, is utterly representative of the DC foreign policy clique who thinks the sun shines out America’s ass, and that everyone else agrees, because, well, isn’t it self-evident? Our intentions are so noble! One would need to marginalize not just Diehl, but all the other armchair warriors like him.
Do that, and all you’d be left with is the people who have been consistently right in the last decade. The number of those folks in DC is vanishingly small; they’re not welcome in either the US foreign policy apparatus or the punditocracy that cheers it on.
“Bashir al-Assad”
Bashar Al Asad.
.
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence.".
Cross-posted from my recent diary – Two Great American Heroes on the Syrian Frontier
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."“Bashir al-Assad has a staunch friend in the Church“
BashAR Al Asad – Don’t they proofread this stuff anymore?!
Yes, indeed, Christians in Iraq were in the same leaky boat without a paddle as Muslims until American “leadership” came along and turned Iraq over to the sectarian powers. Now they have neither boat nor paddle.
“Sunni states…have been checked by Shiite governments in Iraq and Lebanon.“
Lebanon does not have a Shiite government.
“Why should 74% of the population who are Sunni Muslim be ruled over by less than 16% who are Alawites?“
Please look at the composition and nature of the Syrian government. For starters it is not and has never been a sectarian government. In addition – well, just find out about the religious composition of the members of the government before suggesting that Sunnis are being ruled by Alawites.
Not everything in the Middle East comes down to sect and sectrianism.
No, it doesn’t always come down to that, but one reason I oppose the Syrian National Council is because they’re very sectarian and seem to operate on those lines (not that I support the regime either…I simply oppose both lol).
Plus, we can’t trust any news coming from there at all.
Of course, all we see is “rah rah” in favor of said SNC in the West.
Yep, the sectarian nature of the SNC is one of several factors that makes the situaton in Syria not a simple matter of the “good freedom fighters” against the “evil regime”. The dynamics of this situation don’t fit any of the models that Americans – including some who consider themselves fairly sophisticated – insist upon applying to the Middle East.
As for what information you can trust, you can’t trust any news coming from there or here. It’s all BS.
when it comes to exercising control over the country, Lebanon doesn’t really have a government at all. Syria exercises more control over the south than Beirut.
But, whatever. I don’t really know what you mean by “government” in Syria. The army, air force, intelligence agencies, and internal security forces are led by Alawites. The president and prime minister are Alawites. The Ba’athist Party is, of course, open to all. But I don’t really know what you are disputing.
You did this with Iraq, too. Under Saddam, it was accurate to say that Sunnis lorded it over the Shi’a in Iraq even if the society was integrated, the Ba’athist Party was open to all, and day-to-day sectarian tensions were very low. Still, things simmered beneath the surface, tamped down by a massive police state backed up by torture and murder. Remove the oppression and the sectarian animosities rise to the surface in a hurry. This is has been happening in Syria for a long time. And it’s also about secularism vs. religion, and socialism as an emphasis or pan-Arabism as an emphasis or whatever. Ba’athism is a spend force. But what replaces it places a lot more importance on religion. And that’s not a good place to be if you’re an Alawite.
Ah yes, the Sunnis “lording it over the Shi’ites”, and the “simmering sectarian animosities” just under the surface, only kept in check by the “oppressive Sunni regime”. And reverse the picture in Syria where it’s the Alawis “lording it over the Sunnis”, etc. etc., etc.
Americans, even fairly sophisticated ones, do LOVE their simplistic stereotypes. I guess that makes it easier to convince yourselves you really do understand things. I mean, look at all the wonderful things that American “leadership” led to in Iraq.
The part you do have right is the struggle between the sectarianists and the secular governments, but that’s going on just about everywhere, including in your own country – in case you haven’t noticed.
you’re right, DAWA and SCIRI were peachy-keen on Saddam’s regime.
This is a great example of how limited knowledge combined with credulity and a bit of arrogance leads to overly-simplistic, inaccurate analysis.
Da`wa (not DAWA – it is not an English acronym, as you would know if you knew the history of this party) and SCIRI did not come about because of abuse by Saddam or his regime. They were anti-secularists who wanted to overthrow the secular government, take power in Iraq, and institute a theocratic government and a society to match. Oh wait! Thanks to American “leadership” they got exactly that, didn’t they? And women, Christians, Madaeans, Yezidis, and secular Iraqis have been paying the price ever since.
It’s funny how, when threatened with being overthrown, dictators tend to crack down on those groups who are attempting to overthrow them irrespective of whether those groups are secular, sectarian, Sunni, Shi`a, or you name it. Interesting how people who want to believe the simplistic tripe you all have been fed automatically attribute the behavior of the regime to sectarian motivations, never asking whether there might be a different explanation.
Do Americans even know – or bother to wonder – about Sunni and secular opposition to Saddam’s regime, and what happened to them when they were discovered? Does anyone know what Saddam did to Sunni “Islamists” in Iraq? Does anyone even know the punishments the predominantly Sunni Fallujans were subjected to for their opposition to the regime?
And who would think of asking what happened to the Communists (a militantly secular party, in case anyone has forgotten) when Saddam and his gang of thugs took power- oh wait! The U.S. provided lists of them to the regime to make “liquidation” easier. The enemy of my enemy and all that.
I guess it’s just easier and more satisfying to go with the nonsense of “the Sunnis lording it over the Shiites” and not try to really understand anything.
What else distinguished Da’Wa and SCIRI besides their religiousness?
You do acknowledge, I hope, that Iraq has the holiest sites in Shi’a Islam, right? And people like to do pilgrimages to those sites, right? And a certain Ayatollah Khomeini spent over a decade in Najaf before he got the boot, right?
Is this right?
