In March 1974, The Atlantic published a lengthy essay by David Broder who was then at the height of his reportorial powers. The topic was the status of the Democratic Party and its prospects for success in the upcoming midterms and particularly the 1976 election. At the time this piece was published, Nixon was still president but he was so mortally wounded that a Ford presidency was treated as a given. As it turned out, Nixon wouldn’t resign for another five months.
It’s somewhat interesting to see how Broder’s projections turned out, and they weren’t too bad. He only briefly mentioned Jimmy Carter, but he did so to point out that he (along with Govs. Dale Bumpers of Arkansas and Reubin Eskew of Florida) was a more promising prospect than any of the senators (Scoop Jackson, Muskie, McGovern, Humphrey, Walter F. Mondale, Lloyd Bentsen, and Birch Bayh) whose names were bandied about as potential nominees.
Far more interesting, however, is Broder’s deep analysis of what lay behind the Democrats’ defeats in 1968 and 1972, and how they had reacted and organized in the aftermath of McGovern’s epic defeat.
Before I go further, I need to contextualize this a little bit. The reason I am looking at the history of the Democratic Party in this time period is because I think the Republicans are in a similar situation right now. To be more precise, though, today for the Republicans is a lot like December 1971 for the Democrats. Things don’t mesh precisely here, but bear with me.
In December 1971, the Democrats had lost a devastating election three years earlier and were on the cusp of getting wiped out in an electoral drubbing of historic proportions. Their great hope was Senator Ed Muskie of Maine who had lined up the establishment’s support.
Now, I am going to ask you to look for contemporary parallels in the following excerpt from Broder’s analysis of what went wrong at the Democratic National Convention of 1972. Here Broder is explaining both why McGovern got to the convention in the strongest position and why his opponents were unable to derail him.
But the key to the 1972 convention result lay, not in rules manipulations, but in two independent factors, as peculiar in their way as the accidents that befell Kennedy and McCarthy in 1968.
One was the collapse of Edmund Muskie, the front-runner for the nomination and the consequent derailment of the vehicle on which most of the party regulars and elected officials had expected to ride to Miami Beach. No one in modern political history has dissipated as many assets as rapidly as did Muskie in the winter and spring of 1972.
The other key factor was the inability of George Meany to pick a candidate to back in the early going. Facing a divided AFL-CIO executive board, Meany declined to choose among Muskie, Humphrey, and Henry (“Scoop”) Jackson. Not until the California primary, when it was too late, did the AFL-CIO come in full force behind Humphrey, and it nearly turned the tide.
Even with the handicaps of Muskie’s collapse and labor’s indecision, the “regulars” very nearly triumphed. The key vote of the convention, on the California credentials challenge, was decided by only 173 votes–hardly evidence that the losers had been excluded.
Now, substitute the name Jeb Bush for Ed Muskie and substitute the Republican Party’s establishment (elected officials and financiers) for George Meany and “the regulars.”
In this scenario, George McGovern would be replaced by Ted Cruz or Donald Trump or maybe even Ben Carson. I know that’s not a kind comparison to make because McGovern was a better man and a better candidate than these Republican “irregulars.” But the comparison still works because we’re looking at rifts between establishment candidates and candidates powered by party activists and populist anti-establishment dissatisfaction.
In 1971-72, the Democratic establishment’s great hope was Ed Muskie. He was “the vehicle on which most of the party regulars and elected officials had expected to ride to” the national convention. Yet, he rapidly dissipated all his assets in a way that looked all but unprecedented.
Does that not almost perfectly describe Jeb Bush’s campaign so far?
Now, George Meany was the most powerful labor leader in the country back in 1971-72, and he may not have committed himself early enough to stop McGovern, but he was utterly opposed to McGovern from start to finish.
In Hunter S. Thompson’s famous Fear & Loathing on the Campaign Trail ’72 he fantasizes about Meany’s reaction to McGovern wrapping up the nomination at the Miami convention with his successful defense of his California primary delegates:
George Meany, the 77-year-old quarterback of the “Stop McGovern Movement,” is said to be suffering from brain bubbles at this stage of the game. Totally paralyzed. His henchmen have kept him in seclusion ever since he arrived in Florida five days ago, with a bad case of The Fear. He came down from AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington by train, but had to be taken off somewhere near Fort Lauderdale and rushed to a plush motel where his condition deteriorated rapidly over the weekend, and finally climaxed on Monday night when he suffered a terrible stroke while watching the Democratic Convention on TV.
The story is still shrouded in mystery, despite the best efforts of the 5,000 ranking journalists who came here to catch Meany’s last act, but according to a wealthy labor boss who said he was there when it happened – the old man went all to pieces when his creature, Hubert Humphrey, lost the crucial “California challenge.”
He raged incoherently at the Tube for eight minutes without drawing a breath, then suddenly his face turned beet red and his head swelled up to twice its normal size. Seconds later – while his henchmen looked on in mute horror – Meany swallowed his tongue, rolled out of his chair like a log, and crawled through a plate glass window.
This humorous portrait was funny because it contained so much truth. There is no modern day Republican equivalent to a king-maker like George Meany, but I think Ted Cruz’s Republican colleagues in the Senate would have about the same reaction to seeing Cruz crowned in Cleveland next year. As for a potential Donald Trump coronation, the National Republican Senatorial Committee Executive Director Ward Baker has a plan for that. It’s a little more level-headed than raging incoherently at the television but it’s still completely informed by “The Fear.”
