Cameron Abadi is a former Fox International Fellow from Yale University’s MacMillan Center where typical senior fellows include folks like former Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) chief Stanley McChrystal and the neo-conservative former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey. Fox fellows are supposed to go on to shape global affairs.
The Fox International Fellowship Program is a direct two-way student exchange partnership between Yale University and twelve of the world’s leading universities in Russia, England, Germany, China, Japan, France, India, Mexico, Turkey, Israel, Brazil, and South Africa. It was established to identify and support talented individuals who will be future leaders in their respective fields and who, by virtue of those leadership positions, will contribute to decisions affecting global policies and international relations.
In 2005, when Mr. Abadi accepted this fellowship, he intended to continue his “study of 20th century German intellectual history and political theory in graduate school and as a professor.” But he wound up writing for The New Republic instead.
I know this is going to shock you, but Mr. Abadi is criticizing the president for not wanting to get involved in Syria’s civil war and for not wanting to get sucked into getting involved, either.
Abadi’s essay is truly embarrassing. It fails on every level. His basic strategy is to pull at our liberal heartstrings, “but what about the refugees?”
Yes, there are a lot of refugees, and that is because Syria is no longer the country that it used to be. It is no longer a tolerant multi-denominational multi-ethnic society. That’s why this is false:
Besides, humanitarian assistance isn’t just a matter of charity; it’s a political struggle. The millions of Syrians currently displaced by war are eventually going to return to their homes, and will presumably play a role in determining the shape of a future Syrian state.
Unfortunately, many if not most of the soon-to-be million Syrian refugees will not be returning home precisely because their ethnic group or religious sect will lose out in the civil war and have no role in determining the shape of a future Syrian state. I am not saying this because I’m a pessimist. You know that I am generally an optimist. I am saying it because Syria has already fallen off the wall, and its pieces will not be put back together. Think of Lebanon in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, or think about Iraq right now.
Whatever tensions simmered below the surface before the onset of the civil war, the ruling Alawites were tolerated by the majority-Sunni population. But that Sunni population has been radicalized both by the repression of the Assad regime and its Iranian sponsors, and by the Saudi and Gulf State support they’ve received for their resistance. While it may be fairly simple to decide that our country has an interest in seeing the Iranian-backed side lose this struggle, figuring out who we want to win it is much harder. More than that, the winners (regardless of which side wins) are going to do mopping-up operations that are what most people call “ethnic cleansing” and others call “genocide.” So, we have more than one reason to want to keep our distance.
But, “wait,” you ask, “doesn’t the prospect of ethnic cleansing and genocide increase our responsibility to get embroiled in this religious and ethnic conflict?”
The answer is that the whole world has a responsibility for handling the refugee problem and working to prevent human rights violations, but that we can’t do that simply by walking in and fighting the war for one side. Our involvement has geopolitical consequences which should be obvious if we just imagine Russia or China deciding that they were going to waltz in and restore order.
With reports that someone, probably the Assad regime, has used sarin gas during the conflict, enormous pressure is being brought to bear for military intervention. But that’s not Mr. Abadi’s argument:
But, judging from the Obama administration’s reticence until Thursday, the absence of public leadership hardly seems an accident. One gets the sense that the White House’s main goal is not only to avoid military intervention, but to avoid steps that might have the marginal effect of making military intervention more likely. And it’s undeniable that humanitarian assistance will eventually run up against limits imposed by the security situation in and around Syria: There’s only so much you can do in a war zone before you need a military of your own to keep humanitarian organizations safe.
Still, the least that any policy deserves is to be treated on its own terms. The fact that humanitarian assistance might eventually imply the need for military assistance isn’t a reason to simply dismiss the former. And however practiced the arguments about the Iraq war may be, there’s no good reason that a policy of humanitarian leadership needs to be confused with a posture of crude militarism.
So there is something strangely willful about the White House silence on Syria’s refugee crisis—a sense not that a humanitarian intervention might be unwise, but that any intervention might simply be too much for the U.S. to bear. Prudence is worthy of praise when it’s a matter of empiricism, but it’s not worth much when it’s simply a reflexive cringe at complex problems. We’re getting to the point where one can’t help but wonder whether the ultimate effect of Obama’s “light footprint” doctrine isn’t simply to lighten the burden of America’s capacity to lead.
