It can be tiresome responding to what seems like constant trolling from Jonathan Chait, but he’s correct that the Democrats’ electoral labor policies have failed. The thing is, I don’t believe he’s identified the real problem. It’s true that the Biden administration was extremely labor-friendly and that he and Kamala Harris did not get rewarded for their efforts with union votes. For Chait, a big part of the explanation is that Biden’s deference to labor exacerbated inflation which turned working people against him. I’d counter that this was a relatively small part of the problem, and also one that doesn’t necessarily matter anymore.
Let me stipulate that inflation, more than any other factor, destroyed Biden’s political support. If you want to retroactively and reluctantly give former West Virginia Sen. Joe Manchin some credit for understanding the threat posed by inflation, I’ll give you that. But it’s a problem that will always affect incumbents far more than challengers. The people feel high prices and get angry with the status quo. They don’t move against the causes of inflation because the causes are hard to identify. They just seek change. This was an albatross for Biden and Harris, but it’s Trump’s problem now. The vast majority of “inflation voters” will seek change again this November and most likely next November, too. So, in this sense, the Democrats don’t have to do anything to become the beneficiaries of higher costs. What this also means is that labor policies that contribute to inflation actually help the left in the current political climate, even if they hurt them in the most recent elections.
But even as I agree that inflation was a disaster for Biden that cost the Democrats union votes, I want to be clear that this wasn’t any different from why the party lost non-union working class votes. Whether fairly or not, in 2024, the Republicans succeeded in convincing a growing percentage of working class voters or all races that the Democrats were obsessed with helping different voters. High prices made this easier, but so did an obsession with forgiving college loans but not car or truck loans.
While Biden was backing labor at every turn, many union workers were deluged with stories of unrestrained illegal immigration and prisoners getting gender reassignment surgery at taxpayer expense. Health policies that kept a lid on the coronavirus worked fairly well for people who could work from home with a computer and provide structure for their kids to do remote learning, but were a big problem for folks who couldn’t work from home or afford the day care schools provide. There were many substantive reasons for people to be unhappy during the pandemic and its immediate aftermath, especially among working class voters. To compensate for this, the incumbent party would have had to find a way to convince folks that they were on their side, and the Democrats failed.
In a post-pandemic environment where the Republicans are in charge and responsible, much of this is flipped onto them. But the movement to the right of working class voters, whether unionized or not, is a longer term problem. A big part of this comes not from inflation but also losses in the media and culture wars. Yet, there’s a substantive part, too, and this is where Chait’s analysis is not just wrong but dangerous.
While we can all point, like Chait, to discrete labor policies that are stupid and self-defeating, the reality is that things keep getting objectively worse for working folks. This is not the fault of unions, but unions have failed to prevent it. To convince working people that the Democrats are serious about helping them, they can’t keep pointing to their union support and think that will be adequate.
In some sense, this should be a no-brainer. The Republican Party is getting so much support from working class folks that they’re beginning to consider themselves a working class party. But this is not because their policies are labor friendly or help working class people improve their lot. It’s for the very simple reason that the GOP has convinced many of these people that the Democrats don’t care about them. The Democrats care about college loans. They care about abortion or LGBT issues or the environment. And the point is not that all working class voters side with the Republicans on these issues because they certainly do not. The reason it’s so effective should be apparent to any parent with more than one child. A jealous child doesn’t expect his parents to mistreat his brothers and sisters, but he doesn’t want them to get the most attention, either. Most of all, they don’t want to feel less-than or ignored.
I agree with Chait that the Democrats sometimes have to disagree with labor unions for both substantive and political reasons. But the bigger issue can be seen in the fact that the Dems did not get credit with labor for being so friendly to labor. People give more credit to what they feel than what is objectively true. So, the first thing is that if you want to win the support of voters you have to make them feel like their interests are near the very top of your agenda.
And then the second thing, and this is what Chait really seems not to understand, is that the Democrats would do better as champions of labor if unions were more effective in delivering results to its members. It’s any irony that the more the right weakens labor the more support they get, but it’s still an unavoidable truth.
So, the answer is to identify policies that will stop and reverse the slide of life quality for working folks, and then to relentlessly tell them that you’re on their side and that they are your top priority.
The old union model might not ever work politically the way it used to, but success is not necessarily about unions. It’s about working people in general. We won’t win them back by more often saying ‘no’ to unions. That is not some secret ingredient for success.
If you want a secret ingredient, the Republicans have already provided it. You have to convince people you’re on their side and that the other party doesn’t give a shit about them. This should actually be easier for the Dems than it was for the GOP because it’s much closer to being the plain truth.
Really good and thoughtful post, thanks. A couple of additional thoughts:
1) Chicago labor lawyer/author Thomas Geoghegan identified the fundamental challenge facing unions 35 years ago in his terrific and highly readable book, “Which Side Are You On? Trying to Be for Labor When It’s Flat on Its Back”. The challenge is that, as a practical matter, every tactic labor organizers used successfully to organize millions of workers into unions in the 1930s and 40s is now illegal. It’s important for non-labor liberals to wrap their heads around this reality…not because it will change anything in the short term, but because it is a prerequisite to any sensible discussion about how to move forward.
2) There are Democrats who have figured out (or seem to be figuring out) how to talk persuasively to and with working-class voters. Mamdani’s approach has been to focus relentlessly on the cost of living. It’s not that he *doesn’t* talk about abortion or LGBTQ rights or climate change; it’s that the cost of living is the lens through which he talks about almost everything. And he does it with wit and humor and personality, in a way that fits *his* personality. Kentucky governor Andy Beshear has figured out an approach that works for him in connecting with working-class voters in his state. Graham Platner, an oyster farmer, disabled veteran, and first-time candidate faces an uphill climb to win the Democratic nomination to face Susan Collins next fall, but he’s already convinced some long-time Maine political observers that if he does, he can beat her. Again, there’s no magic formula that will work for every candidate and constituency. But 1) listening to what working-class voters are saying about why they voted for Trump, and 2) making that the centerpiece of your campaign seems like the most promising way to go.
Politics is downstream of culture, and the reality is that union support for Democrats is down because of culture wars, and Dems will continue to lose the culture wars without a strong presence in the current online media environment.
I have a theory that the intrinsic disposition of the online social media sphere is to favor content that is reactionary, either right populist or far left populist. This is poison to liberal democratic states, because democracy is not a normal state of existence. Algorithms reward tribalism and reinforce identity and discourage any longer term thinking, preferring short term fears. Until center left or even center right parties learn to deal with this new reality, we will continue to lose. And by we I mean liberal democratic states across the globe.