Baker’s memo, titled “Observations on Donald Trump and 2016,” amounts to a clear-eyed approach to the Trump challenge, to which many Republican elites have responded with only hand-wringing and the vague hope that somehow, someday it will disappear…
…He writes that it is prudent for Senate candidates to craft their own political brands distinct from Trump’s and to distance themselves by quickly condemning his more controversial comments, such as “wacky things about women.” He cautions candidates against “piling on” Trump, however, warning that Republicans up and down the ballot would suffer if the GOP vote was divided or depressed.
In other words, this is advice for surviving the Apocalypse. Prudence and planning dictates that this kind of memo be produced, but if you actually have to utilize its advice you’ve entered Dante’s Inferno and pretty much all hope is already lost.
And the loss of hope is what many establishment Republicans are struggling with. A certain sense of dread and fatalism is setting in and it’s getting to the point that analysts like Charlie Cook are giving pep talks to keep morale from collapsing completely.
Thinking about the 2016 Republican presidential nomination has generally boiled down to two competing views. The first is that Trump and/or Carson, the consummate political outsiders, will remain at the top of the GOP field, with one or the other ending up as the nominee; the prospect makes some Republicans ecstatic and drives others into a near-clinical depression. The second view: While we certainly don’t know who the GOP nominee will be, we can feel reasonably assured that it won’t be one of those two. Adherents of this view see today’s Republican Party as behaving crazily but not actually insane. Things aren’t ever quite this simple, but in my view, this dichotomy is close enough.
Longtime readers of this column can guess I’m of the latter view, that conservatives’ serial infatuations four years ago with then-Rep. Michele Bachmann and pizza magnate Herman Cain, among others, foreshadowed this year’s unorthodox behavior. In 2012, in the end, Republicans behaved normally and nominated a highly conventional Mitt Romney.
This reassurance would be a lot more reassuring to the Republican establishment if Cook was willing to bet the house that Ted Cruz won’t be the nominee, either. But that’s not something he’s willing to say. Quite the opposite, actually:
It’s my belief that these mad-as-hell conservatives and populists will eventually migrate to a more plausible alternative, very likely Sen. Ted Cruz, while the conventional Republicans who aren’t so alienated will coalesce behind a more traditional candidate. The conventional wisdom, which I share, is that this will most likely wind up being Sen. Marco Rubio…
Cook won’t come right and say it, but his hope is that Rubio would prevail against Cruz. Still, he’s not ready to predict an outcome beyond who will be the last two candidates standing.
Let’s remember that there were also two men standing at the end in 1972.
The outsider won.
Then the outsider lost 49 out of 50 states.
The lopsided outcome wasn’t that easy to see coming. After all, in the last election, Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey had both received 31 million votes and 43% of the vote. What was different in 1972 was that “the new left” wasn’t being gassed in the streets outside the convention but were instead running the show on the inside. And it was the traditional party brokers, not the McCarthy/Kennedy acolytes, who were fighting the nomination down to the last second.
In other words, the party had become dangerously split and the party establishment not only had lost control of the process, they couldn’t embrace the candidate with a straight face.
It might be annoying to see McGovernites compared to Tea Partiers and Trumpistas, but the similarities are more important than the differences. What had been a deadlocked nation in 1968 became a Nixonian landslide in 1972, in large part because the Democratic establishment couldn’t take their own nominee seriously.
But this is only half the story.
So far, I’ve been focused primarily on how the Democratic Party establishment reacted to McGovern, but to get a full parallel to today we also have to look at how the McGovernites felt about the party establishment. I think it’s fair to say that “the new left” was utterly unimpressed with the congressional leadership of the party. The war in Vietnam was the primary source of discontent, but DC was still filled with reluctant desegregationist Democrats. Capitol Hill was still filled with ancient representatives who were far behind the times on women’s rights and environmentalism and other drivers of the progressive thought of the time. The hordes of activists surrounding the McGovern campaign were forward thinking and the party leadership was standing in their way.
By March of 1974, the disillusionment with Washington would be near-universal as the details of Watergate and CIA illegality came to light. But in the lead-up to the 1972 election, it was mainly discontent on the left that was driving McGovern forward and sweeping aside supposedly solid candidates like Muskie, Scoop Jackson, and Hubert Humphrey.
This is very similar to how present-day Republican activists feel about the leadership of their party in Washington and in the states. They have already cashiered Speaker of the House John Bohener and his deputy House Majority Leader Eric Cantor. They have already sunk the campaigns of Rick Perry, Bobby Jindal, and Scott Walker. Candidates who would be acceptable to the establishment like Govs. John Kasich and Chris Christie are struggling to get to 5% in the polls. And they seem to be rejecting Jeb Bush like week-old dog food.
The Democratic Party of the 1960’s delivered Vietnam and all its discontents. The Republican Party of the 2000’s and 2010’s delivered the Great Recession, the bailout, and a thousand broken promises. Both parties were so discredited with their own core supporters that they invited a grassroots insurrection.
It may not matter that one group of insurrectionists was on the right track and the other is, as Charlie Cook put it, “behaving crazily.” For our purposes, what might matter is what these similarities portend.
As I wrap up this first segment of my study of our political geology, I want to reiterate something I said in my introductory piece.
The two parties have been locked in a stable pattern for a while now and the pattern can certainly persist into the future. But, every once in a while there is a slip along the dividing line and one party leaps ahead and gains a decisive advantage. This happened in 1972, for example. President Nixon certainly didn’t foresee how decisively he’d win that election. If he had, he wouldn’t have broken so many laws and engaged in so many dirty tricks. Yet, when you look back at 1972 with the benefit of hindsight, all the signs were there that the Democrats were approaching a complete wipeout.