Never mind that the United States has committed more resources to the refugee crisis than any other nation, it is either in our national security interests to get involved on the ground in Syria or it is not. Frida Ghitis of the Miami Herald thinks failing to act would “legitimize the use of chemical weapons, letting regimes that hold power by force know that they can use the world’s most reviled weaponry to preserve their rule from internal challenges.” Of course, that ignores the fact that we cannot prove, yet, that the Assad regime is even responsible for the use of sarin gas. It’s true that Obama has previously said that we would not tolerate the use of chemical weapons. He said Assad would face “dire consequences” if he used them. Yet, we are not even sure he used them. Should the president succumb to this pressure and race to war without the facts? Look at this:
AMMAN, Jordan — About 300 Jordanians have demonstrated against the proposed deployment of 200 U.S. troops on their nation’s border with Syria.
Some protesters warned that the small force could be just the beginning of a process that leads to U.S. involvement in Syria’s civil war to secure its chemical weapons. Other demonstrators, backing the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad, burned American flags.
At the Friday rally in Amman, leftists and independents chanted, “No to U.S. troops in Jordan. This is not in our national interest.” They said they do not want to see a U.S.-led invasion of Syria like the 2003 war in neighboring Iraq, based on faulty intelligence about weapons of mass destruction there.
Mr. Abadi is just one small cog in a giant machine that is pushing, pushing, pushing the president to war.
Read more:
If that assistance had come from the US, would the character of the opposition and the successor regime be any different?
The Soviets were quite good at turning local uprisings into Marxist-Lenninst revolutions. Is leaving others – whether al Qaeda or Sunni-fundie gulf states – to take on the mantle of patron the best way to deal with the threat of unsavory elements in the opposition coming to the fore?
Is that our choice?
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are allies of convenience. Are we going to start fighting their proxies in Syria while maintaining our air and naval bases in Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE?
Who fights for us, then? Turks? Kurds? Intellectuals?
We made the choice to back the uprising in Egypt over “our son of a bitch” Mubarak. Was that wrong?
I remember when the realpolitik outlook you’re expressing here was considered the polar opposite of liberal foreign policy thinking.
Obama never made up his mind until after the facts of the revolt on Tahrir Square. He send in Frank Wisner to see if there was still a chance of a military takeover. Hillary Clinton’s visit to Cairo was first to our bought military junta in Egypt, after which she talked to Morsi. Morsi kicked out all members of US funded NGOs for “democracy” in Egypt. The Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood are just holding back before kicking ass (Western neo-colonial powers). Enough signals throughout the Arab neighborhood. Even the most recent visit to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Turkey, John Kerry got his ass kicked. Thank you America!
Another invasion, more sadness. Bombings at mosques push Iraq death toll to 195 .
Dream on …
I have no idea how any of that is supposed to be a response to what I wrote.
You seem to have some note cards all ready to go, but they don’t really seem all that relevant.
between insight and outside. Your analysis is of yesteryear, I’m telling what tomorrow will be like.
Dream On!
Didn’t your descriptions of tomorrow include a permanent military presence in Iraq and boots onna ground in Libya?
We don’t have a son of a bitch in this case.
What we have is an effort to throw the Alawites out of power removing an ally of Russia and Iran and replacing them with an ally of Wahhabis, with all the anti-Americanism that that typically involves. We’re not opposing democracy or self-determination by standing back nor would we be promoting it if we got more directly involved.
As for the humanitarian argument, we can do what we can, but suffering is likely to get worse once one side gets the true upper hand because there are countless scores to settle, purges to be conducted, and so forth. We saw the same thing happen in Iraq even with our troops on the ground.
Don’t pretend that I am opposing some liberal view of foreign policy here. We can help those we can help, but we can’t solve this.
You are assuming a level of uniformity among the rebels that doesn’t seem to comport with what we know about them.