Imagine if some secularist took over Meccas and cancelled the Hajj for 30 years. I know you can’t exactly equate the two situations, but to argue that the Shi’a were respected in Iraq under Saddam is a bit ludicrous.
As you so often do, BooMan, you find it necessary to put words into my mouth in order to find something you can argue with. I have never suggested or even hinted or implied that the Shi`a were respected under Saddam. I have never suggested, or even hinted or implied that ANYONE was respected under Saddam. It’s really too bad that you are unable to come up with arguments against what I actually say.
Oh, and you manage to completely ignore my point here: “What else distinguished Da’Wa and SCIRI besides their religiousness?” As I believe I have already made clear, what distinguishes Da`wa and SCIRI is that they were determined to overthrow Saddam and his regime, and that they had some powerful backing that could have made it possible. The entire city of Falluja was punished because of Sunni opposition to the regime that did not rise to a serious threat of overthrow. What distinguished Falluja was that it was a source of opposition to the regime. What distinguished the Communists is that they were seen as a threat to the regime. What part of that is so difficult to understand?
Well, you make a good point that no one was respected by the regime. That’s fair.
To answer my question though, it was not only that Da’wa and SCIRI were formidable opponents, they were founded and led by Shi’a oppositionists. There were, of course, formidable Kurdish opposition groups, as well. An an expatriate group of dissenters. And, as you say, pockets of restiveness in the Sunni heartland.
I don’t think you can compare, however, the disrespect shown to religious Sunnis to the disrespect shown to all Shi’ites. Whether it was the denial of the most cherished expressions of the faith, or the squalor of Saddam City, or just the elitism of the Sunni-dominated regime.
Feel free to dispute the following based on your experience. I know the source and his ulterior motives at the time (2002).
We got to know Sistani pretty well over the years.
I will respond to what I have time for now, and try to respond to the rest as time allows.
The first paragraph is somewhat muddled, and is so overstated as to be inaccurate. “Constant campaign of defamation”? I know some very strong-minded Iraqi Shi`as, many of whom are extremely religious, some of whom have very deep knowledge of history in general and their families’ histories in particular, and none of them would buy that.
It is true that the British continued the Turks’ practice of keeping most of the political power in the hands of the Sunnis. That was as much in the interest of continuity as anything else. The British also practiced their (in)famous divide and conquer policies in Iraq as they had everywhere else, and not just with Sunnis versus Shi`as, but with all the major groups, including Jews, who had a very strong and essential presence especially in Baghdad.
As for the alleged campaign to separate the Shi`as from the Arab world, I have never seen, heard of, or read about such a thing from any credible source, including some of the foremost authorities on Southern Iraq history.
I DO remember that in 1991 I began to hear for the first time – from some Americans who fancied themselves authorities on Iraq though they had never traveled more widely in the ME than Israel – stating with great certitude that Iraqi Shi`as identified with Iran, and thought of themselves more as Persians than Arabs. So it seems it was late 20th century Americans, not Iraqis or Brits who were intent on making this connection. In fact it seems these Americans were confused. Lebanese, not Iraqi Shi`as, have a very strong and consistent historical and present-day connection to the Persian Shi`as.
I HAVE heard Iraqis refer to the Shi`as who came to power as a result of American “leadership” since 2003 as “Persians” or “Iranians”, which is understandable under the circumstances. I have never heard an Iraqi refer to Shi`as in general as Persians, though. I have also heard Iraqis and others expressing concern over Iran having control over Iraq, and suggestions that this is only the beginning of Iranian ambitions.
“The general line of Baathist ideology [That is, the ideology of Iraq’s ruling socialist Baath Party] has always been that “the Shiites are all Persians…“
Complete tommyrot! The Ba`thist ideology has no such line. In fact, the Ba`th party was founded by a Christian and an Alawi (as you know, Alawism is an offshoot of Ba`thism), and the Ba`thist ideology is just about as inclusive as you will find, with the possible exception of the Communist ideology. It is a fact that the Iraqi Ba`th party was more open at very high levels, and provided more opportunities to Shi`as than any other previous party had done.
“Iraqi Kurds, if they are Shiites, often look to Iran.“
Most of the Kurds I know are not Shi`as, so I cannot confirm or dispute this, but I have my doubts. Kurds of any religious persuasion, or no religious persuasion find it very easy to operate in an Iranian context because the Kurdish language is very closely related to Farsi, and they can communicate with relative ease. .
That is all I have time for now. I will try to write more later.
Small but important correction: I wrote “…Turks’ practice of keeping most of the political power in the hands of the Sunnis.” That should read “Sunnis”, and not “the Sunnis”. The Sunnis as a collective did not hold power, not under the Brits, and not under Saddam Hussein.
Was there supposed to be an argument in there somewhere?
Because if there is some reason to believe that the Iraqi government wasn’t Sunni-dominated and oppressive towards the country’s Shiite majority, you don’t seem to have included it.
“what replaces [Ba’thism] places a lot more importance on religion. And that’s not a good place to be if you’re an Alawite.“
An Alawite? It’s not a good place to be if you’re a woman, a Christian, a secular person, or much of anything but a religious fanatic.
And by the way, for what it’s worth, I am personally acquainted with Syrians of all flavors with all different points of view on the regime. Among the most adamantly anti-regime people I know are…..get ready…..Alawis. I also know Sunnis who are strongly anti-opposition. Doesn’t fit your stereotyped ideas, I know, but what can I do? Syrians (and Iraqis) don’t always think along sectarian lines. Sometimes they take other factors into consideration.
“when it comes to exercising control over the country, Lebanon doesn’t really have a government at all.“
Either way, Lebanon does not have, and has never had, a Shiite government, and it is a gross error to say it does.
fair enough.