I haven’t touched on all the signs I’m seeing of a complete Republican wipeout. Not even close.
What I hope I’ve successfully done with this article is to get you to see what it might mean that it can fairly be said that “no one [since Muskie] in modern political history has dissipated as many assets as rapidly” as Jeb Bush. I hope you can see what it might mean that the traditional Republican kingmakers cannot settle on a champion to go up against the insurgent campaigns. I hope you can see what it might mean that the base of the party is so incredibly disenchanted with the party leadership while, simultaneously, the party leadership is panicking about the prospect of having to defend a nominee they can’t take seriously.
I will leave you with a teaser on the next segment. The following excerpt from David Broder’s March 1974 analysis explains why the Democrats who had controlled Congress for forty almost uninterrupted years by that point might have a wee bit of a problem exploiting the populist rage in the aftermath of Watergate. This would be especially true if they tried to run a senator for president in 1976.
Republican voter identification is down since the 1972 election, which is not surprising. But the percentage of voters willing to call themselves Democrats is also lower than it was at the time of the McGovern debacle. Congressional dominance of the party inhibits the Democrats from exploiting what is clearly the strongest emotion in the public today–a disgust with the way in which Washington officials have abused the responsibilities of leadership. The obvious Democratic battle cry for 1976 is the classic, “Throw the rascals out!” The only difficulty is that so many of the rascals turn out to be none other than the very congressional Democrats who now hold the party in thrall.
Again, this is a warning for Sens. Rubio and Cruz. As Pogo the Possum said, “WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US.”
In the end, the Democrats didn’t pick a senator in 1976. They picked the governor of Georgia.
And they won.
But we’re not approaching 1976, yet.
We’re still approaching 1972.
I am re-reading Marathon, Broder’s book on ’76. That fight has more similarities to the GOP fight than the ’72 fight, but both bear studying.
I have heard the comparisons to Trump and Carson with Carter. Broder’s description of Carter the candidate is eye opening, and not in a good way. Carter had a plan to reduce the number of government departments to 22, but when pressed it was clear he had no idea how he would do it. He took contradictory positions on issues within days. His ties to Maddux and Wallace were bigger than I realized.
On substance Carter was pretty weak tea in ’76. He ran on broader themes.
Broder’s review of the field on the left reminds me of a review of the current GOP field on the fight. Not an impressive group.
The central idea of Carter’s campaign was the establishment had failed and become too distant from the concerns of average americans. Carter would stay in private homes, not in hotels. His campaign emphasized his common tough in a way that would seem almost ludicrous today. There is an echo of that in EJ Dionne’s column from several weeks ago about elite liberals and conservatives, though, and I believe the establishment in both parties is in shambles, but in different ways.
Things are not OK: and because elites in both parties have failed to really understand this they are increasingly unable to understand the electorate.
The comparison of Muskie to Jeb! is not apt in a way (though I confess I used to practice law with Muskie, and liked him). Muskie’s brother was not a former president. Bush has NEVER had very good favorables in this cycle within the GOP. Muskie did: there was a reservoir of goodwill inside the party and among the rank and file from his time on the ticket in ’68.
Muskie is the prime example of someone who just wasn’t a very good candidate when it came down to it. The day to day grind of primary campaigning just didn’t suit him, and he failed as a result. By the late 80’s when I first knew him he was more than willing to describe his ’72 race as a complete disaster and joke about it.
I always thought there was a comparison of the ’72 race to the ’04 race. War was the dominant issue in both: both had outsiders, and there are similarities between Kerry and Muskie.
Muskie was on the ’68 ticket. He’s close enough to Bush, and your point that Muskie was at least briefly popular only underscores how weak the GOP establishment is by comparison.
Yes, I know he was on the 68 ticket – I mentioned that.
Muskie entering ’72 had no problems with any part of the Democratic Electorate (and this made him unique) He actually lead Nixon in polling in ’71, and had a substantial lead for over year before New Hampshire.
I don’t get why people EVER thought Bush was going to win. Conservatives hate him, and a large portion of the establishment didn’t think he was electable.
The cases are not similar.
If you want to make an argument that the establishment GOP is as weak now as the Dems in ’72 were, I think you are choosing the wrong year.
The Party in ’72 had been split in two by the ’68 convention, by race and by the war. I see no similar issues within the GOP today that are close to those faced by the Democratic Party in ’72.
The election to read about to make that case was 1964. Theodore White goes through the efforts of the establishment to stop Goldwater at great length – and they are identical in this cycle.
’64 stands for the idea that a true nutbag can win the GOP nomination, and in so doing create an electoral landslide. In such an event, we would close 52 years of electoral history that trace the rise of the right through Goldwater to Reagan, and it’s collapse which I would argue really began in ’92.
You could do a similar comparison / analysis to the 1960 election when Kennedy just barely beat Nixon. Two relatively benign periods preceding with a president of the Party not really in power (Eisenhower/Obama) as incumbent president.
But this is an interesting exercise.
In 1972, Nixon was re-elected in a landslide because the economy was between recessions and America was feeling hopeful that Nixon was doing what needed to be done to bring Viet Nam to an end. The Democratic candidate that cycle didn’t really have a chance, as you say. But it was the economy and the war that kept Nixon in office.