It’s certainly true that, in the absence (well, not the absence, but the relative absence) of the U.S. putting itself in a position to pick the leader, those who have been paying the piper (al Qaeda and the gulf states) have been able to move their favorites to the front. It does not follow from this that there must not be any democratic, liberal, rights-supporting factions among the rebellion.
While there will not doubt be some level of this after a civil war, the amount can vary widely. The character of the post-war leadership matters.
There is a rather large difference between a foreign invasion and occupation and the rise of an indigenous leadership. “Even with our troops on the ground” suggests that the presence of a foreign occupation is a force for stability, albeit not enough of one in the case of Iraq, and that is completely wrong.
Don’t pretend that I am opposing some liberal view of foreign policy here.
I’m not pretending. You are opposing a liberal view of foreign policy.
We can help those we can help, but we can’t solve this.
Maybe we can, maybe we can’t. If we can’t, it is because the situation there is too far gone, not because of the argument you make about the Syrian opposition being inherently too barbaric and extreme to justify our support. As the example of Soviet backing for various insurgencies demonstrates, the character of the rebels depends, to some degree, on who is backing them. Noting that bad actors are on the rise when backed by al Qaeda and the gulf dictatorships does not demonstrate that those actors’ rise was the inevitable or natural outcome. It might just as well demonstrate that the character of the rebellion could have been different with different backers.
Joe, when has America every been able to pick a successful leader in these case? When have we picked someone who is not a tremendous monster (or perhaps that IS our influence)?
Libya 2011.
We picked a leader in Libya? News to me.
Haiti under Bill Clinton.
Hamid Karzai isn’t a monster. He’s not great shakes, but in the context of Afghanistan, he’s freaking Gandhi.
The post-war governments in Germany, Italy, and Japan.
I’m just aware of our Cold War shenanigans as you are. That was a deliberate choice to ignore the character of the people we supported. We didn’t try and fail to back democrats and liberals; we never even tried.
What does Hamid Karzai actually lead? I consider that a failure.
What did we have to do with picking the German leadership in the 1949 elections? I’ll give you Yoshida in Japan but since elections were held in 1947 I see that as shaky. As for Italy… well Italy is kind of a mess can’t really figure that one out.
If you mean in regard to occupation that was occupation, that wasn’t picking a leader that was the allies ruling them which is different.
In Haiti, both Bush I and Clinton traded with the people who overthrew Aristide in 1991 against the UN embargo (since he was socialist and turned a blind eye to drug trafficking. Did we “pick” Preval? We might have had a hand in overthrowing Aristide a second time ourselves.
Yes, might not have been a monster every time but either they are useless or can lead but are monsters.
Good points.
I come down on the side of “the situation is too far gone”. Adding outside troops or even support further complicates the domestic politics and makes the political solution more difficult to achieve. US intervention would not result in stabilization.
To do an effective occupation would require 2.5 million troops within Syria alone, assuming that the actions of occupation would destabilize surrounding countries. The best standard for troop counts in a successful occupation is the occupation of Germany in which 10 million allied troops occupied a nation of 80 million that had otherwise been defeated in war. Even then, reconstruction took over a decade. Not the model you want to go running around the world using.
Normal politics is so much cheaper than war.
I can’t think of a better way to get the warring the factions in Syria to put aside their differences than an American invasion and occupation.
It’s not so much that I am assuming a uniformity as I am assessing relative strengths. The folks that are being supplied by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are not democrats. As far as their willingness to restore an ecumenical flavor to Syrian society, I don’t think they’re all that distinguishable from al-Qaeda.
So, we can stick our nose in and have some skin in the game and some folks to talk to and have influence with, or whatever, but the moderates are so far from being the power of the resistance that we’ll just be picking a losing faction on a winning side.
That’s why I asked who are allies are supposed to be? We know how the Turks and Kurds get along. And even Sunnis who used to be happy to get along with anyone, whether they be Shi’ite, Alawite, Christian, or Kurd, are increasingly seeing things in more ethnic and sectarian terms.
