Based on two decades of evidence, it isn’t possible to defeat the Taliban using occupying forces. At the same time, the evidence strongly suggests that Afghanistan cannot sustain itself without impossible levels of foreign aid. A government that oversees famine and cannot keep the lights on is not going to be successful, and that means that Afghanistan needs generous patrons.

On Tuesday, the Taliban made some announcements about who will serve in some ministerial positions in their government, and some of their choices are going to cause problems.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, a deputy leader of the Taliban insurgency and the leader of the terrorist-listed Haqqani Network, was named as acting minister of the interior. And Mawlawi Muhammad Yaqoob, who is the oldest son of the Taliban’s founding leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, was named acting defense minister.

The Haqqani clan and Mullah Omar’s family are not people the United States are prepared to shower with aid. That probably goes too for the rest of the NATO coalition that fought in Afghanistan. In fact, I don’t think there are any countries other than Pakistan that are eager to buddy up these characters, although I assume Russia and China will open their checkbooks.

I don’t trust Indian sources to be objective when it comes to Pakistan, but India Today argues that the Haqqani Network is fronting for them. If their reporting is correct, it looks like the Taliban has already bent to Pakistan’s wishes. This can be seen not only in the appointment of Sirajuddin Haqqani as minister of interior, but in the surprising appointment of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as the acting deputy leader of the council of ministers. It was expected that Baradar would get the top job.

Pakistan’s support to the Haqqani network signals how, through its military intelligence wing, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Pakistani military establishment intends to control power, according to intelligence assessments…

…It is believed that ISI wants to place members of the Haqqani network in key positions, but Taliban factions with Mullah Abdul Baradar don’t want this to happen.

If the Haqqani network enjoys power in the Taliban regime, Pakistan can use it to its advantage and also neutralise India’s influence in the country. The Haqqani network had targeted the Indian embassy in Kabul earlier.

There are also reports of a power tussle, and this even led to a clash where Mullah Baradar was injured.

Again, I don’t know if Mullah Baradar was truly injured, but I can see that he won’t be the serving as the effective prime minister. It seems that he lost the argument with the Haqqanis. For what it’s worth, you can see why the Department of National Intelligence treats the Haqqanis as a terrorist organization here.

The international community doesn’t want a famine in Afghanistan or a new massive exodus of refugees, and this gives the new government in Kabul some leeway that wouldn’t otherwise be afforded based on the Taliban’s prior record in power. But they seem to be squandering their chance to project a more tolerant and inclusive face.

One way to defeat the Taliban is to let them have power but refuse to help them. It’s a cynical ploy, especially because it involves standing by while a lot of people suffer. The New York Times explains:

Running a government will most likely prove more daunting than toppling one. To succeed, the Taliban will need to secure desperately needed aid, which has been frozen by the United States and other nations. Foreign governments and lenders are waiting to see the fate of the opposition and if rights for women and ethnic and religious minorities will be respected.

Without that money, the government faces worsening challenges, including humanitarian and economic crises that have forced Afghans to flee. Basic services like electricity are under threat, and the United Nations warned that food aid would run out by the end of the month for hundreds of thousands of Afghans.

It should be noted, however, that the United States and its allies did not choose this path. They were forced out by 20 years of futile efforts to stand up a government that could run the country. To avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, the new Taliban government needs to, in a sense, give donor nations permission to be of assistance, and bowing to Pakistan and the Haqqani Network denies them that permission.

So it appears that the Taliban will soon have a famine on their hands, and that’s going to negate the domestic good will they’ve established by putting an end to the fighting.

To be fair, the Haqqanis are probably powerful enough militarily that the Taliban have no choice but to include them in the government, but that’s not going to make the job of feeding the people any easier. I don’t think the Taliban will last in power but, since this entails more unrest and civil war, it’s not something we can characterize as good news for the Afghan people. There is nothing but suffering in their near future, with or without the Taliban.

America may not have to suffer the indignity of a Taliban government for long, but that won’t do much to improve our legacy in Afghanistan.