The economy / war notwithstanding, there’s another more significant difference today that wasn’t as true then. The Democratic and Republican Parties are pretty much just one big party now with Republicans representing the pre-rational segment of the electorate and Democrats representing post-rationals. The rational middle is still the same 50-60% or so of the electorate and either party is adequate to their requirements, and both parties represent them well enough, so it’s a back-and-forth. What we have now is just one big party with slightly variant fraternities (the Democrats and Republicans) within it. I know everyone howls at the suggestion that Hillary won’t be that different from Trump, but the signal differences between even them aren’t that significant. In 1972, there remained more at stake for Democrats and Republicans as distinct parties than there is today since they both serve the same corporate masters that dictate the only (economic and war) policies that matter.
Thanks for your comment, but what, in your view, are the specific ways in which the differences between Clinton and Trump (or Sanders and Cruz, or O’Malley and Rubio) “aren’t that significant”?
And if there’s a “back-and-forth” between parties by the “rational middle” of 50-60% of the electorate today, then why has the percentage of swing voters steadily declined for the past 40 years?
How not significantly different? What they want / do (what they signal) won’t affect ultimate outcomes as much as what their corporate masters dictate.
Not talking about “swing” voters which is a useless distinction in terms of the identity of voters lumped randomly into the category. Pre-rational vs rational vs post-rational is what I’m talking about, and their numbers have shrunk (pre-rational) and grown (rational and post-rational) steadily over the past several hundred years. Pre-rationals are innately unstable, so hard to pin down. Post-rationals are just they’re making it up as they go along, so likewise unpredictable. I think my estimate of their combined number, today, at about 40%-50% of the electorate is correct though. For comparison, I’d guess that in 1972 there were fewer in their combined number (25-30% pre and probably only 5-10% post) and more rationals (60%-70%). So, while the balance is different, rationals continue to hold sway / power in our corporate-controlled culture.
The War. 1972 was about the war that everyone hated but no one knew how to end. McGovern offered a solution, but it was rejected by a voter base that still remembered WW II.
And here I was, thinking it was almost 1968 again:
8 years of a Democratic president(s), which saw sweeping liberal social changes and policy victories but which were done in the context of a closely divided electorate. Changes that brought with them a great sense of displacement and resentment among working-class whites, especially men.
As urban black protests against…well… the same bullshit that’s always been with us turned violent, a well-known, bombastic, unpleasant, pasty-faced politician whose biggest turn-on is punishing his enemies (and everyone’s an enemy) rides a wave of white reaction against social liberalism and against the expansion of the safety net to the white house by the slimmest of margins, and creating the greatest threat to the integrity of our Constitution and our democracy seen in a hundred years.
Looks like ’68 all over again, to me…
Yes, eerily similar. Unpopular foreign war of choice as well.
Any analysis of elections in that period that don’t include the impact of the Southern Strategy is extremely suspect. 1972 was unwinnable for any Democrat that came from the New Left or the establish camps. Yes, the turmoil in the Democratic Party didn’t help and Nixon caught a couple of lucky breaks above and beyond Watergate, but even if everything had gone right for them and they nominated a suddenly hale and healthy Robert Kennedy, brute demographics would’ve still given Nixon an easy 60/40 victory.
You kind of glossed it over with the ‘Humphrey and Nixon got 43% of the vote’ point, but you miss the huge black swan of George Wallace. The Nixon + Wallace vote was 57%; this is somewhere between 1980 and 1984 Reagan territory. Maybe not having an October Surprise or a bungled Vietnam War wouldn’t have had margins that huge, but as long as American Civil Rights happened and the Democratic Party refused to turn their back on it, 1972 was unwinnable without the mother of all black swans.
Looking at 1968 – 1988, 1976 was the anomaly. Not 1972.
On the day he was shot Wallace carried Michigan and Maryland. McGovern was far more acceptable to the establishment then Wallace ever was.
A simplistic read of ’72 is Nixon in ’72 = Nixon plus Wallace from ’68,
You are dead right about ’76 being the anomaly.
It’s no accident that the only Democrats to win up to Obama were southerners. That was (and may still be) the only way to get significant numbers Southerners to vote Democratic.
I don’t know if the South will ever be in step with the rest of America. It won’t be in my lifetime.
Thanks. Everything seems to be going smoothly to plan for Cruz. The notion that Rubio will shake out as the mainstream candidate is probably valid but it elides the risk of suddenly elevating a relatively unproven and occasionally wobbly young talent to a position of considerable prestige, exposure and duress. Does Marco have the ticker for it? We’ll soon see.
Anybody who is not scared shitless of Cruz at every level isn’t paying attention.
A nominated Cruz is one black swan event away from the White House. If anything went terribly wrong like a terrorist attack or an economic crisis he would be right there grinning and earnestly offering our salvation. The oleaginous undertaker of the American dream.
Realistically, the odds of a recession between now and next November are probably 1 in 3. The odds of a significant terrorist event are impossible to be that exact but say 1 in 5.
The far right is closer to having complete power in this country then they have in my life time.
Between Trump and Cruz give me Trump.
Cruz scares me, and I still believe that Trump loses the general as long as the Democratic candidate isn’t totally brain-dead on election day.
I think the difference between Cruz and Trump is that while Trump is seen as an egomaniac and a buffoon, he would be opposed by all Democrats and most Republicans if in office.
Cruz, on the other hand, is more of an establishment candidate as he’s a sitting Senator, and if he were in the White House, he’d be much more like Stalin, where the people who openly give him crap now will keep clapping until everyone else stops. That is what scares me about Cruz.
. . . the American dream.”
Rated “excellent” just for that. Not that the rest isn’t good, too!