My point about the ethnic cleansing that took place in Iraq was that we were powerless to stop it even though we had a lot of troops there. It hasn’t really stopped since we left. In fact, it’s probably worse than when we left. So, if people are proposing that we can put troops in and stop the bloodshed, that’s too optimistic.
If we go to the pre-invasion Iraq model of no-flight zones, we might be able to preside over an ethnic cleansing that actually winds up saving lives by segregating populations. But that didn’t work out for us in the end in Iraq and we have no international support for it even at the outset.
I hope, also, that you see the tension between your remark about indigenous leadership and your recommendation that we steer the revolution to get a leader or leadership of our liking.
But again, noting that the factions that having significant foreign backing have more power than the factions that do not suggests pretty strongly that foreign backing is what made them powerful.
Think back to 2011. There was virtually no al Qaeda or foreign jihadist presence among the revolution at all. It is entirely the consequence of foreign backing that the Nusra Front has come to the fore.
the moderates are so far from being the power of the resistance that we’ll just be picking a losing faction on a winning side
They are now. In 2011, they were the resistance. When I talk about backing one faction, I’m talking about backing the faction that demonstrably did have the greatest credibility in-country by virtue of being the vanguard of the protests and the revolution.
This is true.
Let me say it looks really really really bad that Obama said chemicals is a major line, Kerry has said chemical weapons have been used and nothing has happened. I don’t think we should invade (we’re going to lose no matter what happens or who we help or don’t) but I Obama shouldn’t have said that if he wasn’t going to follow through.
Pressures on the transition to a non-hegemonic leadership role – weapons manufacturing must be feeling the “austerity”
War is politics by other means.—Clausewitz
The wisdom in Clausewitz’s “dictum” (yes, that’s the cliche pair of words) is that consideration of the politics must come first.
Had we honestly considered the politics in 2002, we would have realized that Chalabi was setting up the US to weaken Iraq on behalf of Iran. And that W had intended to seize domestic power by being a “war president”.
So what are the politics here. Yes, a flood of refugees into any country can have destabilizing consequences. And affect the domestic politics of those countries. Sarkozy certainly felt threatened by the flood of Libyan refugees going to France during the run-up to an election. (Before he tried to run against Muslims in the election.) A flood of Syrian refugees is already putting pressure on Lebanon and requiring Turkey to provide resources for relief. Importantly politically is that Turkey is a NATO ally that can call for the alliance to protect its security.
But the cynical use of humanitarian arguments by American politicians has finally run off the rails. No one accepts them anymore. There has been too much betrayal by American foreign policy leaders.
The politics of the situation requires the US to do what President Obama has so far been unwilling to do–deal with the cancerous situation that our ally Israel is causing. Which means at a minimum not to buy into self-serving Israeli intelligence stories about what is happening in Syria.
Without effective journalism, now excluded because of the total war nature of the conflict in Syria, no one, not even the participants have any clue what is happening except semi-strategic violence intended to seize the infrastructure of power, with little concern for civilians. Which means that any allegations of the use of WMD, the self-stated US “red line”, better be publicly vetted both as to the accuracy of the event and the identity of the perpetrator. Not even the legendary or mythical Mossad likely has the capability to do that.
The political environment in the US is that you have a bunch of bedwetting warhawk members of Congress, with enough tokens in the Democratic Party to actually stampede the President toward war. You have a foreign policy apparatus that has been so thoroughly militarized over the past 30 years that war seems to be the first instead of the last option. And you have a institutional system in the Executive that privileges presidential action in time of war and has been too seductively for too many occupants of that office. Power that has accreted to the Presidency has never been given back.
Before we engage in another military action that puts the civilians of another country in harm’s way, we need to thoroughly review and restructure our foreign policy and national security institutions so that they are not biased toward disastrous intervention and so they are once again accountable to the people who pay the taxes for them and have to pay off the debts that they incur.
And anyone who thinks that a war would goose the economy should be handed an AR-15, dropped off at the Turkish-Syrian border, pointed to Syria, and told to show folks how it’s done.
But I’m not surprised at all to see these sort of sentiments in the New Republican, the “liberal” cheering section of the empire.