I read Sen. Josh Hawley’s explanation for why he will vote against bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO. It makes me suspicious.

On the surface, it’s a well-written and mostly well-reasoned essay on how best to allocate limited American resources. In Hawley’s opinion, which is widely shared in the Biden administration, China is more of a strategic and military threat than Russia, and our response is under-resourced. For Hawley, if we have to choose, it’s better to add resources to the Far East than to Scandinavia.

The thing is, you can believe this and still honor and support Sweden and Finland’s desire to join NATO. Even if you agree that more money and military resources should be committed to containing and deterring China, it’s not at all clear that this should be paid for by denying Sweden and Finland’s request. So, the heart of Hawley’s argument isn’t really about China at all. It’s about Europe.

Hawley argues more broadly that we’re underprepared in the Far East because we’ve been too focused on the Middle East and “legacy commitments to Europe.”

In the face of this stark reality, we must choose. We must do less in Europe (and elsewhere) in order to prioritize China and Asia.

There are lot of ways we could “do less in Europe.” For Hawley, though, the main way is by keeping the NATO membership status quo. That, of course, wouldn’t result in any cost savings at all so no new money would be available to combat China. What Hawley really wants is for European countries to contribute more of their GDP to defense spending so that America can get savings for Asian reallocation.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has already created political support for more defense spending in NATO countries, so this longstanding American complaint (voiced by several administrations and most stridently and incoherently by Trump) is in the process of being rectified. Theoretically, when Germany doubles its defense spending overnight, the U.S. can spend correspondingly less, although that would defeat the purpose of adding deterrence to Vladimir Putin. Let’s just say, American could spend somewhat less, or take the savings and apply them both to China and to any increased costs for Sweden and Finland.

As to those increased costs, Hawley says this:

As to Sweden and Finland, both nations are advanced economies, with capable militaries. But they haven’t yet made the policy commitments appropriate to their geostrategic positions. Sweden doesn’t spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense and won’t for years to come. And Finland, though it announced a one-time defense spending boost, hasn’t made clear whether it will sustain these levels. In the event of a future conflict in Europe, U.S. forces would almost certainly be called in to defend both countries.

And even absent armed conflict, NATO expansion would almost certainly mean more U.S. forces in Europe for the long haul, more military hardware devoted there, and more dollars spent—to the detriment of our security needs in Asia, to say nothing of needs at home.

This analysis completely dismisses the possibility that Sweden and Finland would improve NATO’s response to any future conflict with Russia in Europe, thereby making victory more likely and less costly. Hawley says Sweden and Finland’s inclusion in NATO would “almost certainly” create more expense, larger American troop commitments, and require more military equipment, but both countries would be adding their manpower and equipment from their “capable militaries,” which would seem to offer the possibility of America needing to commit less of their own. Hawley doesn’t address this scenario at all.

When I add up all of Hawley’s arguments, I come up with a bunch of unconvincing rationales for why he’s going to cast his vote against Sweden and Finland. Denying them entry to NATO cannot be justified by the threat of Chinese aggression alone. Hawley is mainly using this piece to argue that America is too committed to Europe in general, but his ideas for cost savings aren’t well-developed or documented. He advances the idea that NATO members are deadbeats who don’t dedicate enough resources to their own defense, while ignoring that this is rapidly changing. In fact, Sweden and Finland have been the ultimate freeloaders by benefiting from NATO deterrence while not formally joining the alliance. That they now want to make that commitment should be seen as a positive.

If there’s an argument against Sweden and Finland, it’s that their inclusion in NATO might make a military conflict with Russia more, rather than less, likely, and that America would be formally committed to come to their defense. As things stand now, however, it’s hard to envision how Russia could invade Scandinavia without starting a war with NATO. So far, the invasion of non-NATO Ukraine has not resulted in outright war with Russia, but Finnish or Swedish sovereignty would be a bridge too far. In any case, Hawley doesn’t focus much on this threat, saying only that we’d “almost certainly be called in to defend both countries” which could be expensive.

Of course, NATO expansion for Sweden and Finland doesn’t depend on Hawley’s vote, and the people of Missouri are unlikely to see the issue as a top priority in Hawley’s next reelection bid. The audience for this piece is the Trump-supporting MAGA crowd which is now objectively anti-NATO,  anti-China, and pro-Russia.

If Trump raised suspicion by consistently taking the Kremlin line in international affairs, Hawley appears ready to carry that banner forward. And I just want to know why.