Is he any worse than Reagan?
Cruz will not ascend unless and until Trump goes down. And if Trump goes down because the non-Trump Republicans line up behind a candidate, there won’t be any room for Cruz anyway.
If Trump flounces from the race or has an asshole heart attack or has a really juicy scandal (like pictures of him fucking teenage boys) or something, I could see Cruz taking the GOP nomination if the opposition remains in disarray. But otherwise, he just doesn’t have the demographics.
That’s been exactly Cruz’ plan since the beginning; Trump is just a convenient warm-up act. Cruz is the one with ground game and genuine political outreach not beholden to the Republican establishment.
Base insurrections aren’t always bad for the party’s political fortunes. Oftentimes, it’s the establishment that’s out of touch with the country. 1932 (or more pertinently, 1936) was the last gasp of the Old Progressives in the Democratic Party and the New Deal Dems dominated. If Smith or, god forbid, Garner had somehow won the primary* a Republican counterattack would not have been out of the question. Similarly, if Reagan had suffered an asshole heart attack and a cloth coat/old guard Republican won it’s quite possible that Carter, even with stagflation and the Iranian hostage crisis, could’ve won in 1976.
The base insurrection of 1968-1972 was disastrous because, as always, demographics are destiny and the New Left just couldn’t accept the fact that most Americans, then as now, are selfish, putrid, and stupid and their vision of a multicultural, egalitarian America powered by scientific leftist economics was a dreamed as doomed as Willy Loman becoming Ricky Roma.
It’s a bit too early to say what will become of the GOP 2009-present insurrectionists. There was no way for the New Left to wield power, but they still have a few cards to play. By the same token, if they blow their shot in 2020, they’re finished.
*This analogy is inapt because FDR’s pre-Presidential history and profile shows him the epitome of the Old Progressive establishment. His 1932 nomination acceptance speech would put tears of joys in the eyes of Taft, TR, and Wilson. It’s actually pretty damn surprising how much of a modern liberal he was.
Your dates are off. Carter won in 1976 in reaction to Ford’s pardoning of Nixon. He lost in 1980 in reaction substantially to the horrible stagflation and to the Iran hostage crisis. He was also a dreadful downer of a POTUS.
Interesting how many analyses of Carter’s defeat don’t really mention how the public judged Carter’s and the Democratic Party’s actual political policies. Carter is always cast as a good man who would’ve been loved were he not rocked by so many tragic scandals. Even the stagflation bungling is viewed more of a 仕方が無い than something we and thus the public at that time could fairly hold against him.
I’m honestly kind of stunned by this denial-in-depth. Is it really that painful to acknowledge that both the New Left and New Deal Dems were out of touch with the post-American Civil Rights voting base?
I don’t understand this. Are you saying the newly enfranchised and energized black voters elected Reagan?
I think dataguy’s picture of a demoralized electorate choosing between a sitting President, seemingly powerless against a tide of economic dislocation and foeign disaster, and a confident challenger promising radical change, is the correct one. 1980 was 1932 redux.
It’s conventional wisdom that white racists elected Reagan. That’s not what I heard in the Chicago white working class bars. 1968, sure, there were plenty of racists pushing Wallace who were normally Democrats, as was Wallace. But in 1980, memory of the riots had faded to be replaced by fear of homelessness and joblessness. The Democratic agenda was not working. Many decided to try Reagan, not really believing in his economics but willing to try something. When the economy did a cyclical upturn in 1981 (the bottom was in late 1980 just in time for the election) Reaganomics seemed justified. The collapse of the OPEC embargo happened shortly, further propelling the economy.
To the extent that prejudice had an effect in those bars, it was resentment against the “hillbilly”, Carter. The long memory of the Civil War cuts both ways.
I maintain that even if Carter had run a smooth and prosperous Presidency he still would’ve gone down in flames in 1980. Again, the various fuck-ups didn’t help his case but at that point we’re talking about whether it sucks more to be hit with a 4-Megaton bomb or a 10-Megaton Bomb.
OT:
`Misguided missile’: A GOP strategist’s private advice on a Trump nomination
December 2 at 3:20 PM
Donald Trump has become such a force in the Republican Party that the official overseeing next year’s Senate races has proposed a delicate strategy for GOP candidates: Tap into Trumpism without mimicking Trump.
In a seven-page confidential memo that imagines Trump as the party’s presidential nominee, the head of the National Republican Senatorial Committee urges candidates to adopt many of Trump’s tactics, issues and approaches — right down to adjusting the way they dress and how they use Twitter.
………………
In the memo on “the Trump phenomenon,” NRSC Executive Director Ward Baker said Republicans should embrace Trump’s tough talk about China and “grab onto the best elements of [his] anti-Washington populist agenda.” Above all, they should appeal to voters as genuine and beyond the influence of special interests.
“Trump has risen because voters see him as authentic, independent, direct, firm, — and believe he can’t be bought,” Baker writes. “These are the same character traits our candidates should be advancing in 2016. That’s Trump lesson #1.”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/private-memo-lays-out-how-the-gop-would-deal-with-trump-as-i
ts-nominee/2015/12/02/78514cba-9909-11e5-94f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html
I cited that article prominently in the piece.
Honestly, I don’t know if there are any good historical parallels. As this thread shows, everyone can draw their own.
But the one critical factor to consider is that the electorate is very different in 2016 than it was in 1972 (or 1976, or 1988, or 1968).
Notice, I am not relying on demographics here at all, but only on splits between establishment and insurgent campaigns and the loss of control of the process.
