The assassination of Qassem Soleimani was highly questionable from an international law perspective, and extremely dubious as a strategic decision. Those are interesting angles to explore, but I want to focus more on what the man was doing with his life before he lost it.

A simple explanation is that he was simply defending the Iran regime’s interests (and their Islamic revolutionary vision) in the region. But that formulation elides more than it explains. There’s a moral dimension to both Iran’s vision and Soleimani’s tactical and strategic decision-making that goes beyond simple national self-interest.

I don’t come at these questions with a pro- or anti-Israeli bias, nor with any preference between Sunni and Shi’a, Arab or Persian. I’m generally in favor of self-determination for all nations and peoples, and I advocate religious moderation, tolerance, and pluralism. So, there are many aspects of Iranian self-interest that I’m inclined to respect, but my overall impression of their regime is entirely negative. Where I have any sympathy for them at all that isn’t applicable to any nation and any alternative Iranian government, it’s in a recognition that their adversaries are not better, and are often worse.

Anything critical I have to say about the Mullah-run government in Tehran, I could say probably with more force about the Kingdom of the Sauds. Without question, the Taliban fail every test I have for religious tolerance and moderation.

As for America having any say in how these different groups govern their people, that’s also a very complicated question that could merit its own discussion.

As things stand, we’re enmeshed in the region and cannot be indifferent to the decisions that are made there. On that score, Soleimani was possibly the most problematic actor on the stage. I say that, in part, because of his tremendous cynicism. Nowhere was this more on display that in his willingness to use Sunni radicals to further his schemes. He sheltered al-Qaeda figures before unleashing them on us in Iraq. He told Assad in Syria to let them transit to Iraq and then used the predictable civil war to convince the Iraqis to seek his protection. He sheltered behind their radicalism to prop up Assad as the protector of religious minorities and moderates in Syria, but he funded the same groups in Palestine. You can call this genius because it surprised his enemies and was so effective, but it came at a staggering cost in lives and refugees and destruction.

As an Iranian general tasked with preventing the U.S. from setting up shop in Iraq and gathering strength to take down his own government, he certainly faced difficult choices but I don’t think this can justify many of the decisions he made. I believe this, in part, because I don’t share the belief that the government of Iran as it is presently constituted deserves to be saved. But I also say it because Soleimani was engaged in more than self-defense. His project was highly sectarian in nature, and aimed at expanding Iran’s influence beyond its borders. In this latter sense, his indifference to human suffering (exemplified by the civil war and humanitarian crisis in Syria), can be condemned without the mitigating considerations involved in protecting his home regime.

In general, I think Iran’s regional dominance, which was achieved primarily through Soleimani’s astounding cynicism and generalship (with a major assist from President George W. Bush), needs to be rolled back if there is going to be a semblance of peace achieved in the Middle East. I don’t know that America has the first clue how to accomplish this, nor do I think the Americans are the best “deciders” in this instance, but Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq would all be better off with less Iranian control over events.

If eliminating Soleimani furthered this objective in some ways, it would make it less of a reckless act to have assassinated him, but it’s hard to see how this is supposed to work. In the short term, Iraq responded by asking America to leave. That has plenty of merit in many ways, but it would actually strengthen Iran’s dominance in Baghdad. It would also strengthen their position in Syria and, thus, Lebanon. It would probably help ISIS regenerate, which would, as it has in the past, push Iraqis and Syrians into Iran’s arms for protection.

And that gets to the available alternatives to Iranian dominance. If it’s ISIS or similarly radical Sunni groups, that’s good for no one. If it’s pretty much the same kind of folks, but just pro- rather than anti-Saudi Royal Family, it’s hard to see that as preferable.

When we step back like this and look at the problem from a wider perspective, it’s easier to see why killing Soleimani was unlikely to make matters better either for America or for the people of the region.

Ideally, countries like Iraq, Syria and Lebanon should enjoy self-determination rather than suffering as battlegrounds in a sectarian fight between extreme visions of Islam. In that sense, the less aggressive Iran is in those countries, the less aggressive the pushback will be. But, as cunning and amoral as he was, Soleimani was merely a soldier in a larger war, and the incentives driving both sides won’t be altered by his absence.

A solution would involve both sides, so getting Iran to focus more inward would help but wouldn’t be sufficient unless the Sunni radicals did the same. Unfortunately, since the time of the Russian-Afghan War, the Saudis have sought to do anything to prevent their own radicals from looking inward.

I’d like to believe that the protestors in the streets of Iran could bring an end to their revolutionary government. I think that would be the most hopeful development possible. I can picture a moderate Iran focused on the well-being of its own citizens rather than waging some regional Holy War. And that’s something I can’t say about Saudi Arabia.