Amy Walter is a savvy political analyst and I agree with most of what she has to say about the upcoming midterm elections. I do think, however, that she goes a little too far when she writes this:
The dirty little secret is that we “see” a wave on Election Night and not before. As the results come in, we start to see a very discernible pattern as the closest races break disproportionally to one party. In 2008, the GOP lost four out of the six closest races (66 percent). In 2010, in what was a “wave year” just two of the seven toss-up races went to Republicans, though public polling predicted that four of those seven (57 percent) would flip to the GOP.
Part of this depends on how you want to define a “wave election.” Does that refer to an election in which one party wins a very large number of seats from the other party? Does the term apply when the big change is limited only to one house of Congress? Or is a wave election one that tips decisively in one direction right at the end, causing one party to greatly exceed expectations?
If you look at the 2010 midterms the first way, it was a very big wave election. But, if you look at it the second way, the GOP actually underperformed in the Senate.
This year, we can all see, and have been able to see since before election night in 2012, that this would be a good year for the GOP in the Senate and that the House would be difficult for the Democrats to win back because of the way the districts are drawn, the tendency of Democrats to live in compacted urban and suburban areas, and the drop off of Democratic turnout in non-presidential elections. Those elements of the upcoming midterms are part of the architecture and aren’t dependent on the state of the economy or the president’s approval numbers or the degree of turmoil in foreign lands. You can call this an architectural wave.
What we’re not seeing are indications that the Republicans are doing better than expected. And this is distinct from, say, the 2006 midterms. In those midterms, we did not see as early as November 2004 that the Democrats were going to have a great night in November 2006. There were no structural advantages for the Democrats outside of the typical six-year itch that presidencies often suffer. What happened is that the Bush administration suffered one calamity after another, on Social Security privatization, Terri Schiavo, Hurricane Katrina, the war in Iraq, the Abramoff scandal, the Mark Foley scandal, the Valerie Plame scandal, the Alberto Gonzales scandal, and so on. And the people began to turn on the Republicans for cause.
The Obama administration, and the world, has had a rough summer, but there are no indications that the Democrats are taking any disproportionate amount of the blame. They remain more popular than the GOP and they still lead the Generic Congressional Ballot.
In this sense, the Republican are underperforming expectations. And, yet, this is an election that they basically cannot lose.
Politically, if not statistically, a wave election is one that turns the direction of policy in a way that was unexpected before election night. In 2008, it was the end of the “permanent Republican majority” as a GOP hope and the idea of a restoration of New Deal policies. (Despite the hindsight, look at the statements at the time.) In 2010 it was the surprise that Citizens United could force in Tea Party candidates and turn policy towards austerity. (In this case, the pundits were primed and drove this story.)
Wave elections are in the spin that politicians and pundits create and push afterwards.
No one would call the election of 1960 a wave election. But policy changed. And the wave election of 1964 set up the Democratic Party for self-destruction in 1968.
No one would call the election of 1960 a wave election. But policy changed. And the wave election of 1964 set up the Democratic Party for self-destruction in 1968.
How so? I really doubt anyone could for-see in 1964 what would happened in 1968.
You could argue LBJ himself did, in foreseeing the Republicanization of the South which proceeded through the Democrats’ split in 1968-72.
Earlier this year, you seemed much more optimistic about the turnout operation being better for Dems than in previous years- and that therefore it wasn’t a foregone conclusion that the GOP would have such an “architectural wave.” What’s shifted?
The turnout operation may be very effective. The problem is a very limited upside from the Democrats.
For turnout operations to really matter, you must have a close race. There are a lot of Senate races that are very close. But they’re almost all in seats we stand to lose rather than gain.
The pollsters may be picking up on the ground game when they screen for how likely people are to actually vote, or they may not be picking that up. When they weight their polls by expected turnout, they could easily be missing the effect of the Dems new programs. Most likely, it’s a combination of both. The polls may be better than expected because the ground game is improved. But there is still a lot of groundwork to do. If the Dems succeed in changing the shape of the electorate, the polls right now will not reflect that even if they are accurate (right now).
I am not seeing evidence that the Dems are going to win the House, although there’s almost no polling on House races right now, so it’s hard to say. What I do know is that the best we can do in the Senate is to lose West Virginia, Montana, and South Dakota, while winning Kentucky and Georgia.
I guess we should keep our eyes on Kansas, too. Things are weird there in a three-way race.
But, in any case, barring something totally unexpected, we simply cannot pick up seats in the Senate.
So, we can’t “win” these elections. We can, however, do much better than expected.
What I do know is that the best we can do in the Senate is to lose West Virginia, Montana, and South Dakota, while winning Kentucky and Georgia.
See my post below.
Well, see, that’s the kind of evidence you look for to demonstrate that a wave is not developing. Even if Rounds ultimately wins, things are not moving in his direction.
Right, and SD has a weird three-way race. The fact that the other guy’s voters prefer Weiland says there is a bit of anti-Rounds sentiment out there. I guess my point is that all is not lost if SD is at least competitive at this stage.
Then there is this:
http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2014/08/weiland-continues-to-chip-away-at-rounds-lead-in-sou
th-dakota.html