But demographics is what separates 1980 insurgencies from being 1972 insurgencies. The only factor, once you think about it.
The New Right had the demographics for an insurgency to wield majority power in absence of black swans. The New Left didn’t. That is the only thing that made the former movement dominant and prescient and the latter movement laughable and quixotic.
The New Left was laughable and quixotic because they had an unrealistic view of human nature, like Karl Marx had. Uncomfortable as the thought is, Benito Mussolini, Adolph Hitler. and Ronald Reagan had a more realistic view of human nature. The New Left appealed to man’s angelic nature. the others appealed to the beast within. The beast always wins.
Demographic analysis is based on slow, progressive changes in the makeup of the electorate, which is totally different from sudden landslide elections that seemingly come out of nowhere.
But demographic analysis is what tells you whether your insurgency will survive or not.
The New Right, as it turned out, was tragically right about being in the majority and the clothcoats outliving their usefulness. The New Left, as it turned out, was tragically wrong about being in the majority and the Dixiecrats outliving their usefulness. Because demographic analysis showed that the former had the voters and the latter didn’t.
That said, insurgents aren’t exactly known for their reflection on whether the public is really on board with their agenda, so maybe it’s a moot point. I’m sure that if the Tea People and Trumpists had incontrovertible proof from time travelers that they were headed to a McGovern-style disaster (with no hope for a resurrection) they’d still march down their death spiral as vigorously as ever.
well, the point is really that the two insurgencies are badly out of step with the electorate. The merits are not my concern here.
Are they, now?
I think that it’s an open question of just how much appeal Trumpism would actually have in a fair fight.
Even with the GOP predictably tanking with racial minorities, Trump could still squeak out a win by sweeping the states that have less than 15% racial minority population… which includes much of the Midwest and Chesapeake.
Neo-confederatism done in Bush (either) or Romney or even Cruz or Buchanan-style won’t do the trick. We ran that experiment in 2012 with favorable conditions and it still lost. However, Trump running on a platform of racial revanchism and genuine economic populism might simultaneously capture the votes of the traditional neo-confederates while also picking up enough white Gen-Xers and Millenials to win states like Iowa and Virginia.
There are two flies in that ointment. The first is whether Trumpism causes the GOP to lose Arizona and/or Texas in 2016 or 2020. If that’s the case then the plan is doomed from the start. There’s not a lot of danger of that happening in 2016 even with a Trump at the ticket, sadly, unless the Democratic Party does the mother of all GOTV efforts.
The second fly in that ointment is that Trump is by far from the best spokesmodel for this kind of campaign. Even granting that Wallace and Perot-style campaigns almost by definition require a political outsider, Trump comes with a lot of baggage that could derail neo-fascism. And there’s also the fact that he’s being increasingly exposed as a phony for the economic populism. He licks Norquist’s boots as hard as any other GOP candidate — even HRC could credibly assault him from the economic left again after his recent moves. A less compromised fascist that was more sincere would be a much riskier proposition.
I’d wait until 2020 to announce the death of the GOP insurgents. Especially if an ineffectual HRC Presidency causes widespread disillusionment with Millenials.
So, if a predictable HRC 2016-2020 leads to a much better shot at a Republican winning in 2020, simply because the Republican isn’t HRC/Democratic, would it be better to have an ineffectual fascist like Trump for 2016-2020, or a much more refined fascist that the Republican party is likely going to have to deal with in 2020?
In essence, is Trump just the first go at an outright fascist, and would it be better if the US got a taste of it with someone like Trump so that a stronger fascist wouldn’t have a chance in 2020?
One genuinely good thing that can be said about the GOP nomination process: it actually does a very good job at filtering out the herrenvolk. To rise in the ranks of the GOP, you have to repeatedly genuflect to the overclass. This completely kills off any credible ‘us versus the minorities and indolent economic elites’ candidate. I don’t think that it’s a coincidence at all that the three most Trump-like candidates were George Wallace, Huey Long, and Ross Perot and they were all marked by a long period of quiet between their flameouts.
So I think that the chances of another anti-establishment fascist in the Trump vein rising in 2020 is pretty low. We’re more likely going to get another Romney-type or if we’re really unlucky a Cruz-type.
However, there’s the genuine worry that the GOP’s elders, noting Trump’s strength and their own blinkered demographics, decides to refine Trump’s playbook (find a less compromised candidate, hide their plutocratic ties, then make a backdoor deal) and roll a rice on fascism. Obviously we’re talking about a last resort of last resorts since fascism isn’t exactly known for being friendly to the old aristocracy — a lot of them will end up with cement shoes under a neo-Trump regime. But on the other hand, a lot of social dominators seem to think that they’re exceptions to the meshing maws of violent social darwinism.
only internet progressives could think that losing an election is a win for their cause
And only centrists think that pyrrhic victories are something to be goose-stepped towards with pride.
Listen: if you want to make the argument that having the mafia torture you to death for non-payment in three months is better than starving to death in the streets after you refused to get a payday loan, then make that argument. But it’s annoying how centrists don’t even try to acknowledge the possibility that a victory now can lead to a much more painful defeat later.
It appears that “winning the battle but losing the war” never occurred to Jim.
it’s funny how conservatives never suggest losing is going to further their cause
You win a war by winning battles not losing them
Ha! You should listen to them more. Modern American conservatives use 1976 and especially 1964 as examples where a defeat led to a greater long-term victory than accepting an immediate moderated victory.
This is above and beyond the fact that conservatives look quite likely to self-destruct as a result of their midterm success. The long-term prospect is that they’re demographically doomed for Presidential elections and need to rebrand — but the problem is that their current platform and brand makes midterms very lucrative, so they can’t bring themselves to rebrand.
What a naive and simplistic view of war. The Vietcong lost the vast majority of battles with the US, but they were still able to win the war by minimizing the scale of defeats until the proper opportunity came up. If they were launching Tet Offensives nonstop they would’ve self-destructed.
No one should care if you win or lose individual battles as long as the long-term outcome has you winning. So if an individual battle has you losing later ones as the price of victory, instead of fighting it anyway and hoping for the best you should be looking for ways to endure and counterattacks.
Yes. Not unlike how Democrats/liberals have been “fighting” to retain “Roe” while the opposition has accepted plenty of small defeats but won enough of them that it’s ever so much more difficult for women to access abortion medical care than it was forty years ago. And accessing that care, and not the safety of the procedure, is the real and present danger for women today.
OT: OH WELL..
shrug.
you built it. you keep him.
…………..
The one sentence that shows how worried Senate Republicans are about Donald Trump
By Amber Phillips December 3 at 7:30 AM
“If he carries this message into the general election in Ohio, we’ll hand this election to Hillary Clinton — and then try to salvage the rest of the ticket.”
That’s a quote from Matt Borges, chairman of the Republican Party in Ohio. He’s just one of several Republican operatives who recently told Jonathan Martin of the New York Times just how concerned they are that Republicans’ chances of keeping a hold of the U.S. Senate are inversely related to Donald Trump’s chances of getting the nomination.
Borges is in the thick of that right now. He’s trying to keep Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio) in office in what is already a competitive reelection race in a presidential battleground state.
https:/www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/03/the-one-sentence-that-shows-how-worried-se
nate-republicans-are-about-donald-trump?tid=pm_politics_pop_b
Sorry, I couldn’t help thinking, as I read this excellent analysis, that Clinton could be Nixon in this scenario. Sadly, she might be more like him than we know.
If she wins 49 states, I think I might have a higher opinion of her than I do of Nixon.
Just guessing here.
Clearly I don’t. That’s my point.
It also depends on what happens in the Congressional elections next year. Hillary Clinton plus a Democratic Congress will be very different from Hillary Clinton plus a Republican Congress.
OT:Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel Is Throwing Anyone Within Arm’s Reach Under the Bus
He’s determined that someone else will go down for the city’s mishandling of the Laquan McDonald shooting.
BY CHARLES P. PIERCE
DEC 3, 2015 @ 10:28 AM
Over the past two decades or so, I’ve decided that there is no more inexcusable a figure in our national politics than Rahm Emanuel, who is, for the moment, the mayor of Chicago, but also someone who, throughout his entire career, has made it quite clear that he believes political power derives from being as much of a dick as possible to the people who ostensibly are on your side. He is angry and profane, but he also remains utterly graceless and completely without charm. He alienated enough people while he was working for Bill Clinton that his tenure in the White House was shorter than it would have been otherwise. In 2006, when Howard Dean’s 50-state strategy delivered the Democratic Party a whopping victory in the midterm elections, he climbed over the people who did the real work to claim credit for the landslide. (And he succeeded: he is what passes in the political elite for a “tough guy” because he says “fuck” a lot. Google “Rahm Emanuel 2006” sometime.)
He was insufferable as a member of the House of Representatives, where the standards are designed by the Constitution to be pretty damned high. His hiring as White House chief-of-staff was probably the worst personnel mistake the Obama Administration made in its early days. As mayor of Chicago, he’s managed to be so horrible to the city’s public school teachers that a couple of them went on hunger strike. He got re-elected because he strategically has not been a dick to anyone who would contribute a fat check to his campaigns. Now, though, he has his ass in a crack because the Chicago Police Department is running amok (again), and it looks like Emanuel put his re-election prospects ahead of telling the parents of Laquan McDonald how their son came to get shot 16 times by a Chicago patrolman.
http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a40161/rahm-emanuel-laquan-mcdonald/
geez so many people’s comments on this and other threads are depressing — everything suck, it’s getting worse, and there’s nothing we can do about it because everyone’s corrupt except for Bernie but since he’ll have to work with all these corrupt politicians nothing will change.
Does that about sum up the mood around here?
No, it’s not. The most obvious, and very defining difference, it that an incumbent President isn’t running in 2016. So, are there parallels between 1972 and 2012? No.
At the national level, a whole lot of stuff happened and was done by those in power in the prior dozen years between 1960 and 1972. Comparatively little has happened or been done in the past dozen years.
The focus on Muskie seems odd to me. Historically, there seems to be but one instance of a losing VP nominee subsequently winning a Presidential election. The odds may be less than 50% to even secure that subsequent nomination. In recent times, only Dole and Mondale accomplished that. Warren, (Lodge sort-of) Muskie, Quayle, Lieberman, and Edwards failed. Palin fantasized about a run; who knows if Ferraro had any fantasies. Too soon to tell with Ryan.
(Also note that HHH was a serious candidate in 1972 with significant support among party elites. As if the rematches in 1948 and 1956 had produced a different result.)
There is a structural parallel between 1972 and 2016, but that appears only to have impacted one party and mixes with the prior bitter loss in the 1968 and 2012 elections. 1968 and the DEM Chicago convention led to reforming the nomination process and rules. That whittled away at the power of local, state, and national party “bosses.” (In ’68 HHH didn’t run in and therefore, didn’t win a single primary.)
Various factions of the DEM party elites were aghast at this demonstration of democracy. Even though McGovern was fully in line with DEM political icons that were much loved by the party elites — FDR, Stevenson, and JFK. I would add LBJ because he did attempt to bring the disaster in Vietnam to an end. (HHH was also more like McGovern than the other ’72 contender Jackson.) So, they sulked, sat on their hands, and/or aided and abetted the reelection of Nixon. They may also have plotted how to “get their party back,” but they sucked at that as well. Meanwhile, Republican voters and party elites were completely satisfied with their nominee and seemed oblivious to the fact that Nixon was despicable.
The 2016 structural change is CU. (Came to late to get really rolling for the 2012 election.) The GOP elders are aghast at this demonstration of anti-democracy (the buying of an election by a few mega-billionaires) that they don’t control. Unlike the DEM party in the run-up to the ’72 election, the GOP has been stoking and feeding their little monsters since 1968. Never expecting them to wander off the rez.
One intra-party difference in 2016, so far, is that the GOP elites have been careful to denigrate the experience, character, etc. of the GOP candidates that they loathe and not attack the supporters of those candidates. They can’t afford to lose those rubes. Not such restrained was practiced by the DEM party in ’68, ’72, or anytime since then. The “hippie” punching continues. Even on DEM/liberal blogs. Doesn’t matter that the track record of DFHs has been far more correct than that of the DEM party over the decades. Two examples, after the ’64 GOP debacle and ’92 loss, the GOP moved on. They didn’t spend years blaming GOP voter defections to Perot or that there was anything wrong with the GOP primary voters that insisted on nominating Goldwater. Compare that to partisan Democrats that still blame “Nader voters” for Gore’s “loss.” Blame the DFHs has become part of the DEM DNA.
If I’d wanted a neoliberalcon in 1972, Scoop Jackson would have been my man. The lipstick doesn’t improve the product all these decades later for me.
. . . I was really taken aback by the overall positive (I’m tempted to write “fawning”, but I’ll restrain myself) words about Broder being
during the 1972-1974 timeframe.
I found that jarring in the context of my longstanding disdain of Broder as one of the worst exemplars of Beltway political media’s immensely harmful practice of constructing a herd “narrative” through which “reporting” is then filtered.
To whatever extent my understanding of this phenomenon is valid, that owes a large debt to Bob Somerby (dailyhowler.com), who delivers the goods here, quoting Paul Waldman in 2011 to document what Broder “reported” in 1972 realtime:
It’s now conventional wisdom that this incident (or more to the point, the Beltway Village media’s portrayal of it) was pivotal: a, if not indeed the major turning point in the “collapse” of the Muskie campaign that you describe. Yet in your Broder excerpt, he neglects to disclose his own (along with his Village media cohort’s) pivotal role in bringing about that collapse.
(Somerby has elsewhere documented a subsequent admission by Broder that the Villagers had decided amongst themselves that Muskie was somehow too unstable, thus unfit for the Presidency, and this was the incident they chose to insert that notion into the media herd narrative that took Muskie down. In other [my!] words, much as with Bush and Gore, the Village “reporters” reached their own judgments regarding the candidates’ “character”/fitness, then usurped voters’ ability to form our own judgments by filtering their “reporting” through the chosen narrative. Notably, it was likewise Broder who with appropriate Villager disdain infamously said of that Trailer Trash President Clinton:
[clearly implied: ” . . . it’s ours!])
In which context it is rather gobsmacking to see Broder (again courtesy Somerby, same link, emphasis his) say this in the Washington Monthly, 15 years later, and still without disclosing his own original, primary role in pushing the “Muskie cried” narrative:
So to the notion of there having been a “height” of Broder’s “reportorial powers” in that ’72-’74 timeframe . . . or indeed ever . . . I can only conclude, “meh!”
My basic read is that the GOP has gotten to the point where it’s impossible for a Republican to even become a prominent candidate, much less win the nomination, without aggressively and vehemently declaring their purity of essence. I have no trouble believing that a candidate with a truly radical or fascistic ideology could be elected as President. I have trouble believing that such a candidate could be elected without quite a lot of very clever “softening” and cunning ceremonial humbug. Which has to start before the convention. I just can’t see it with guys who are out and proud extremists. Reagan was ideologically quite extreme for his time (no longer unfortunately) but he famously had a sunny and optimistic pitch. GWB ran as a compassionate conservative and salt of the earth regular guy you’d like to have a beer with in a contest about nothing, not so much a raging xenophobe (and he didn’t even win!)
It seems the structural conflict in GOP funding is reflected in the fact that it appears impossible for any candidate to bridge the divide between extremist rhetoric and national plausibility.
I could imagine a crazy world where Trump gets to slide on his naked fascism because he’s in the Tyson-zone and can get away with almost anything. I think he’d probably be a political disaster as the nominee but America is quite insane so who knows. I suspect Cruz’s gleeful embrace of Trumpism has something to do with seeing Trump as an ice-breaker he can draft off of (to mix metaphors). But in general, I can’t imagine anyone other than maybe Trump pulling off a start to finish run as the Tea-bagger in chief. I still think you have to be able to sell “Presidential” on some level, and that doesn’t get done by ranting about baby parts or whatever the outrage of the day is. In other words, the Republican primary process now appears to be encouraging behaviors diametrically opposed to those which would convey, purely on the showbiz level, genuine presidential appeal.
Unless, of course, Hillary runs a national level Martha Coakley-style campaign, which I think is unlikely but who knows.